网络环境下图书馆信息咨询服务的新模式

图书馆的信息咨询服务在网络信息的湍流中感到了前所未有的压力，这对图书馆工作既是挑战，又是机遇。本文讨论了网络环境下图书馆的发展变化，指出图书馆无论在传统条件下还是在网络环境下，信息咨询服务都是图书馆工作的主题，图书馆只有在信息咨询服务方面不     

风险投资股份转让的博弈分析

本文讨论风险投资股份转让的两种方式的比选问题,基于信息的不对称程度,可实现的交易范围相应变小,而随着风险企业控制方的不同,不同的转让方武是最优的.     

参与管理对组织效率的影响

在当今社会，人们发现单纯依靠命令式管理来提高员工工作效率，似乎收效不大，于是寻求人本管理，采取激励的方法来提高员工的积极性，以影响组织效率。本文通过让员工参与管理，满足员工个人成长、自我价值实现的需要，充分调动员工的积极性，达到组织效率提高的目的。     

责任感、信任感与职工持股

中国企业中实行的职工持股制度，目的是为了解决长期以来企业中存在的“人人皆主人，无人会负责”的职工缺乏主人翁意识的状况。职工在工作中的责任感和信任感的存在，对企业的活动及其效益皆具有非常重要的意义。职工持股制度的着眼点是把激励建立在可感知的利益和“期望的利益”之上，这对于增强企业职工的主人翁意识与强化企业与职工之间的信任关系大有益处，它使职工对企业的参与有了可靠的物质基础和切入点。     

悖论思维对创造力的“过犹不及”效应研究

悖论思维帮助个体发现对立事物间的联系,有利于创造性想法或创意的生成,但过高水平的悖论思维极易导致认知过载,使个体无暇顾及需要想象力和灵感的创造性活动。基于"过犹不及效应",本文提出悖论思维对员工创造力产生非线性影响。同时,根据能力-动机-机会(AMO)的理论框架,探索个人学习能力在这一关系中的中介作用,以及领导调节聚焦行为的调节作用。本文认为:悖论思维与员工创造力呈倒U型关系,个人学习能力在上述关系中起中介传导作用,领导促进型聚焦行为强化了变量间的间接关系,而领导防御型聚焦行为削弱了变量间的间接关系。通过对313名员工的三阶段调查分析,数据支持了本研究提出的假设。虽然适度的悖论思维有助于员工提升学习能力,但过度的悖论思维反而会降低员工学习效率进而削弱员工创造力,领导调节聚焦行为决定了员工是否能完成学习能力到创造力的转化。研究结论为员工创造力的影响因素研究提供了新思路,引导企业通过甄选员工和调整领导行为来激发员工创造力。     

Information processing and innovative choice

In this paper we examine how the information processing of subjects who make an innovative choice (innovators) differs from that of subjects who make a noninnovative choice (noninnovators). The task involves selection of an alternative within a range of prerated product category innovativeness. We propose that subjects who seek 1) impersonal/uncontrollable sources, 2) higher levels of information, 3) more detailed (versus summary) data, and 4) noncomparative (versus comparative) data are more likely to make innovative choices. The research method is a computerized process tracing experiment utilizing Search Monitor (Brucks 1988).The authors wish to express their gratitude to Merrie Brucks for the use of and help with Search Monitor and to Eric Johnson, Dave Schmittlein, and Mita Sujan for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

资本市场变迁及运行效率相关研究评析

资本市场变迁及运行效率是中外学者研究的重点，形成了许多理论流派，其中信息空间理论为资本市场制度变迁提供了新的分析框架。同时，中国资本市场正处在发展建设之中，亟需有效的理论指导其发展。然而，中国资本市场的不完备性和特殊性导致诸多理论的应用存在局限性。而信息是各理论流派研究的核心，只是角度和侧重点不同，故信息空间理论可为研究资本市场变迁和制度选择提供新的研究思路。     

Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions

Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information.