Central versus local states: Which matters more in affecting China's urban growth?

To date, many geography studies have identified GDP, population, FDI, and transportation factors as key drivers of urban growth in China. The political science literature has demonstrated that China's urban growth is also driven by powerful economic and fiscal incentives for local governments, as well as by the political incentives of local leaders who control land use in their jurisdictions. These parallel but distinct research traditions limit a comprehensive understanding that can result in partial and potentially misleading conclusions of urbanization in China. This paper presents a spatially explicit study that incorporates both political science and geographic perspectives to understand the relative importance of hierarchal administrative governments in affecting urban growth. We use multi-level modeling approach to examine how socio-economic and policy factors – represented here by fiscal transfers – at different administrative levels affect growth in “urban hotspot counties” across three time periods (1995–2000, 2000–2005, and 2005–2008). Our results show that counties that are more dependent on fiscal transfers from the central government convert less cultivated land to urban use, controlling for other factors. We also find that local governments are becoming more powerful in shaping urban land development as a result of local economic, fiscal, and political incentives, as well as through the practical management and control of capital, land, and human resources. By incorporating fiscal transfers in our analysis, our study examines a factor in the urban development of China that had previously been neglected and provides an improved understanding of the underlying processes and pathways involved in urban growth in China.     

Job transfers and job-bid systems in restructuring Japanese and American firms

When Japanese firms restructured their operations in the 1990s, Japanese employees were not fired and were often transferred together in groups inside firms or to related outside firms. Undergoing similar business restructuring from the late 1980s on, American firms fired low-performing white-collar employees, and excess midoodle-performing white-collar employees were fired if they could not locate other jobs in the firms by using 'job-bid' systems (systems that identifyopenings and allow individuals at their own choosing to 'bid' for those openings). American unionized blue-collar workers were laid off based on seniority rules. Although similar job-bid systems were introduced into Japanese firms in the 1990s, they were used only for certain white-collar jobs. In the United States, job-bid systems commonly were used for both blue- and white-collar employees. Overall, the Japanese employment system was characterized by management control and stable employment in contrast to the active role played by individual choice in an environment of unstable employment in the United States.     

Cross‐border information transfers: Evidence from profit warnings issued by European firms

This paper reports evidence on cross‐border accounting information transfers associated with profit warning announcements. Using a sample of firms from 29 European countries, we find that negative earnings surprises disclosed by firms in one country affect investors’ perceptions of comparable non‐announcing firms in other countries. The form and magnitude of cross‐border effects is consistent with domestic transfers. Tests explaining variation in cross‐border information transfers provide some (albeit rather limited) evidence that effects vary according to a range of firm‐, industryand country‐level characteristics.     

Cash vs. in-kind transfers: Indian data meets theory

This paper uses qualitative and quantitative data from a survey of over 1200 rural households in nine Indian states to explore the arguments for and against cash and in-kind (in this case, food) transfers. When respondents were asked to think about, argue, and ‘choose’ between the two, two-thirds of the respondents expressed a preference for food. Rather than the choice made by respondents, the focus here is on understanding the reasons behind their choice, as explained by beneficiaries themselves. Two main findings emerge. First, some arguments corroborate existing theory (e.g., paternalism, fungibility), but others (e.g., self-control, transition costs) are not incorporated in existing theory on the advantages of in-kind transfers. Second, context is important. Most importantly, respondents’ reported preferences were associated with the benefits they were experiencing under the status quo: where the PDS performed better at distributing food, respondents were more likely to report preferring food to cash transfers. The contention of traditional theory that cash is superior fails to factor in contextual concerns.     

农地流转：历史、困境与制度创新

文章采用激励理论、合约理论的分析方法,探讨了中国农村土地流转发展缓慢的原因：农户土地转让激励不足、关系型合约限制了农地转让的发展。只有通过完善农户转让的激励机制,实现由关系型合约向规则型合约的转变,才能真正使农地流转起来。     

美国的金融自由化与经济虚拟化

本文阐述美国金融自由化政策与经济虚拟化的关系。美国经济虚拟化的核心是杠杆机制、金融创新机制,以及债务—美元体系下的国际资本自由流动。2008年美国金融危机是经济、金融去杠杆化的危机和美元危机,金融市场没有能力恢复对高杠杆机制的信心,美国经济和美元地位也就相对下降。政府在推行金融自由化政策时,要注重对高杠杆金融活动的管制,对虚拟经济发展进行更系统的干预。     

Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go?

Business support policies are widespread in advanced countries, to foster employment and productivity. This paper analyses the role of organized crime in the allocation of public subsidies to businesses. We assemble an innovative data set on the Italian mafia at municipality level and test whether mafia-ridden municipalities receive a disproportionally higher amount of funds. We exploit exogenous variation at municipality level to instrument mafia activity and show that the presence of organized crime positively affects the probability of obtaining funding and the amount of public funds. Organized crime is also found to lead to episodes of corruption in the public administration sector. A series of robustness checks confirms the above findings.