Demand for,and impediments to,the disclosure of information about climate change-related corporate governance practices

Based on a survey of climate change experts in different stakeholder groups and interviews with corporate climate change managers, this study provides insights into the gap between what information stakeholders expect, and what Australian corporations disclose. This paper focuses on annual reports and sustainability reports with specific reference to the disclosure of climate change-related corporate governance practices. The findings culminate in the refinement of a best practice index for the disclosure of climate change-related corporate governance practises. Interview results indicate that the low levels of disclosures made by Australian companies may be due to a number of factors. A lack of proactive stakeholder engagement and an apparent preoccupation with financial performance and advancing shareholders interest, coupled with a failure by managers to accept accountability, seems to go a long way to explaining low levels of disclosure.     

Persuasion with communication costs

This paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report. Contrary to previous literature, it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by Milgrom (1981) is relatively robust to costly reporting. A separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs. Intuitively, the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplishes full separation. With reporting costs there are typically multiple equilibria. For example, a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if the reporting costs are high. Finally, a separating equilibrium exists when the receiver has to make a costly effort in order to access the information in a report, as long as this cost is not too high.     

A study on risk retention regulation in asset securitization process

We study the impacts of the recently proposed risk retention regulation for asset securitization, i.e. the issuer has to retain a certain proportion of securitized assets. We also consider the frequently discussed measure to require the issuer disclose certain information of the securitized assets. In a dynamic model with asymmetric information between a risk-averse originating bank and a continuum of risk-averse investors, we find that it is impossible for a flat-rate retention requirement to be optimal for all asset types. Although both risk retention and information disclosure regulations are effective in reducing investors’ informational loss, neither can unconditionally enhance social welfare upon the unregulated case. For both measures, there are associated regulatory cost: risk retention regulation aggravates adverse selection problem because it undermines the channel of informational revelation by the choice of securitization intensity, and information disclosure requirement incurs a signalling cost by distorting banks’ securitization intensity in sending signals. Under an appropriate set of conditions we find that information disclosure requirement complements risk retention regulation when investors are sufficiently risk averse.     

Heterogeneity of Funds and Information Disclosure: Evidence

Institutional investors, especially public funds, play an important role in governing listed firms as they grow in Chinese stock markets. We classify each fund as “dedicated,” “transient,” or “mixed,” according to the concentration, turnover, and profit sensitivity of their stock holdings. We find that listed firms with more shares held by dedicated funds have a higher disclosure quality, while firms with more shares held by transient funds have a lower disclosure quality. These findings are consistent in different model settings. In addition, dedicated funds improve the disclosure quality of non-state-owned enterprises more than state-owned enterprises. Dedicated funds can benefit from the lower debt-financing cost and higher stock liquidity of firms with better disclosure quality.     

高管机会主义品行与公司信息披露决策

文章构建相应策略识别了高管机会主义品行，并探究其对公司信息披露决策的影响。研究结果表明，高管的机会主义品行会显著增加公司信息披露违规、真实盈余管理行为；提升公司选择非国际“四大”会计师事务所的概率，并支付更高的审计费用。随着高管机会主义水平上升，公司更有可能作出上述决策。进一步地，国有产权能在一定程度上抑制高管机会主义品行对信息披露质量的负面影响，却显著增加了公司应计盈余管理；当高管机会主义水平较高时，国有产权也无法发挥有效治理作用。从经济后果看，高管的机会主义品行能被资本市场识别，并显著减损公司未来价值。     

Value relevance of multinational directorship and cross-listing on MNEs national governance disclosure practices in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Nigeria

We draw on institutional isomorphism literature to develop a conceptual framework which uncovers how emerging market MNEs manage institutional tensions and complexity in corporate governance (CG) regulations within and across economic environments. Using a sample of 400 firm-year observations (2011–2015) from Nigeria, we show foreign directorship and cross-listing as significant avenues for governance isomorphism. MNEs employ these mechanisms to manage and reconcile foreign and Nigerian CG regulations whilst overcoming institutional weaknesses at home. Specifically, governance isomorphism leads to improvement of home country CG disclosures practices because of associated linkages with international CG systems through cross-listing and employment of multinational directors.     

Determinants of materiality disclosure quality in integrated reporting: Empirical evidence from an international setting

This study examines determinants of materiality disclosure quality (MDQ) in integrated reporting (IR) in an international setting. To this purpose, we constructed a novel, hand‐collected MDQ score in line with the <IR> guiding principles introduced by the International Integrated Reporting Council. On the basis of a cross‐national sample consisting of 359 firm‐year observations between 2013 and 2016, we find that MDQ is positively associated with learning effects, gender diversity, and the assurance of nonfinancial information in the integrated report. On the other hand, we find that IR readability, listing in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, and earnings management do not affect MDQ. Our results are robust to different statistical models. We expand on earlier empirical findings on IR disclosure quality and provide valuable insights for research, practice, and standard setting.     

Do measurement-related fair value disclosures affect information asymmetry?

Using a sample of European real estate firms over the 2007–2010 period, this study provides some evidence that measurement-related fair value disclosures reduce information asymmetry. We find a negative association between the extent of fair value disclosures and the bid-ask spread, but no association with two additional measures of information asymmetry (zero returns and price impact). Contrary to our expectation, we fail to find evidence that firms using model estimates exclusively benefit the most from such additional disclosure. Analysing measurement errors (the absolute difference between the selling price of an asset and its fair value prior to sale), we find that firms that use model estimates exclusively and provide more measurement-related disclosures have lower errors and more accurate fair value estimates. In other words, if our lack of results is due to investors not using this additional disclosure this is to their detriment.