国企改革方向:劳动者所有制

"全民所有制"企业的建立不是与民争利,而是为民谋利。没有很好地实现这一目的的原因,一是国家利益高于一切的"战时"思维,潜意识中根深蒂固的按资分配观念和企业国有观念,使国家、企业、经营者、职工之间的利益关系失衡,造成国有企业不能形成有效的利益激励机制;二是缺乏有效的管理运行机制,委托代理关系中的道德风险太大;三是社会负担过重;四是税收负担不公平。国企改革既不能固守"国家所有制",也不应搞私有化,纯粹的"全民所有制"更不现实,正确的选择应是"劳动者所有制"。     

Risk-taking behaviour and ownership in the banking industry: The Spanish evidence

This paper analyses the determinants of risk-taking in Spanish financial intermediaries, with special emphasis on the ownership structure and size of the different entities. On the one hand, the specific legal configuration of Spanish Savings banks may lead them to differ from Commercial banks in their risk behaviour. In particular, they may invest in riskier projects. Nevertheless, other theories indicate that greater stockholder control in Commercial banks may induce them towards greater risk-taking in certain situations. In this paper we test these hypotheses with a dynamic panel data model (1993–2000) for Spanish Commercial banks and Savings banks. We analyse whether differences in risk behaviour are related to different ownership structures or to other factors such as the size of the entity.     

中国高新技术产业研发资本存量和研发产出效率

本文运用中国高新技术产业的面板数据，在测算研发资本存量的基础上．构建了柯布一道格拉斯型研发生产函数．研究了研发生产的要素投入问题、研发生产的性质及其相关影响因素。研究发现：（1）在我国高新技术产业研发生产中，研发资本的贡献高于研发人员的贡献，研发生产过程表现出规模报酬递增的特征；（2）外资产权、企业规模对研发产出效率呈显著正效用；国有产权、以企业数为指标的市场结构以及绩效（利润和税收）对研发产出效率呈显著负效用：（3）我国国有及国有控股高新技术企业产权清晰度较高．对研发产出效率负面影响较小；法制不健全、政策不稳定等外部因素对我国高新技术产业研发产出效率负面影响较大。     

Large shareholders’ power and the quality of corporate governance: An analysis of Brazilian firms

This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to implement the corporate governance system that favors their interests within a framework of highly concentrated ownership and poor legal protection for investors. A metric for corporate governance based on the fulfillment of non-mandatory rules of good corporate governance is used. System GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimates for a balanced panel data of Brazilian firms reveal that the ownership concentration is detrimental to corporate governance quality and the quality of board composition. In accordance with the expropriation effect on principal-principal agency conflicts, by weakening the corporate governance system and board composition, large controlling shareholders may use private benefits of control. As proposed by the substitution effect, in a complementary way, controlling shareholders may renounce strong boards and directly perform management monitoring, mitigating agency conflicts with managers. Finally, the ability of large shareholders other than the main blockholder is not enough to contest his/her power to shape the corporate governance system. The work provides evidence of the prominence of the principal–principal agency problem in an emerging market, by analyzing the effect of ownership concentration over the quality of the corporate governance system, and also that other large non-controlling shareholders are not able to contest the power of the main blockholder.     

Institutional investors and firm performance: Evidence from IPOs

We investigate the post-IPO evolution of institutional investor holdings and the manner in which operating performance is related to these holdings. During the first year after the IPO, average institutional holdings increase from 24% to 36% of shares outstanding and stabilize at about 42% by the end of the second year. We document that post-IPO operating performance is positively related to institutional holdings, but this relation subsides in the third year after the IPO. Overall, our findings indicate that institutional ownership is a valid indicator of the firm’s operating performance in its initial years as a public company.     

Franchising: Directions for Future Research

There have been important contributions to the literature on franchising in recent years, but many interesting questions have received less attention than they deserve. In this paper, I briefly highlight four of these: (i) the existence of master franchising and multi-unit ownership, (ii) the differences in the intensity of franchising across sectors, (iii) international franchising, and (iv) the problems surrounding the adoption of new technologies and adaptation in franchised chains. While not exhaustive, this set of topics illustrates the variety of potential franchise-related research topics.     

个人大股东持股与股价暴跌风险

本文以2007至2016年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了个人大股东持股与股价暴跌风险之间的关系。研究发现:第一,个人大股东持股比例的增加能够显著降低公司未来股价暴跌风险。这一结论在剔除了个人大股东中董监高持股数量、进行内生性处理、更换不同统计检验方法后依然成立。第二,个人大股东持股对公司管理层监督的效果并不明显,个人大股东持股比例的增加对于公司应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理、投资效率、过度投资等可能影响公司股价暴跌风险的经营指标并没有显著影响。第三,个人大股东的持股加强了公司股权制衡的力度,进而显著降低了公司股价暴跌风险。股权制衡机制解释了大股东持股对股价暴跌风险一半以上的影响。本文的研究对于全面认识个人大股东在资本市场中发挥的作用,促进股市平稳发展具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

Separation versus Affiliation with Partial Vertical Ownership in Network Industries

Abstract

The separation of integrated monopolies and new market entrants has changed vertical interactions between suppliers and dealers. Firms have substituted full integration with vertical restraints, leading to collusive behaviour harmful to competition. We examine how a partial vertical ownership (an affiliation) of one of the competing downstream retailers by the upstream monopoly could help internalise the production decision after a complete divestiture. Our results in a Cournot framework confirm the positive role of partial integration on firms’ profits and consumer surplus in increasing social welfare. These results are consistent with empirical studies of economies after vertical separation in network industries.     

Emerging economies and institutional quality: Assessing the differential effects of institutional distances on ownership strategy

The current study contributes to the institution-based view of internationalization that is contingent upon the home country development. We examine the differential effects of formal and informal institutions on emerging market multinational corporations’ (EMNCs) ownership strategies. Facing a large informal institutional distance that represents diverse cultural beliefs, EMNCs opt for a low ownership position that alleviates legitimacy threat, whereas a large formal institutional distance leads EMNCs to establish dominant ownership control. EMNC home market conditions, including market size and regulatory institutional quality, further explain the differential effects of institutional distances.     

Unpacking Institutional Distance: Addressing Human Capital Development and Emerging‐Market Firms’ Ownership Strategy in an Advanced Economy

As latecomers to global business competition, emerging‐market multinational companies (EMNCs) utilize cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to quickly acquire strategic assets, resulting in an improved competitive position. Advanced markets with well‐established firms and well‐developed market‐supporting institutions become particularly important destinations for EMNCs’ foreign operations. Institutional distance, which represents conflicting legitimacy requirements between the host and home institutional environments, is expected to be negatively associated with the foreign acquirer's ownership position. The current study examines a sample of EMNCs’ cross‐border M&As in the United States between 2005 and 2011 and reveals the unique nature of EMNCs’ ownership strategies. Taking both formal and informal institutions into consideration, our findings suggest that EMNCs originating in countries with lower levels of human capital development may have more urgency in seeking ownership control in advanced markets and are less influenced by the negative association of institutional distance in their ownership strategy. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.