非关税措施量化公式评价

与直接可以用税率高低来度量其保护程度的关税不一样,非关税措施是一种隐蔽的难以直接度量其保护作用的贸易保护主义手段。本文评价了近年来国外普遍采用的非关税措施保护作用的量化方法,包括频度——类型测算法、价格对比测算法、支持率测算法的设计思路和运用状况,以便为不时发生的贸易争端和贸易谈判提供可以用来判断进口国非关税措施保护程度的分析工具。     

Preferential trade agreements between asymmetric countries: Free trade areas (with rules of origin) vs. customs unions

This paper examines differences in welfare implications between a free trade area (FTA) and a customs union (CU) for member countries differing in their market sizes. In a stylized three-country model of trade under oligopoly, we take into account the conditions that FTA members set external tariffs to induce their exporting firms to comply with rules of origin (ROO) within the trade bloc. This approach rules out trade deflection and regime switches in forming an effective FTA. The key findings are as follows: (i) Unless the difference in market size is too large and ROO are too restrictive, an FTA can be welfare-improving to countries with market size differential. (ii) The formation of a preferential trade agreement (either an FTA or a CU) is more likely to emerge between countries of similar market size. However, forming a CU allows for a greater degree of market size asymmetry than forming an FTA. (iii) Compared to the pre-PTA equilibrium, the greater reductions in external tariffs under an FTA than under a CU remain valid even for the case with market size asymmetry and preferential ROO. As such, a non-member country is relatively better off under an FTA. (iv) World welfare is higher under an FTA than under a CU when the market size asymmetry is moderate and ROO are less restrictive.     

Ranking the optimum tariff and the maximum revenue tariff in vertically related markets

This paper firstly shows that in a vertically related industry with either domestic upstream monopolist or foreign upstream monopolist, when the upstream firm adopts uniform input pricing, the optimum-welfare tariff is higher than the maximum-revenue tariff, if the number of foreign competitors is sufficiently large. Secondly, when domestic upstream monopolist adopts discriminatory input pricing, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. Thirdly, when foreign upstream monopolist adopts discriminatory input pricing, the optimum-welfare tariff will exceed the maximum-revenue tariff if the sizes of domestic and foreign firms become more unequally distributed.     

Free trade areas,the limit of Rules of Origin,and optimal tariff reductions under international oligopoly: A welfare analysis

In this article we analyze the economic effects associated with preferential Rules of Origin (RoO) in a free trade area (FTA). By presenting a stylized three-country model of trade under oligopoly, we show that there exists a maximum limit of RoO below which forming an FTA is welfare-improving. In examining external tariff reductions under FTA, we take into account the constrained conditions that optimal tariffs set by member countries effectively induce the intrabloc exporters to comply with RoO. This approach rules out trade regime switches and helps identify the economic determinants of establishing an effective and welfare-improving FTA with RoO. We further examine whether an FTA with RoO increases total trade or whether the extra trade arises at the expense of nonmembers. Our simple model has implications for economic factors that foster or impede regional economic integration under imperfect completion.     

Interim dividend cuts and omissions in the UK

UK firms that cut or omit interim dividends during the period 1986–1993 are studied. Price reactions to cuts and omissions were found to be significantly negative and stronger for initial reductions. Future earnings variables were found to be predictable from interim dividend reductions. Gearing, company size and interim earnings change variables were found to have explanatory power for the decision to determine whether to cut or omit an interim dividend.     

乌拉圭回合前后美国园艺产品关税调整动向研究

美国是世界园艺的生产和贸易大国。乌拉圭回合谈判前后美国对园艺类产品的关税进行了大幅度的调整，对其本国园艺产品的贸易反对外推广起到了良好的促进作用。笔者对乌拉圭回舍前后美国园艺产品关税调整的动向进行了研究，以期对我国园艺产品的关税调整提供一定的政策建议。     

中国与TPP国家关税减让的宏观经济效应：基于GTAP模型的分析

采用GTAP模型,模拟分析中国与TPP国家关税减让合作的宏观经济效应.结果显示:中国与TPP国家双边关税减让会强化双边的贸易联系,其中,制造业双边关税壁垒的取消比农业双边关税壁垒取消对中国及TPP国家的对外贸易影响更大;双边关税减让将提升双边的福利水平,同时也会使中国与TPP国家的贸易不平衡进一步扩大.结果表明,考虑到单边关税减让将损害减让国福利水平,采用双边关税减让以平衡双方利益是一个可行的合作途径.     

非关税措施量化公式评价

与直接可以用税率高低来度量其保护程度的关税不一样．非关税措施是一种隐蔽的难以直接度量其保护作用的贸易保护主义手段。本文评价了近年来国外普遍采用的非关税措施保护作用的量化方法,包括频度——类型测算法、价格对比测算法、支持率测算法的设计思路和运用状况．以便为不时发生的贸易争端和贸易谈判提供可以用来判断进口国非关税措施保护程度的分析工具。     

Tariff escalation and invasive species damages

We investigate the interface between trade and damages from invasive species (IS), focusing on escalation in tariffs between raw-input and processed-good markets, and its implication for IS-based damages. The current tariff escalation in processed agro-forestry products motivates our analysis. Tariff escalation exacerbates the likelihood of IS introduction by biasing trade flows towards increased trade of primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. We show that a reduction of tariff escalation, by lowering the tariff on processed goods increases allocative efficiency and reduces IS-based damages, a win-win situation. We also identify policy menus for trade reforms involving tariffs on both raw input and processed goods leading to win-win situations.     

关税减让对我国制造业行业生产率的影响

为了加入WTO,我国进行了以进口关税减让为主的贸易政策改革。那么关税减让所引起的国内市场开放对制造业行业生产率是产生了冲击,还是激励企业提高了经营效率,进而提高了制造业行业的生产率?本文采用我国加入WTO前后(1999-2004年)27个制造业内资行业的面板数据,实证分析了关税减让的贸易政策变动对生产率的影响。结果表明,我国进口关税减让对制造业内资行业的生产率产生了明显的负面影响,而美国进口关税减让则有提高我国制造业行业生产率的作用。