Do WTO members have more liberal trade policy?

This paper uses 68 measures of trade policy and liberalization to ask if membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is associated with more liberal trade policy. Almost no measures of trade policy are significantly correlated with GATT/WTO membership. Trade liberalizations, when they occur, usually lag GATT entry by many years, and the GATT/WTO often admits countries that are closed and remain closed for years. The exception to the rule is that WTO members tend to have slightly more freedom as judged by the Heritage Foundation's index.     

关税减让对我国农产品进口的影响分析

本文运用理论和实证的分析方法,研究了关税减让对我国农产品进口的实际影响。研究结果表明,关税减让与我国农产品的进口之间存在着高度的负相关关系,在影响我国农产品进口行为的诸多因素中,关税起到了主要的作用,但并非唯一因素。同时,关税减让与农产品的进口额、进口结构之间存在密切的关系,最后,还提出几点政策性意见。     

Establishment heterogeneity,exporter dynamics,and the effects of trade liberalization

We study the effects of tariffs and iceberg trade costs in a two-sector dynamic variation of the Melitz (2003) model extended to include a sunk cost of exporting, establishment-level uncertainty in productivity, capital accumulation, and material usage. We calibrate the model to match both cross-sectional and dynamic aspects of US producers related to export participation and the establishment lifecycle. We find a tariff equivalent of fixed export costs of 30 percentage points. We also find that a sizeable share of export profits is a return to the organizational capital from investing in export capacity rather than creating an establishment. We use the model to estimate the effect of reducing tariffs on welfare, trade, and export participation. We find that eliminating an 8 percent tariff increases the ratio of trade to GDP from 3.9% to 7.4% and raises welfare by 1.02%. Along the transition, consumption overshoots its steady state, even as trade and the capital stock grow gradually, so that the change in steady state consumption understates the welfare gain. Models without a dynamic export decision generate more gradual aggregate transition dynamics and smaller gains from trade. Capital accumulation and material usage are important sources of the welfare gains to trade.     

Index Volume XIII – 1979

Abstract:

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 has been typically viewed as being the Republican Party’s policy response to weak farm prices which – via political logrolling – snowballed into a full-fledged, across-the-board tariff bill, wreaking havoc at home and abroad (Irwin 2011; Shattschneider 1935; Taussig 1930). Empirical evidence, however, has failed to confirm this hypothesis (Callahan, McDonald and O’Brien 1994; Destler 1986; Pastor 1980). Rather, voting patterns in the Senate have been consistent with the “party platform” hypothesis. This paper presents an alternative account of the origins of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which is in keeping with the “party platform” hypothesis, and whose results are consistent with the “log-rolling” hypothesis. Specifically, I argue that the demand for protection on the part of U.S. farmers and manufacturers in the late 1920s, and the subsequent supply of protection by the Republican Party, were the direct result of a general-purpose technology shock – namely, electrification whose diffusion throughout the 1920s led to significant excess capacity in manufacturing and agriculture. In manufacturing, more productive firms became increasingly constrained on product markets. The resulting tractorization of U.S. agriculture and the motorization (trucks and automobiles) of transportation throughout the 1920s wreaked havoc on an already weakened agricultural sector (owing to lower post-war exports) by decreasing the demand by 48,294,887 grain- and hayequivalent acres. The proposed tariff bill sought to increase domestic firms’ market share in these industries by reducing imports.     

International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions

Several serious environmental problems have a global character. International cooperation to reduce emissions for this type of problems often takes the form of an agreement among the cooperating countries to cut back emissions by a uniform percent rate compared with some base year. This type of agreements has two disadvantages. In the first place, it is well known from environmental economics that equal percentage reductions of emissions from different sources usually gives an inefficient outcome, in the sense that the same environmental goals could be achieved at lower costs through a different distribution of emission reductions. A second problem with agreements of equal percentage reductions is that not all countries will find it in their interest to participate in such agreements. In the paper, it is assumed that the set of countries which participate in an agreement is endogenously determined, with a country participating in an agreement provided that this makes the country better off than it would have been in a situation without any agreement. The agreement among the participating countries is assumed to be a uniform percentage reduction of their emissions. The countries have different opinions about what this uniform percentage should be. In the paper, it is assumed that the outcome is determined by the median country of the participating countries. The assumptions above lead to a particular equilibrium, in which some but not all countries cooperate. The equilibrium reduction of emissions for the cooperating countries is also derived. This equilibrium compared with the first best optimum within the context of simple numerical example.Presented at the conference Environmental Cooperation and Policy in the Single European Market, Venice, April 16–20, 1990. The paper is part of the research project Energy and Society at the Centre for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Oslo. I am grateful to Ignazio Musu and Henk Folmer for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Fairness in a tradeable-permit treaty for carbon emissions reductions in Europe and the former Soviet Union

This paper evaluates the distributional implications of alternative permit allocations in a tradeable permit regime for carbon emissions reductions (20% below baseline) in 2010 for a region consisting of Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Participation in such a regime is expected to hinge on the fairness of the distributional consequences. We find that initial permit allocations by populationand/or GDP are unlikely to induce participation by most countries of Eastern Europe and FSU because of the net costs involved. We identify a set of initial allocations that would at least compensate these countries. A fair treatment of the countries in Western Europe (WE) is here one which equalizes net costs perGDP. For a wide set of cost functions for carbon emission reductions, the cost gains that WE would reap from a tradeable permit system relative to unilateral reductions by WE as a group are found to be on the order of 85 percent. This would imply, among other things, a significant increase in WE'scapacity to make further emissions reductions.     

进口需求、市场准入与我国农产品的贸易逆差

我国加入世贸组织以来，于2003—2004年间出现了农产品的贸易逆差，本文分析了农产品贸易逆差的构成及其产生原因。大豆、棉花、食用油等是我国农产品贸易逆差的主要构成产品．这些农产品进口价格和进口数量都出现了增长，而相关产业的发展导致这些农产品进口需求猛增．致使农产品贸易逆差不断扩大。另外，我国农产品关税的大幅削减以及配额管制农产品市场准入机会的扩大，也是农产品贸易逆差进一步拉大的一个重要原因。     

物流成本控制与铁路货物运价体系的完善

运输成本是制约物流成本的重要组成部分，控制运输成本对提高企业和产品的竞争力具有重大的意义。运价是决定运输成本的关键。文中对现行铁路货物运价体系的现状及弊端的进行了分析，并对如何完善铁路货物运价体系提出了设想。     

Labor standards, labor-management bargaining and international rivalry

Using the labor union's bargaining power as an indication of government policy on labor standards issues, we analyze the competition between a domestic (North) firm and a foreign (South) firm, and their relationship with optimal labor standards (LS). First, we show that the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when they are not. Second, it is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if labor unions are employment-oriented. Third, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS occurs in the case of wage-oriented unions. Fourth, the North's imposing a tariff to force the Southern government to raise its LS is effective only if the Southern union is wage-oriented. In order to raise Southern LS, both countries may need some deeper form of economic integration, if the North does not want to abandon its free trade system.     

Trade Verticality and Structural Change in Industries:The Cases of Taiwan and South Korea

This paper documents that a significant portion of trade for Taiwan and Korea follows the trend of world trade in moving toward a pattern of vertical specialization (VS). Noteworthy is the manufacturing sector, whose VS shares of exports has been steadily increasing and has accounted for more than 90% of the total VS shares of manufactured exports. For Taiwan, nearly 57% of the growth in exports is contributed by the growth in VS-based trade; for Korea, it is as high as 64%. In the analysis, we compare VS shares of exports with or without input-output circulation among domestic industries in an open economy. Using Taiwan as a case study, we further discuss the implications of trade liberalization through tariff reductions for trade verticality. JEL Classification Numbers: F1, F14