A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Game-theoretic properties of Final-Offer Arbitration

Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA) is a dispute settlement procedure in which an arbitrator chooses one side's final position as the resolution. Game-theoretic models of FOA in two-sided interest disputes are reviewed, especially models of the disputants' final offer choices under uncertainty about the arbitrator's preferences. The extent to which the Brams-Merrill Theorem (1986) reveals optimal strategic behavior under FOA, and the implications for efficiency and equity, are assessed. Analysis of a model not satisfying the hypotheses of the Theorem suggests that, for some arbitrators, FOA can have an undesirable tendency. Another game model is used to address the question of how disputants' differential risk-aversion is reflected in their strategic behavior, and in the fairness of FOA outcomes. This calculation clarifies some apparently contradictory empirical evidence about FOA.     

关于基尼系数若干问题的再研究--与部分学者商榷

基尼系数是测量收入不平等的一个重要指标，近年来有很多学者对此进行了深入研究，本文主要对有关学者的研究内容进行商榷与补充。首先，实际计算基尼系数应首选离散公式，并且根据具体的抽样方法选择无偏或有效的估计公式；其次，本文论证了对数正态分布下基尼系数G与标准差d的关系式：G=2Ф（σ/√2）-1；再次，针对基尼系数存在的不足，改进基尼系数成为一些学者的研究重点，本文发现一些改进并没有解决基尼系数与洛伦茨曲线的非一一对应问题，并且可操作性较差，通过介绍S基尼系数和E基尼系数，本文说明了基尼系数改进的总体思路；最后，针对学者提出的“部分分布决定性定理（PD定理）”，本文论证了其推理过程中存在的问题，说明该定理是错误的。     

Reduced Form Auctions Revisited

This note uses the Theorem of the Alternative to prove new results on the implementability of general, asymmetric auctions, and to provide simpler proofs of known results for symmetric auctions. The tradeoff is that type spaces are taken to be finite.     

Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis

Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation – mandatory disclosure of information. While information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior – often resulting in lower levels of pollution – little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome a lack of information on the part of the public. We characterize the conditions under which information disclosure will lead to a reduction in emissions, and ultimately, the conditions under which it will enhance social welfare. Several extensions of the model are briefly explored, including the effect of two sources of pollution – only one of which is subject to information disclosure. This paper was prepared while V. Santhakumar was a Visiting Scholar at the Vanderbilt Center for Environmental Management Studies, Vanderbilt University.     

论传统外部性理论解决环境代际外部性的失效

代际外部性问题主要是人类代际之间行为的相互影响,尤其是前代对后代、当代对后代的影响。在解决代际外部性上,施害者、受害者和政府生活在不同的时空中,新古典方法几乎就无能为力。产权的界定是在产权主体存在的前提下进行的,所以产权在代际进行界定是不可能实现的,所以通过科斯定理来消除代际的外部性也行不通。     

THE CASE FOR A COMMUNITY TRANSACTION ENGINE: GETTING COASE FOR THE TWENTY‐FIRST CENTURY

New types of marketplace are now becoming viable. They can slash transaction costs, bring new resources into the economy and expand economic opportunity. These markets can be grown by the private sector. But, to deliver their full potential, they need a change in the mindset of government.     

Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games

We propose the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games and prove that these strategies are outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed Ellsberg strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. In addition, we show that not only the profile of Ellsberg strategies must be appropriately chosen but also the extensive form must satisfy further restrictions beyond those implied by perfect recall in order to ensure that each player will respect his ex ante strategy choice with the evolution of play.     

On Minimally-supported <Emphasis Type="Italic">D</Emphasis>-optimal Designs for Polynomial Regression with Log-concave Weight Function

This paper studies minimally-supported D-optimal designs for polynomial regression model with logarithmically concave (log-concave) weight functions. Many commonly used weight functions in the design literature are log-concave. For example, and exp(−x ²) in Theorem 2.3.2 of Fedorov (Theory of optimal experiments, 1972) are all log-concave. We show that the determinant of information matrix of minimally-supported design is a log-concave function of ordered support points and the D-optimal design is unique. Therefore, the numerically D-optimal designs can be constructed efficiently by cyclic exchange algorithm.