Investment liberalization — Why a restrictive cross-border merger policy can be counterproductive

Investment liberalizing countries are often concerned that cross-border mergers and acquisitions, in contrast to greenfield investments, might have an adverse effect on domestic firms and consumers. However, given that domestic assets are sufficiently scarce, we identify a preemption effect and an asset complementarity effect, which imply that the acquisition price is substantially higher than the domestic seller's profits. Moreover, we show that for the acquisition to take place, the MNE must be sufficiently efficient when using the domestic assets, otherwise rivals will expand their business, thereby making the acquisition unprofitable. Consequently, restricting cross-border M&As may also hurt consumers.     

股权结构与企业股利政策选择关系:理论与实证分析

本文从公司治理视角出发,以中国上市公司为样本,对股权结构与企业股利政策关系进行了理论与实证分析。结果表明,管理者持股比例、股权集中度(包括第一大股东持股比例)与现金股利支付率显著正相关;国有股比例与现金股利支付率正相关;法人股比例和流通A股比例对现金股利支付率的影响可能是负向的,且极不显著。     

公司治理结构特征与困境公司恢复——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

目前学者们对公司财务困境的研究主要集中在事前的困境预测上,而对公司陷入财务困境后如何恢复研究较少。本文选取2005—2009年国内被ST的上市公司为研究样本,将研究样本分为逐渐走出财务困境的公司（一类公司）和一直处于财务困境中的公司（二类公司）,从董事会特征、股权结构以及管理层持股这三个方面来比较分析这两类公司在陷入财务困境之后的公司治理结构差异对困境恢复的影响。研究结果表明,公司处于不同的财务情况下,大股东们对公司绩效的影响是不一样的。当公司逐渐陷入财务困境的过程中,大股东们对公司绩效没有显著性的影响;而在公司逐渐摆脱财务的过程中,大股东们对公司绩效有显著的正面影响,此时的公司治理关键在于股权集中度,大股东在公司摆脱财务困境中起到了重要作用。     

Are Multiple Directorships Beneficial in East Asia?

We posit that the benefits and costs of multiple directorships are conditional on firm characteristics. We find firm valuation is positively associated with multiple directorships in (i) firms with high advising needs and (ii) firms with high external financing needs. These beneficial effects of multiple directorships are generally stronger in countries with weak shareholder rights and in firms that are widely held. However, when controlling shareholder hold high voting‐rights to cash‐flow rights, multiple directorships reduce firm valuation, especially in countries with weak shareholder rights and in closely held firms. As multiple directorships increases, cash holdings (capital expenditures) contribute less to shareholder value. The negative association between value of cash (capital expenditure) and busy boards is mitigated in firms with (i) high advising needs, (ii) high external financing needs and (iii) less entrenched ownership structures.     

上市公司股权结构对投资决策的影响实证研究

大量研究表明股权结构影响公司价值。从价值的创造过程看，股权结构首先影响公司投资，从而影响公司价值。解释股权结构如何影响公司投资具有非常重要的意义。通过计量经济方法对我国上市公司股权结构如何影响公司投资的研究表明，国有股东控股的公司存在过度投资行为，而非国有股东控股的公司能够较好地控制过度投资。我国国有控股公司现有股权结构导致了扭曲的公司投资决策。     

高校科技成果转化现实障碍及其破解机制

高校科技成果转化率低的现实早已引起社会各界警觉,但理论研究和实践探索都将权属改革视为破解圭臬,并未实现预期目标。事实上,高校科技成果转化的真正障碍是专利技术水平和转化价值低、专业转化人才与机构缺失、中试环节薄弱且资金匮乏。因此,为了针对高校成果转化痛点精准施策,释放创新驱动效能,我国应改革专利管理体制和科研评价机制,提升专利质量并加大科学研究对企业需求的关照;可借鉴牛津大学的做法,由高校在不增加编制的前提下,独资建立自负盈亏的专业转化服务公司;优化科研经费投入结构,引导多元风险资金进入,健全科技成果转化风险投资机制。     

Corporate governance,accounting and finance: A review

We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.     

Ownership concentration, voluntary disclosures and information asymmetry in New Zealand

This paper investigates the impact of different classes of ownership concentration on information asymmetry conditional upon corporate voluntary disclosures in New Zealand. The current paper attempts to extend this stream of research by incorporating three mutually exclusive ownership structures and considering the interactive relationship between such ownership structures and corporate voluntary disclosures. Results reveal that ownership concentration in general is significantly positively associated with bid-ask spreads (proxy for information asymmetry) observed around annual report release dates. This finding supports the adverse selection hypothesis and importantly this effect is found to be most pronounced for financial institutions and management-controlled ownership categories. When voluntary disclosure is taken into account, the findings demonstrate that disclosures significantly attenuate information asymmetry risk associated with ownership concentration. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms with management-controlled ownership structures. The findings highlight the importance of corporate disclosures under concentrated ownership structures especially management-controlled ownership structures in reducing information asymmetry and enhancing market efficiency in New Zealand.     

试论农村信用社体制改革及路径选择

本文从农村信用社的民主管理制度本身进行探讨,研究民主管理制度与当前农村金融的相容性问题。本文的基本判断是：正如自由竞争可能导致垄断一样,合作制所体现的民主管理是一种一厢情愿的制度构想,其所导致的内部人控制是民主制的悖论。因此,如果要继续坚持农村信用社继续为“三农”服务的基本方向,必须在现实上放弃空想式的民主制度,近期实行治理结构的准国有化,远期实行所有制的民营化,并在整体金融领域实行“反向剪刀差”。     

控制股东的掏空行为与公司的股权结构及公司价值——基于双层委托代理模型的分析

本文构建了一个小股东、控制股东和经理人之间的双层委托代理理论分析框架来分析我国上市公司中同时存在的两类代理问题:股东与经理人的利益冲突以及控制股东与小股东的利益冲突。在此基础上着重研究了控制股东掏空行为与公司股权结构及公司价值之间的关系。通过分析指出:(1)均衡状态下,公司的所有权集中程度由公司股东所受投资者法律保护程度决定。随着投资者法律保护程度的增加,小股东最优的投资数量也会增加,公司的所有权结构趋于更加分散。(2)在公司的现金流所有权结构确定的情况下,由股东和经理人之间的信息非对称性引起的股东和经理人之间的利益冲突会减少公司价值,使得控制股东和小股东的利益均受到损害。控制股东掏空资产收益的比例随着其自身现金流所有权的增加而减少,随着其控制权和所有权之间的分离程度而增加,随着投资者法律保护的增加而减少。(3)相对于公司中仅仅存在股东和经理人之间的利益冲突的情形,控制股东的掏空行为会进一步降低公司的价值,而且降低的程度会随着控制股东的控制权和所有权的分离程度的增加而增加。(4)当控制股东完全不能进行掏空时,即使小股东仍然面临由于公司中的第Ⅰ类代理问题引起的利益损害,但均衡时,由于控制股东和小股东之间不存在利...