Natural disasters,growth and institutions: A tale of two earthquakes

We examine the impact of natural disasters on GDP per capita by applying the synthetic control approach and using a within-country perspective. Our analysis encompasses two large-scale earthquakes that occurred in two different Italian regions in 1976 and 1980. We show that the short-term effects are negligible in both regions, though they become negative if we simulate the GDP that would have been observed in absence of financial aid. In the long-term, our findings indicate a positive effect in one case and a negative effect in the other, largely reflecting divergent patterns of the TFP. Consistent with these findings, we offer further evidence suggesting that a quake and related financial aid might either increase technical efficiency via a disruptive creation mechanism or reduce it by stimulating corruption, distorting the markets and deteriorating social capital. Finally, we show that the bad outcome is more likely to occur in regions with lower pre-quake institutional quality. As a result, our evidence suggests that unanticipated local shocks are likely to change long run growth rates, exacerbating territorial disparities.     

The evolution of corruption and development in transitional economies: Evidence from China

It is widely accepted in the literature, that the level of corruption is negatively and robustly related to economic development. However, skeptics argue that for transitional economies, this relationship may not hold. Economic reform loosens up the control of local officials and can increase corruption; Corruption and per capita income can be positively related. Using panel provincial data of China from 1995 to 2014 on prosecuted cases of corruption, we discover that during the early phase of China’s economic reform (during Zhu Rongji and Hu-Wen administrations), a positive short-run relationship is indeed observed. But, there is a robust negative long-run cointegration relationship between corruption and per capita income. The development of the market economy improves private wage and income in the long-run. The relatively inefficient and low returns to ordinary corruption cannot compete with rising market returns, which lead to dwindling corruption. However, the share of major corruption cases is increasing over time to be able to compete with rising market wages.     

Limited attention,share repurchases,and takeover risk

We hypothesize that announcing open market share repurchases (OMRs) to counter negative valuation shocks reveals repurchasing firms’ lost growth opportunities or underperforming assets to potential bidders, making them more likely to become takeover targets. This also leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, a systematic risk associated with economic fundamentals that drive takeover waves, as proposed by Cremers et al. (2009). Indeed, we find that repurchasing firms tend to face higher takeover probability in the first few years following their OMR announcements, and that the increase in takeover risk can largely explain their post-announcement long-run abnormal returns documented in the literature. The increase in takeover risk is larger for smaller firms, firms with poorer pre-announcement stock performance, and those attracting more attention of market participants. Our results suggest that OMRs, which are used by many firms to counter undervaluation, could make the firms more sensitive to takeover waves and raise their cost of equity capital.     

A characterization of the extended serial correspondence

We study the problem of assigning objects to a group of agents. We focus on probabilistic methods that take agents’ ordinal preferences over the objects. Importantly, we allow for indifferences among objects. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) propose the extended serial correspondence to solve this problem. Our main result is a characterization of the extended serial correspondence in welfare terms by means of stochastic dominance efficiency, stochastic dominance no-envy and “limited invariance,” a requirement we adapt from Heo (2014a). We also prove that an assignment matrix is selected by the extended serial correspondence if and only if it satisfies “non-wastefulness” and “ordinal fairness,” which we adapt from Kesten et al. (2011).     

Effects of subject pool culture and institutional environment on corruption: Experimental evidence from Albania

This research uses experimental methods to investigate whether subject pool culture and institutional environment have an effect on participants’ corrupt behavior in the laboratory. While we find that subject pool culture does not affect the overall magnitude of corruption of laboratory participants, it does affect the likelihood of corruption and its distribution. Additionally, we find that the effect on corrupt behavior differs with the framing of the experiment’s instructions. Interestingly, in the context of a weak rule of law and high levels of corruption, loaded negative instructions positively affect corrupt behavior of firms and public officials. Previous research in the context of a country exhibiting a strong rule of law and low levels of corruption finds no framing effects. We also find that increasing the probability of detection significantly reduces corruption as measured by the amount of the bribes offered/accepted and the probability of offering/accepting a bribe. Finally, we find that individual risk preferences negatively affect the level of corrupt behavior.     

The effects of mega-events on perceived corruption

In recent decades, the media have covered many cases of corruption related to the celebration of mega-events around the globe. In most of these cases, politicians and other high officials are involved. This paper analyses the effect of hosting mega-events on the level of perceived corruption in 34 OECD countries, during 1996–2017. Summer and Winter Olympic Games, FIFA World Cups, and Universal Expositions are considered. Results show that, when we take the year of the celebration of the event as the turning point, there is no robust evidence in favour of a positive impact on perceived corruption. However, when we take the election date of the host country as the threshold, the magnitude of the effect is lasting, reaching its maximum value 1–2 years before the celebration itself, and increasing the perceived level of corruption by about 4%.     

Domestic or global imbalances? Rising income risk and the fall in the US current account

When default leads to exclusion from financial markets, the implied loss of consumption smoothing opportunities is more costly when income volatility is high. A rise in income risk thus makes default less attractive, allowing creditors to relax borrowing limits. I show how, in an open economy, this endogenous financial deepening may reduce aggregate foreign assets in response to a rise in individual income risk, against the precautionary savings intuition. Conditions for this depend on whether default constrains complete or uncontingent contracts. The post-1980 rise in US household income risk strongly reduces foreign assets when domestic markets are complete or world interest rates low.     

Bribery,corruption and bureaucratic hassle: Evidence from Myanmar

Corruption has been found to be the most severe obstacle to business operations, according to a recent survey of over 3000 firms in Myanmar. This paper sets out to understand the structure of corruption through an econometric analysis of this survey. It finds that firms with higher ‘ability to pay’ (proxied by sales revenue and employee growth) are more likely to pay bribes. While firms with lower ‘refusal power’ (i.e. those dependent on bureaucratic permissions to export and import) are more likely to find corruption to be an obstacle. A distinct but related question is whether bribes act as ‘efficiency grease’ by allowing firms to circumvent red tape. No evidence is found to support this hypothesis; in fact, firms that pay bribes report greater bureaucratic hassle compared to firms that do not. This result fits in more closely with the view that red tape could be used to extract bribes from firms.     

洗钱罪刑事立法之完善——以《联合国反腐败公约》为视角

《联合国反腐败公约》对洗钱犯罪作了规定,我国现行《刑法》对洗钱罪的规定与《公约》存在较大差异,从而使我国对洗钱罪及其上游犯罪的预防和打击的效果受到影响。我们有必要根据《公约》的规定完善我国关于洗钱犯罪的立法。     

经济发展中的地方官员行为研究——基于政治晋升、财政分权与腐败的视角

本文同时考虑财政分权、政治晋升和腐败三个因素对地方官员行为的影响,进而构建了理论模型。从中得到的主要结论是,在基本模型中,地方官员对政治晋升的偏好程度越高,则其努力程度越高、腐败程度越低。而财政分权程度越高,官员的努力也越高,但对腐败水平影响却是不确定的。在进一步假设腐败会被惩罚的拓展模型中,基本模型的大部分结论都没有发生太大变化,只是分权程度的对努力的影响也变得不确定了。除此之外,我们进一步研究了,对官员腐败惩罚的力度和对官员腐败的惩罚准确程度的影响,相关命题表明,如果对官员腐败惩罚的越严厉,并且对官员腐败的惩罚越准确,官员努力水平和官员腐败程度都会变低。通过对研究结论的分析,我们还对以往文献的结果进行了重新解释。