Relevance of corruption on the effect of public health expenditure and taxation on economic growth

We investigate whether corruption distorts the positive effect of public health expenditure and taxation on growth through panel data analysis of 75 developing countries for the period from 1995 to 2014. The findings indicate that, although both public health expenditure and taxation can increase economic growth, in countries with more corrupt governments this effect is reduced.     

重商文化、腐败与企业创新投资

目前,关于企业创新投资决策的研究对正式制度关注较多,对非正式制度研究较少。检验了作为非正式制度的重商文化如何影响企业创新投入水平,以及重商文化与地区腐败在影响企业创新投入方面的相互关系。研究发现：相对于受重商文化影响较弱地区的上市公司,受重商文化影响较强地区的上市公司创新投入水平更高,且这一影响主要发生在非国有企业。同时,受腐败挤出效应和替代效应的影响,重商文化对企业创新投入的促进作用在腐败程度较低的地区更显著。     

Natural resource dependence, non-tradables, and economic growth

I argue that the commonly used nominal measure of natural resource dependence – the share of exports of primary products in GNP – understates in growth regressions the negative link between natural resource dependence and per capita GDP growth. I show that using a purchasing power parity adjusted measure yields an economically much larger negative relationship between per capita GDP growth and natural resource dependence than what has been suggested by the nominal measure. Consistent with the rent-seeking literature, I show that the resource curse is a symptom of societies characterized by high levels of corruption and sluggish checks and balances on political decision-making.     

反洗钱国际合作与犯罪资产分享问题研究

洗钱犯罪具有诸多上游犯罪,腐败犯罪是其中之一。腐败犯罪,特别是跨国腐败犯罪,日益演化成为跨国洗钱犯罪。犯罪行为人利用国际金融快速便捷的汇兑工具,实施转移腐败赃款的活动。通过跨国洗钱活动,可以使犯罪分子获取大量的现金,并进而从事经营活动,聚敛更多的非法财产,获取更多的经济资源,从而为进一步实施腐败活动提供经济支持。为此,国际社会给予高度重视,在腐败资产追回和预防腐败资产转移目标下,探讨反洗钱国际合作,以及犯罪资产分享等理论和实践问题,为腐败资产追回和预防腐败资产转移探索国际合作途径,提高反腐败国际合作成效提供方法上的参考。我国为研究实施《联合国反腐败公约》,投入较大的精力,成立了国家预防腐败局,并广泛开展反腐败国际合作,推动实施《联合国反腐败公约》的步伐。本文就围绕以上问题,从反腐败国际合作实践角度,运用实证思考方法加以研究,以期为反腐败调查、追回腐败资产、开展反洗钱合作提供总结与建议性思想材料。     

由“问责风暴”谈公务员行政法律责任的完善

一段时间以来。国内安全事故频频见诸报端,有不少官员被依法追究行政法律责任,其影响之大被媒体形容为中国掀起“问责风暴”。这种现象应当引起我们对公务员行政法律责任完善的思考,问责应当形成常态机制,而不能是运动式的追责效果．在这方面可以借鉴香港地区的“廉政公署”制度,健全公务员行政问责机制。     

新兴市场经济国家腐败对经济影响研究:基于1995-2008年实证分析

当学术界观点一致强调腐败将为国家经济发展带来巨大不良后果的同时,新兴市场经济国家却以经济快速增长且腐败较为严重的情况展现于世人。本文拟透过实证分析,以人均GDP增长率作为因变量,探讨可能影响经济发展的变量,如实际国内固定资产增长率、就业人口增长率、中学入学率、政治稳定程度、腐败程度等,探究在新兴市场经济国家中,这些因素,特别是腐败对经济增长有何影响。     

Individual investor’s limited attention and IPO performance

The paper models and verifies the spread and decay of investor’s attention before listing on the stock market by using the Baidu Index as a proxy for investor attention of the frequency of searches. We find that individual investor’s attention has a significant influence on the first-day IPO return. We empirically study the allocation of investor attention among several stocks and discover that the more stocks going public on the same day, the milder and more similar their performance tends to be. This paper is the first to research IPO performance and individual attention.     

Investment Flows,Economic Growth,and Corruption in African Countries: An Analysis

ABSTRACT

The analysis of corruption in international business is a relatively new phenomenon, and for the past two decades, many studies have attempted to capture the economic impact of the corruption in a country. However, most of these studies have concentrated their analysis to the experiences of the developed countries. None or very few of the current works have addressed the corruption issue in the context of foreign direct investment and economic growth in the developing countries. This work examines theoretically, as well as empirically, the incidence of corruption in the context of foreign direct investment in the developing countries, especially several African countries that signed a treaty to reduce the incidence of corruption in their respective countries.     

Bridging Africa’s income inequality gap: How relevant is China’s outward FDI to Africa?

This study examines whether: (i) the remarkable inflow of Chinese FDI to Africa matters for bridging the continent’s marked income inequality gap, (ii) Africa’s institutional fabric is effective in propelling Chinese FDI towards the equalisation of incomes in Africa and (iii) there exist relevant thresholds required for the various governance dynamics to cause Chinese FDI to equalise incomes in Africa. Our results, which are based on the dynamic GMM estimator and macrodata for 48 African countries, reveal the following. First, although Chinese FDI contributes to fairer income distribution in Africa, the effect is weak. Second, although Africa’s institutional fabric matters for propelling Chinese FDI towards the equalisation of incomes across the continent, governance mechanisms for ensuring political stability, low corruption, and voice and accountability are critical. Finally, the critical masses required for these three key governance dynamics to cause Chinese FDI and other income inequality-reducing modules to reduce income inequality are 0.8, 0.5 and 0.1, respectively. These critical masses are thresholds at which governance is necessary but no longer sufficient to complement Chinese FDI to mitigate income inequality. Hence, at the attendant thresholds, complementary policies are worthwhile. Policy recommendations are provided in the conclusion.     

Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy

This paper describes a model where the size of the informal sector decreases as the degree to which financing contracts can be enforced in the formal sector rises. Agents who choose to operate in the informal sector can evade taxes, but they have no access to official means of contract enforcement. Numerical simulations of the model suggest that lax tax enforcement alone does not suffice to generate a large informal sector. Contractual imperfections, on the other hand, can generate a large informal sector and account for several distinguishing features of the organization of production in developing economies. I would like to thank Tim Kehoe, Ed Prescott and Manuel Santos for their guidance, and seminar participants at ITAM, the Universidad Torcuato di Tella and the University of Montréal for their valuable comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.