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311.
Summary. This paper examines the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of a Bertrand model of price competition where firms supply all demand. When firms are asymmetric we prove existence and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. For symmetric firms, we show that an equilibrium is necessarily unique. We also examine whether this unique equilibrium outcome is implementable through a sequential move game where the firms take turns at announcing prices. Finally we examine the limiting property of such equilibria as the number of firms go to infinity.Received: 20 March 2002, Revised: 5 August 2003JEL Classification Numbers:
D43, D41, L13.Correspondence to: Kunal SenguptaWe are deeply indebted to an anonymous referee for very helpful and incisive comments that led to substantial improvements in the paper. We also gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of the Department of Finance, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology where much of the work on this paper was carried out. 相似文献
312.
Bryan Engelhardt 《Journal of Economic Policy Reform》2016,19(1):65-76
The externalities associated with political contributions imply agents choose a socially inefficient level. A typical market solution to these externalities would involve Coase bargaining where agents form contracts with payments conditional on the actions of others. These contracts, however, are hard to enforce because political contributions can be unobservable or unmeasurable. In this study, we modify these Coasian contracts, making the payments conditional on the outcome of the political election. We show the agents that form these contracts contribute the socially efficient amount. 相似文献
313.
Javier López-Bernardo Félix López-Martínez Engelbert Stockhammer 《Review of Political Economy》2016,28(2):190-204
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty presents a rich set of data that deals with income and wealth distribution, output-wealth dynamics and rates of return. He also proposes some ‘laws of capitalism’. At the core of his argument lies the ‘fundamental inequality of capitalism’, an empirical regularity stating that the rate of return on wealth is greater than the growth rate of the economy. This simple construct allows him to conclude that increasing wealth (and income) inequality is an inevitable outcome of capitalism. While we share some of his conclusions, we will highlight some shortcomings of his approach based on a Cambridge post-Keynesian growth-and-distribution model. The paper makes four points. First, r?>?g is not necessarily associated with increasing inequality in functional distribution. Second, Piketty succumbs to a fallacy of composition when he claims that a necessary condition for r?>?g is that capitalists save a large share of their capital income. Third, post-Keynesians can learn from Piketty's insights about personal income distribution and incorporate them into their models. Fourth, we reiterate the post-Keynesian argument that a well-behaved aggregate production function does not exist and cannot explain income distribution. 相似文献
314.
We consider the Cox regression model and study the asymptotic global behavior of the Grenander-type estimator for a monotone baseline hazard function. This model is not included in the general setting of Durot (2007). However, we show that a similar central limit theorem holds for Lp-error of the Grenander-type estimator. As an illustration of application of our main result, we propose a test procedure for a Weibull baseline distribution, based on the Lp-distance between the Grenander estimator and a parametric estimator of the baseline hazard. Simulation studies are performed to investigate the performance of this test. 相似文献
315.
排污权交易的经济分析 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
陈安国 《石家庄经济学院学报》2002,25(4):392-394
排污权交易是按照科斯定理而制定的基于市场机制的行之有效的污染控制手段。实行排污权交易的结果是污染的治理主要由边际治理成本较低的企业来完成,从而优化了资源配置,有利于社会总产值的提高。排污权交易便于政府进行污染物的总量控制,有助于推动企业进行污染控制技术的革新,实施清洁生产,也有利于环境保护与经济的协调发展,应尽快在我国推广。 相似文献
316.
在国有企业实现公司制改造的过程中,基于所有权与经营权分离和信息不对称的事实,在经营者(受托人)与所有者(委托人)之间,围绕着受托责任关系的确立与解除,存在着固有的利益冲突.公司内部控制机制从公司自身出发,增强"内功",作为缓解这一冲突的有效方式,具有不可忽视的研究必要性和重要性.本文认为要使公司内部控制机制有效,"内部控制机制+外部控制机制"模式可以作为一种选择,文中围绕如何优化内部控制机制的问题,首次提出公司制企业控制机制的有效性定理和"内部控制机制+外部控制机制"模式,从控制论原理角度综述我国现存的公司制企业内部控制机制失效理论(委托-代理理论、产权代表缺位理论、人力资本报酬理论、外部经营环境影响理论、内部人控制财务理论),并按照"内部控制机制+外部控制机制"模式,对各个理论逐一评价,并给出笔者的解决思路. 相似文献
317.
Summary. A simple proof of Reny and Wooders' recent strengthening of Shapley's extension of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma
on a closed cover of a simplex is given. The proof uses Ky Fan's coincidence theorem.
Received: May 26, 2000; revised version: January 22, 2001 相似文献
318.
"科斯定理"与科斯理论的核心思想--读"社会成本问题" 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
本文所指的"科斯定理"仅限于科斯"第一定理",即"如果交易成本为零,那么无论初始权利如何界定,都可以通过市场交易实现产值最大化"这一基本思想.文章通过对"社会成本问题"一文脉络的简要梳理之后指出,"科斯定理"只是科斯为了讨论外部侵害问题而发展出来的分析方法,但这一思路对于分析和解决我国社会主义市场经济建设中所出现的一些问题具有启发和借鉴意义. 相似文献
319.
Equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model. In contrast to Salop [Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156.], the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint. 相似文献
320.
This paper revisits the excess entry theorem in spatial models according to Vickrey [Vickrey, W.S., 1964. Microstatics. Harcourt, Brace and World, New York] and Salop [Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156] while relaxing the assumption of inelastic demand. Using a demand function with a constant demand elasticity, we show that the number of firms that enter a market decreases with the degree of demand elasticity. We find that the excess entry theorem does only hold when the demand elasticity is sufficiently small. Otherwise, there is insufficient entry. In the limiting case of unit elastic demand, the market is monopolized. We broaden our results with a more general transportation cost function. 相似文献