The Value of Product Attributes,Brands and Private Labels: An Analysis of Frozen Seafood in Germany

It is well known that the price of a food in general and fish in particular is a function of a number of attributes such as species, product form, processing form and size. However, limited attention has been given to the influence of private labels, production method, eco‐labels and promotions. We use a unique dataset which identifies these attributes in the German seafood market. We estimate a hedonic price function, and our results highlight the importance of brand and labels for seafood prices in Germany. Our results also suggest that private label products are discounted by 20%, while branded products achieve substantial price premiums, as do fish products from aquaculture.     

资源税改革影响煤炭企业可持续发展

介绍了当前我国煤炭行业的现状,并以淮南矿业集团为实例,分析了淮南矿业集团面临的实际困难,及资源税改革对淮南矿业集团的影响,并给出了相应的建议。     

发达国家住房福利政策的演变及启示——我国公租房领域供给侧结构性改革探析

我国公租房领域存在投资主体单一、政府财政压力大、市场参与度不够、配置低效、供需失衡及错配、贫富分区程度加大等问题，需通过推进供给侧结构性改革来予以解决。发达国家住房福利政策的演变表明，住房政策应与住房市场供需状况相适应，政府所扮演的角色须从“公共住房的直接供给者”走向“市场化供给的环境营造者”，即从“补砖头”到“补人头”是住房福利政策演进的必然趋势。我国公租房领域供给侧结构性改革应与住房供求情况相匹配。一方面，要转变政府职能，从政府实物配给逐步过渡到市场化供给；另一方面，要积极打造健康的住宅租赁投资市场以促进公租房供给市场化，并通过开发配建和货币化补贴等措施促成公租房“隐形化”混合居住模式。     

Why do commercial banks hold government bonds? The case of Japan

We investigate the determinants of the demand for Japanese government bonds (JGBs) by commercial banks in Japan. In particular, by estimating portfolio equations for JGB demand and bank loans, based on a panel data set from the late 1990s to the 2000s, we rigorously test the popular assertion that the long stagnation of the real economy caused a shift in the portfolios of commercial banks from bank lending to JGBs. We find that the popular assertion is not empirically supported. Rather, the portfolio shift from loans to JGBs has been caused by a fall in the ratio of the loan rate to unit lending costs, or the bank’s price–cost margin for lending.     

Pricing Political Rallies

Why are political rallies free to attend? Fundraising is a central campaign activity and a perennial correlate of political victory. We argue that politicians set a zero price for rallies in order to reap a non‐pecuniary benefit: political support. An ‘allocation by waiting’ scheme selects those attendees with a lower opportunity cost of time relative to a standard ‘allocation by price’ scheme. Transactions costs mitigate Coasean bargaining by removing the secondary market, thereby altering the composition of the average rally crowd. This mechanism allows politicians to facilitate exchange with ‘general interests’: citizens who do not engage in rent seeking due to collective action costs but still stand to gain from redistributive policies.     

Oil price shocks and volatility spillovers in the Nigerian sovereign bond market

This paper investigates volatility spillover in the Nigerian sovereign bond market arising from oil price shocks, using Vector Autoregressive Moving Average ‐ Asymmetric Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (VARMA‐AGARCH) model. The paper covers the period March 22, 2011 to April 14, 2016 and makes use of the daily data of the Nigerian Sovereign Bond, Brent oil and West Texas Intermediate (WTI), respectively. We endogenously and sequentially detect structural break points using the test of Bai and Perron (2003) framework. In order to accurately estimate the model, we modify it by incorporating the break points into the VARMA‐AGARCH model, a process which if ignored would lead to model misspecification. The results obtained demonstrate a significant cross‐market volatility transmission between oil and sovereign bond market with ample sensitivity to structural breaks. The study also computes optimum weight portfolio and hedge ratio both with and without structural breaks and results equally indicate sensitivity to structural breaks.     

Industrial land price between China’s Pearl River Delta and Southeast Asian regions: Competition or Coopetition?

The planned economy system’s previous form of industrial land market control in China has led to current market failure because of a large amount of industrial land being sold at a very low price, causing extensive overuse of land and negative effects on land management. As the “World Factory”, the Pearl River Delta (PRD) is well known for its rapid urbanization largely driven by Foreign Direct Investment in labor-intensive industries. A low-land price strategy has been commonly adopted by the local government in order to attract industrial investment. In the past decade, the PRD has increasingly faced the increasing competition from its neighboring competition from its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia that have established preference policies to attract FDI and foreign enterprises. Despite a growing body of literature on the internal forces of industrial land in China, little is known of the external forces involved except for the importance of FDI and the intensity of interregional competition between China and other countries in attempting to attract foreign investment. This research fills the knowledge gap by modeling the situation in the form of an international cooperative game model aimed at revealing the industrial land price formation mechanism between the PRD region and Southeast Asian regions. The conditions of industrial land in the area and several Southeast Asian countries are first analyzed for their industrial land price movements in recent years. A game theoretic model is then built that exhibits similar characteristics. The result indicates that the governments’ low land price strategy and the competition between the PRD and its neighboring countries have created unnecessarily high social and environmental costs. Policy suggestions are made to encourage a more appropriate use of industrial land in China, and the most important being the need for a mindset shift from competition towards coopetition between the PRD and Southeast Asian regions.     

Asset price volatility and banks

This paper examines the operation of Diamond–Dybvig banks when depositors have access to the asset market. Previous studies have shown that banks are redundant in this environment since it is impossible to prevent the strategic withdrawals. This paper shows that the strategic withdrawals can be prevented if the market risk, due to asset price volatility, is considered. Banks provide deterministic returns to the depositors since the aggregate withdrawals are predictable, and therefore, banks can choose the portfolio such that no asset liquidation is involved. However, an individual consumer with stochastic liquidity need is vulnerable to the price volatility if he holds the asset directly. Therefore, banks improve the consumers’ welfare by providing the insurance against not only the liquidity shock but also the market risk. Banks are not redundant.     

全球海运铁矿石市场承压解析与行业影响

世界钢产量峰期出现在2000年以后,其高速增长动力主要来源于中国,而中国铁矿石原矿资源禀赋的劣势,愈发刺激了中国对国际海运铁矿石的需求,致使中国铁矿石需求的对外依存度较高,与此同时,作为铁矿石纯进口国的中国难以主导铁矿石定价权。2011年国际铁矿石市场正值高位运行,大部分铁矿石生产商在高价驱使下,选择大幅增加投资成本扩建产能,海运铁矿石市场供需基本面开始倒转。2015年以来,铁矿石中国到岸价大幅下跌,铁矿石生产巨头由于低廉的现金生产成本也只能勉强盈利或者维持在盈亏平衡线附近,高成本矿被实质性挤压出局。而美国量化宽松政策收紧乃至退出,导致金融流动性降低,进一步巩固了全球铁矿石市场"供强需弱"的格局。由于国内高成本铁矿项目的退出,中国铁矿石需求对外依存度将会进一步升高。     

Does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design? Empirical evidence from the Thai Jasmine rice market

In the oligopsony market, farmers may receive low prices and policy analysis assuming perfect competition can yield serious bias results. In this paper, we estimate oligopsony power between processors and farmers and evaluate the welfare impact of the paddy pledging program (PPP), a generous price support program in the Thai Jasmine rice market, with an imperfect competition model. We develop a model that consists of rice supply equation and derived demand equation. We then simultaneously estimate these equations using system estimation methods to recover oligopsony power parameters. Finally, we use these parameters to assess the welfare impact of the price support program. Using annual panel data running from crop marketing year 2001/2002–2015/2016 and exploiting the institutional feature of the PPP, we find strong evidence of some oligopsony power, a moderate level of oligopsony price distortion, and a negative relationship between price support and oligopsony power. We also find that the PPP is inefficient but effective in income redistribution. Moreover, the program benefits both farmers and consumers. With better policymaking decisions, the PPP can be efficient by setting a suitable support price. Therefore, our results show that in the case of the Thai Jasmine rice market, the generally accepted “wisdom” about agricultural price support policy does not necessarily hold, and price support can be designed to improve the efficiency of the market.