Application fee manipulations in matching markets

In some well-known hospital–intern type of matching markets, hospitals impose mandatory application fees on internship applicants to consider their applications. Motivated by this real-life phenomenon, we study the application fee overreporting incentives of hospitals in centralized matching markets by assuming that interns have finite budgets to spend on such fees. Our main theorem shows that no stable mechanism is immune to application fee manipulations. Interestingly, under any stable rule, hospitals might not only obtain better matchings but also increase their application fee revenues through overreporting their application fees. In the restricted domains in which either side has homogeneous preferences or each hospital has only one available position, every stable mechanism turns out to be immune to application fee overreportings.     

新会计准则中借款费用对房地产企业的影响

围绕新借款费用会计准则对房地产企业会计工作产生的影响,阐述了借款费用及借款费用资本化的概念.分析了新旧借款费用会计准则的差异及新借款费用会计准则的实施对房地产企业产生的影响.     

Structural change,the push-pull hypothesis and the Spanish labour market

This paper proposes a small-scale general equilibrium model of structural transformation with a non-agricultural labour market characterized by search frictions. The model is used to investigate the role of sectoral TFPs as main drivers of structural change and a new growth accounting exercise allows a quantitative reassessment of the importance of the labour reallocation bonus in structural transformation in the presence of labour market frictions. The model is calibrated to data for post-war Spain and its transition from dictatorship to democracy. Counterfactual simulations point towards productivity improvements in agriculture as the main driver, while modifications in labour market institutions affect mainly the labour market itself, with only a modest effect on structural change.     

MATCHING SUBSIDIES AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS: A REVIEW

This paper provides a synthesis of the experimental literature on matching subsidies in the context of charitable giving. We classify results according to four different outcome variables frequently considered in the literature and address (i) short‐term effects of linear matching, (ii) the role of the matching rate, (iii) context‐dependence of behavioural responses, (iv) the relevance of the price of giving, (v) long‐term effects and (vi) nonlinear matching schemes. Based on this comprehensive review, we highlight several avenues for future research, such as putting stronger emphasis on competition in fundraising, long‐term effects or heterogeneity in responses.     

Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games

Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic game such as Matching Pennies. Between matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a finite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals from the same population follow the same behavioral rule. In the resulting discrete time dynamics the unique Nash equilibrium is unstable. However, for sample sizes greater than one, we present an imitation rule where long run play cycles closely around the equilibrium.     

Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China

We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre-exam submission asks students to submit college preferences before entrance exam scores are known, whereas post-score (post-exam) submission removes (reduces) score uncertainties. Theoretical analyses show that although mechanisms with post-score submission or SD matching are ex-post fair and efficient, they are not so ex-ante. Instead, the mechanism with pre-exam submission and BOS matching can be more fair and efficient ex-ante. These hypotheses are supported by empirical test on data from a top school at a top-ranked Chinese university with identification based on temporal and provincial changes. We find that although students admitted under the pre-exam BOS mechanism have lower college entrance exam scores than students admitted through other mechanisms on average, they exhibit similar or even better college academic performance.     

Matching bias in labor demand estimation

Using a matched firm-worker dataset, we show both theoretically and empirically that positive assortative matching between firms and workers leads to an underestimation of the absolute value of wage elasticity of labor demand.     

Relating alternative forms of contingency fit to the appropriate methods to test them

At the core of contingency theory, a major theory in management accounting, is the concept of fit. We critically discuss forms of fit as presented in overview articles from the management accounting field, highlighting forms of fit that have not appeared in prior overview articles (matching fit with hetero-performance on the fit line and/or asymmetric effects of mis-fit on performance). We also address some confusing arguments in the literature concerning the moderation form of fit and what has been referred as the mediation form of fit. In a second step, we reevaluate the appropriateness of statistical techniques used to test sub-forms of fit, highlighting the difficulties in differentiating conclusively between them. Specifically, we present polynomial regression analysis (PRA) in conjunction with the response surface methodology (RSM) as a powerful methodological alternative and discuss its ability to differentiate between the sub-forms of fit. We also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of structural equation modeling (SEM) to test for forms of fit.     

Training,Job Upgrading,Job Creation and Job Destruction

We extend the Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a, b) model to feature an endogenous upgrading or training rate, to gain a novel, general equilibrium, approach to training and labour market policy to gain a distinct model from the traditional partial equilibrium approach (e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). Among other results, we show training subsidies decrease equilibrium unemployment incidence, duration and level and less generous unemployment benefits increase the occurance of training. We also show the high elasticity of job destruction to aggregate conditions causes the frequency of training to be procyclical. A calibrated version of our model rationalizes cross-country differences in labour and training equilibrium outcomes.      

A theory of self-selection in a market with matching frictions: An application to delay in refereeing times in economics journals

A matching market with imperfect information is studied. With imperfect information, it is shown that friction in a meeting process can facilitate self-selection and thus may improve the matching outcome. As an application, the effect of delay in refereeing time on publication outcome is analyzed in a publication process in economics journals. Though the delay causes efficiency loss by postponing the dissemination of new research, it will better sort the papers to each journal by their qualities by preventing mediocre papers from being submitted to a prestigious journal and published by luck. If an assortative outcome (good papers in prestigious journals and mediocre papers in less prestigious journals) is efficient, the delay may actually improve the publication outcome. Other matching market examples are also discussed.