基于实物期权法对R&D项目价值评估的研究——对布莱克-舒尔斯定价模型的改进

针对R&D项目投资的特点,探讨了采用布莱克一舒尔斯期权定价模型对R&D项目价值评估可能存在的缺陷,并提出一种改进方法,即将决策树和布莱克一舒尔斯定价模型结合运用,因为决策树能够模拟研发项目的阶段性决策过程,考虑到多个离散型不确定性因素的相关性,模拟并计算出对决策路径依赖的现金流,因此能克服纯粹使用布莱克一舒尔斯公式的不足,在考虑多个不确定性因素的影响下,实现对多阶段R&D项目价值的评估,作出正确的投资决策。     

产业组织角度的合作R＆D研究述评

合作R＆D是企业整合研发资源的有效组织形式。本文对产业组织角度的合作R＆D研究进行了较为细致的综述。首先列举了对合作R＆D理论具有一定影响的经验研究；然后梳理了产业组织角度的合作R＆D主流理论；之后介绍了较有代表性的非主流理论研究；最后是全文结论和留待进一步研究的论题。     

开放条件下R＆D政策的福利分析

本文在引入国外企业竞争压力和本国政府政策的情形下,构建一个三阶段的博弈模型。在该模型中,我们对不同R&D政策下的社会福利水平进行比较分析,进而选择最优福利水平的R&D政策。文章最终的结论是:政府应该鼓励企业进行R&D的合作,但禁止企业在研发合作阶段之后的产品市场进行共谋,这种政策行为是最优的。     

“长三角”加强与跨国公司投资及研发合作的对策建议

建立上海多极型研发中心是十分重要而紧迫的战略任务。为此，应加快长三角开放式研发信息中心的建设，加快建设与跨国公司对接的科技中介服务体系；选择在全球跨国公司产业链中具有相对竞争优势和发展潜力的企业及项目，作为优先支持的重点领域，并制定与国际惯例接轨的阶段性优惠政策。     

Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty

Abstract. I evaluate a new German regulation that requires retail discounters to guarantee the availability of their products in bargain sales. The regulation is meant to prevent loss leaders. Retailers undermine the regulation's rationale by claiming that rationing is due to demand uncertainty. This paper shows that under demand uncertainty the regulation has ambiguous welfare effects. Effectively, it raises production, which, under imperfect competition, tends to be beneficial. However, the regulation overshoots and decreases welfare if it requires availability for a state of high demand that is relatively unlikely. In this case more sophisticated regulation is required.     

Buyer power and supplier incentives

This paper analyzes the origins and welfare consequences of buyer power. We show that if suppliers are capacity constrained or have strictly convex costs, there are two different channels through which large buyers can obtain more favorable terms from their suppliers. In particular, we show how the presence of large buyers can then erode the value of suppliers’ outside option. Somewhat surprisingly, we show how this can induce suppliers to undertake strategies that lead to higher output and potentially higher welfare.     

Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo.     

A note on cheap talk and burned money

Austen-Smith and Banks [Cheap talk and burned money, J. Econ. Theory 91(1) (2000) 1-16] study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel [Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50(6) (1982) 1431-1451]. I identify an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning. This strengthens a result of Austen-Smith and Banks, but uncovers other errors in their analysis. Finally, an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.     

Irreversible investment and Knightian uncertainty

When firms make a decision about irreversible investment, they may not have complete confidence about their perceived probability measure describing future uncertainty. They may think other probability measures perturbed from the original one are also possible. Such uncertainty, characterized by not a single probability measure but a set of probability measures, is called “Knightian uncertainty.” The effect of Knightian uncertainty on the value of irreversible investment opportunity is shown to be drastically different from that of traditional uncertainty in the form of risk. Specifically, an increase in Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of investment opportunity while an increase in risk increases it.