Victim or Victimizer: Firm Responses to Government Corruption

What is the relationship between government corruption and firm performance? To address this question, I conduct a review of articles published in the leading management journals on government‐business interactions pertaining to rent‐seeking activities and integrate findings from the fields of international business, social issues in management, public organization, institutional change, and corporate political activity. I find that while much empirical work corroborates the earlier findings suggesting a corrosive impact of government corruption on firm performance in general, management research also points to the heterogeneous impact of government corruption on individual firm performance, driven by the strategic activities conducted by firms in response to corruption. I propose an integrative model of firm strategy vis‐à‐vis corruption that predicts the activity choice of the firm as predicated by its organizational structure, political resources, industry regulation, and surrounding political and social institutions.     

The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an Investment/Trust Game

This article analyses the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender–receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose their private information and choose to return a fair proportion of the firm's income as dividend to the investor, then a rational manager will mimic such behaviour in an attempt to earn a reputation for being trustworthy. The rational manager will mimic with probability 1 in the early periods of the game. The investor, too, will invest with probability 1 in these periods. However, in the later periods, the rational manager will mimic with a certain probability strictly less than 1. The probability will be such that it will make the investor indifferent between investing and not investing, and he, in turn, will invest with a probability (strictly less than 1) that will make the rational manager indifferent between mimicking and not mimicking; that is, the game will begin with pure-strategy play but will switch to mixed-strategy play. There is one exception, though: when the investor's ex ante beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are exceptionally high, the game will continue in a pure strategy, and the switch to mixed-strategy play will never occur. Identical results obtain if the manager's choice of whether to share his private information with the investor is replaced by exogenously imposed information sharing.     

A Daunting Task in Asia

Abstract

This article deals with the question of how to transform the public sector in Asia towards transparency and accountability. What are the main challenges and constraints in promoting transparency and accountability? What kind of strategies can we suggest to enhance and sustain transparency and accountability? It will start with the introduction, including environmental changes in public affairs, and a brief overview of transparency and accountability. Then it will look at what major challenges and constraints there are in enhancing transparency and accountability. This will be followed by a discussion of key strategies for the transformation and sustainability of transparency and accountability for further development in the Asian public sector.     

Political corruption shielding and corporate acquisitions

Corruption includes rent‐seeking behavior by public officials (e.g., lavish in‐kind benefits and monetary kickbacks for contracts/permits/regulatory leniency, improper political contributions/support, etc.) that can negatively affect firm valuations, performances, and strategic choices. Shielding strategies are used to diminish rent‐seeking attractiveness of firms. Acquisitions provide a better channel than cash or leverage for assessing the wealth effects of shielding strategies. We find that the mean 3‐day announcement returns for acquirers for a large sample of U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1990 and 2014 is significantly lower for firms headquartered in relatively higher corruption states. Our results survive an array of robustness tests.     

Drivers of firm formalization in Vietnam: an attention theory explanation

Informal enterprises are widely viewed as a mechanism to engage unemployed people in the economy and thereby alleviate poverty in developing economies. However, over-representation in an economy may lead to both economic growth and broader employment opportunities being sacrificed. This paper presents a process model to investigate three potential drivers for firms to formalize: the first from a desire to grow and develop the firm through innovation, the second from the wish to access government financial support and the third stimulated by the payment of unofficial payments or bribes. We use data from surveys of Vietnamese firms in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 to investigate these drivers of formalization. Although we find support for all three of these drivers, the results differ in significance across years and firm types. We explain these differences using attention theory to show how different situations and events can make the formalization decision more likely over time.     

Corruption and market attractiveness influences on different types of FDI

Previous studies have proposed that a compensatory model predicts the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) in a country; FDI levels are a result of ‘trade‐offs’ between the positive effect of market attractiveness and the negative influence of corruption. In contrast, we hypothesize and find that the compensatory relationship only holds for market‐seeking investment; for resource‐seeking FDI the model appears to be noncompensatory. Greater market attractiveness mitigates the negative impact of corruption on market‐seeking investment, but the ability of market attractiveness to mitigate the negative impact of corruption on resource‐seeking FDI quickly disappears as corruption levels increase. Implications and future research directions are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

民营经济发展与“腐败有效论”的检验

据"腐败有效论"的已有研究结合私营企业发展路径分析试图解释中国高腐败和民营经济高增长并存的"双高之谜"。通过1998～2006年的省级面板数据实证检验,我们发现腐败与民营经济发展呈现著正相关关系,对民营经济发展而言"腐败有效论"是成立的。并且我们证明,腐败有利于民营经济发展起作用的一个重要渠道就是可以减少政府的掠夺和干预。说明面对一个扭曲的制度安排,必然存在另一个扭曲的制度对其进行纠正。而要根除这种次优的扭曲的资源配置方式,只有根除其赖以生存的制度环境,即只有坚定不移地推动市场化改革。     

International Marketing Ethics from an Islamic Perspective: A Value-Maximization Approach

International marketing practices, embedded in a strong ethical doctrine, can play a vital role in raising the standards of business conduct worldwide, while in no way compromising the quality of services or products offered to customers, or surrendering the profit margins of businesses. Adherence to such ethical practices can help to elevate the standards of behavior and thus of living, of traders and consumers alike. Against this background, this paper endeavors to identify the salient features of the Islamic framework of International Marketing Ethics. In particular, it highlights the capabilities and strengths of this framework in creating and sustaining a strong ethical international marketing culture. At the heart of Islamic marketing is the principle of value-maximization based on equity and justice (constituting just dealing and fair play) for the wider welfare of the society. Selected key international marketing issues are examined from an Islamic perspective which, it is argued, if adhered to, can help to create a value-loaded global ethical marketing framework for MNCs in general, and establish harmony and meaningful cooperation between international marketers and Muslim target markets in particular.     

Determinants of Bribery in Asian Firms: Evidence from the World Business Environment Survey

While it is widely believed that bribery is ubiquitous among Asian firms, few studies have offered systematic evidence of such activities, and the dynamics of bribery in Asian firms have not been well understood. The research reported here used World Business Environment Survey data to examine some distinct characteristics of bribery in Asian firms and to empirically test 10 hypotheses on determinants of bribery. We find that firm characteristics such as firm size, growth rate, and corporate governance are important determinants of bribery activities at the firm level, and that Asian firms are more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, corrupted court systems, convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent interpretation of laws and regulations, inefficient government service delivery, and high taxes.     

Why Firms Engage in Corruption: A Top Management Perspective

This study builds upon the top management literature to predict and test antecedents to firms’ engagement in corruption. Building on a survey of 341 executives in India, we find that if executives have social ties with government officials, their firms are more likely to engage in corruption. Further, these executives are likely to rationalize engaging in corruption as a necessity for being competitive. The results collectively illustrate the role that executives’ social ties and perceptions have in shaping illegal actions of their respective firms.