公司财务控制机理:一个基于制度博弈的分析

财务控制的目标是对出资者和经营者之间形成的代理契约的冲突进行管理和协调.以出资者与经营者的制度博弈模型为分析基础,可以清楚表明财务控制机理特征:首先,财务控制本身具有的制度成本(控制成本)是制约控制成效的关键因素;其次,财务控制作为一种制度安排,应具备使经营者违背代理契约的外部成本内部化的功能;最后,财务控制本质是一种契约安排,是出资者和经营者之间多次动态博弈的结果,因此需要不断进行修正完善.     

基于混合激励机制的两层供应链产品开发合作博弈分析

针对供应商与制造商在产品开发合作中潜在的风险,建立了动态合作博弈模型,通过对正负激励策略的比较分析,得出两种激励策略按照一定结构混合运用能有效地发挥负激励降低合作风险、正激励增加合作收益的作用的结论。     

基于博弈视角的供应链伙伴关系研究

科学技术的飞速发展、经济的全球化以及竞争的日益激烈，使得企业要想在市场上取得成功，就必须和供应商、客户建立紧密的伙伴关系，通过整体协作增强各节点企业的竞争力。对于供应链伙伴关系，可以从交易费用、资源观、博弈论等到不同视角进行研究，本文将从博弈的视角，通过企业间博弈的不同阶段，包括囚徒困境、鹿的陷阱以及单方承诺三个阶段，对供应链内企业间的伙伴关系进行探讨，揭示其内在规律。     

重构企业R＆D项目战略投资决策方法体系

传统的投资决策方法是一种建立在广泛应用的以货币的时间价值为基础的投资决策方法,它已越来越不能适应当今充满不确定性和竞争性的市场需要.实物期权方法比传统的折现现金流法（DCF）更适合来分析不确定条件下的投资决策问题,但仅凭实物期权方法还不能对不完全竞争环境下的企业R＆D项目战略投资问题进行准确分析和估价,而引入期权博弈理论恰好能克服这些缺陷.文章从理论上阐述了重构企业R＆D项目投资决策方法体系的可能性和必要性,并由此提出了研究的基本框架.     

建筑工程项目无标底招标行为的经济博弈分析

运用博弈方法对建筑工程项目无标底招标行为展开模型化研究,剖析各投标人的出价策略以及招标人的期望收益,演绎其博弈特性和博弈均衡.在实证中提出建筑工程项目无标底招标行为博弈所需满足的条件,设计可操作的建筑工程项目无标底招标博弈机制,规范建筑行业经营及行政管理部门提供决策支持.     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Optimising a Probabilistic Model of the Development of Play in Soccer

We present a probabilistic model based on the one developed by Hernández Mendo and Anguera (Revista de Psicologíca Social, 16(1), 71–93, 2001). Here we have tried to break down the interaction contexts that the opposing teams are able to generate and transform during the game. We are aware that a given player or team does not produce consistent behaviour in similar situations. However, a degree of uncertainty is assumed to exist regarding whether the results obtained are a specific function of the analysis used. In order to carry out this research a category system which optimized that used in the previous model was developed. This system should enable the interaction between teams to be observed within the actual play of a soccer game. A lag sequential analysis was performed on the basis of a coding of the behavioural flow. After describing the behavioural patterns obtained a probabilistic model of the development of play in soccer is proposed.     

建筑工程无标底招标理论与实践

随着中国建筑业管理体制改革的不断深化，招投标制度在中国得以推广应用，但在招投标机制方面还存在不足，有待完善。文章通过无标底招投标的博弈论基础，分析了无标底招标的意义和作用，同时对无标底招标的实施提出了一些相应的措施和建议，最后指出，随着中国加入WTO，与国际接轨，推广无标底招投标方法是我国建筑业招投标制度改革的当务之急。     

区域性物流园区布局方案优选的博弈研究

本文基于区域物流理论与博弈论的理论基础，建立了相应的区域性物流园区布局方案的优选博弈模型，并列出了可行的计算步骤，做出了方法评价，指出了该方法后续研究的方向，为物流园区区域性总体布局的优选问题提供了一种解决方法。