有限责任公司股权转让规则的完善与发展

如何制定完善的有限责任公司股权转让规则是各国公司法不可回避的问题。修订前我国《公司法》有关有限责任公司股权转让规则存在诸多缺陷；修订后《公司法》从多个方面对股权转让规则进行了完善和发展，这些完善和发展既涉及股权转让的一般规则也涉及股权转让的特殊规则。     

The demand for agricultural land and strategic bidding in auctions

A unique feature of land auctions is that the same land is auctioned twice; first the land is broken into tracts and each tract is auctioned individually. Then, the tracts are reassembled and auctioned as a whole parcel. After the two auctions are completed, the seller chooses the one that generates a higher revenue. The main purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of why such an auction design is employed to sell farmland. We also show that this feature of land auctions leads to interesting interaction among the bidding strategies of the players in each of the two auction stages.     

Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.     

改进和完善政府采购制度的思考

建立政府采购制度对于提高财政支出效益、增强国家财政的宏观调控能力、抑制财政支出的腐败现象具有重要意义，中国的政府采购已取得了显著成效。但是，在其具体实施过程中仍存在诸如思想认识、管理制度、法律法规等方面的问题，尚需在职能界定、采购约束、采购效益等方面进一步规范和完善。     

不同市场条件下的初始排污权免费分配方法的选择

要实施排污权交易制度，在理论和实践中首先要解决的一个关键问题是初始排污权的分配问题。因为在实践中以初始排污权的免费分配方式更具有操作性，所以亟待解决的是初始排污权免费分配方案的选择与制定。本文研究的是在不同的市场条件下分析、建立并选择适合的初始排污权免费分配的分配模型。     

p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics

This paper studies equilibrium selection based on a class of perfect foresight dynamics and relates it to the notion of p-dominance. A continuum of rational players is repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric n×n game. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes. The dynamics has stationary states, each of which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the static game. A strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresight dynamics if, independent of the current action distribution, there exists a consistent belief that any player necessarily plays the Nash equilibrium action at every revision opportunity. It is shown that a strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresight dynamics with a small degree of friction if and only if it is the p-dominant equilibrium with p<1/2. It is also shown that if a strict Nash equilibrium is the p-dominant equilibrium with p<1/2, then it is uniquely absorbing (and globally accessible) for a small friction (but not vice versa). Set-valued stability concepts are introduced and their existence is shown. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.     

Population growth and technological change in a global warming model

Global warming (GW) is now recognized as a significant threat to sustainable development on an international scale. After providing some introductory background material, we introduce a benchmark dynamic game within which to study the GW problem. The model allows for population growth and is subsequently generalized to allow for changes in technology. In each case, a benchmark “Business as Usual” (BAU) equilibrium is analyzed and contrasted with the efficient solution. Furthermore, a complete characterization is provided in the benchmark model of the entire subgame perfect equilibrium value correspondence.JEL Classification Q54, D99, O12This paper builds on the Woytinsky Lecture delivered by Roy Radner at the University of Michigan, March 11, 1998. We would like to thank Graciela Chichilnisky, Arnulf Grubler, Geoffrey Heal, Leonid Hurwicz, Jill Jaeger, Peter de Janosi, Paul Kleindorfer, Giuseppe Lopomo, Thomas Schelling, Tapan Mitra, and Michael Toman for helpful discussions and references, and Andrew King, Charlotte V. Kuh, and Frank Sinden for comments on an earlier draft. In the case of the present enterprise, much of whose scope lies outside of our previous expertise, it is even more important than usual to emphasize that we are responsible for all errors.     

Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games

It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C6, C7, D8.     

WTO背景下我国地产法的完善

如何在WTO法律的框架下通过法律制度的完善与创新，保障我国地产经济的安全，促进地产市场的发展，是我国地产法所应关注的重点。笔者认为：我国应完善国有土地所有权主体制度、改革国有土地使用权取得制度、地产市场宏观调控制度、建立地产市场信息披露制度、创新土地征收制度。对上述问题的解决，笔者提出了自己的思路。     

功能主义:企业演化理论的基石

芝加哥学派的企业选择论、威廉姆森的组织演化论和纳尔逊与温特的演化经济理论,之所以称为演化理论,在于它们有一个共同的特点,即都可以用经济的"自然选择"和"适应性学习"两种基于功能主义的方法论对其理论基础进行解释.企业演化理论的方法论基础是目的论解释和完全功能主义解释.威廉姆逊的组织结构演化方法论不适合完全功能主义解释,而纳尔逊、温特的企业演化方法论和芝加哥学派的选择论则是以典型的完全功能主义方法论为基础.