Remittance,Institutions and Investment Volatility Interactions: An Intercontinental Analysis

Generating massive investment for growth and development has been one of the main policy goals of most economies around the globe. Countries, most especially developing ones, are highly susceptible to investment volatility owing largely to the fragile nature of their economies as well as weaknesses in terms of dysfunctional institutions. Therefore, sound economic management suggests the need to better understand possible sources for mitigating the adverse effects of investment volatility. Remittances have been identified as important capital flows which do a good job of dousing macroeconomic volatilities. It is on this basis that the study sought to uncover the causal relationship between remittances and investment volatility via the intermediating role of institutions. Using a panel of 70 countries and the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, three insightful outcomes come to the fore. First, remittances played countercyclical roles across the estimated regressions. Second, institutional quality had no significant role in mitigating investment volatility and lastly, the interactive terms of both remittances and institutions significantly mitigated the negative impacts of investment volatility with the exception of the political component of the institutional architecture. Policy suggestions are drawn based on our results.     

Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.     

Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty

We study the formation of advocacy groups and how they can impact policy outcomes by revealing information about voters׳ preferences to uninformed political candidates. We conduct a laboratory experiment based on a two-candidate spatial electoral competition setting where the policy preferences of voters are (initially) unknown and change over time. In the control treatment candidates learn about the preferred policy of the median voter through the voting outcome of elections. In the advocacy treatments, voters can organize themselves into advocacy groups in order to reveal their policy preferences. We find that voters often overcome the collective action problem of forming an advocacy group. In fact, we observe the formation of both informative advocacy groups, which convey new information, and uninformative advocacy groups, which do not. Overall, advocacy groups significantly speed up the convergence to the preferred policy of the median voter. However, advocacy does not lead to higher earnings as the gains from faster convergence are offset by the costs of group formation.     

Do the poor benefit from globalization regardless of institutional quality?

Despite significant progress towards the Millennium goals, more than one billion people live on less than 1.25 US dollars per day. Previous research suggests that globalization stimulates poverty reduction, but does not investigate what role institutions play in this relationship. Theoretically, globalization could act as either a complement or a substitute to institutional quality in reducing poverty. We find that the poverty-reducing effect of globalization is stronger when institutions are weak. In particular, increasing social globalization reduces poverty more when corruption is high and democratic accountability is low. Thus, globalization has the power to reduce poverty even in countries with low institutional quality.     

Deposit insurance around the world: A comprehensive analysis and database

This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.     

International free riding on institutions

Economic institutions are linked to economic growth because they create conditions favourable for production and exchange. Institutions can give a country comparative advantage in producing some goods. If its trading partners lack such institutions, it can still enjoy their benefits by importing these goods. Some institutions, such as intellectual property rights, have non‐excludable benefits because the resulting production is intangible, non‐rival, and often publicly disclosed. The profits, or surplus, that result, however, is rival. Foreign countries can ‘free ride’ on this benefit by misappropriating rival surplus through infringement. This article develops a theory of institutional free riding in which firms in one country free ride on the benefit of foreign institutions to the detriment of their competitor firms and their countries' institutions. It evaluates the incentives of firms and governments for this free riding, its effects, and potential responses to mitigate these effects.     

Market-based grazing land transfers and customary institutions in the management of rangelands: Two case studies on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau

Beginning in the early 1990’s, grazing lands once held in common were contracted to individual households in the rangeland regions of China. The resulting fragmentation of rangelands has led to ecological and social problems. As China seeks to address intractable poverty and rangeland degradation, attention has turned to rental, or transfer, of contracted grazing land as a market-based approach to re-aggregating grazing land into larger units that support economies of scale. However, given that many pastoral regions still maintain community customary institutions, what the relationship between market mechanisms and local customary institutions should be in rangeland management needs further analysis. This paper applies comparative case studies of two types of relationships between market mechanisms and customary institutions: (1) market mechanisms that replace customary institutions in the case of Axi village, and (2) market mechanisms that are embedded within customary institutions in Xiareer village. This allows contrast of the impacts of differing approaches on livelihoods, livestock production, and wealth differentiation among pastoral households. We found that there is a higher level of livestock mortality, lower livestock productivity, and higher livestock production cost in Axi Village compared to Xiareer Village. In addition, household asset levels are higher and there is less income differentiation in Xiareer Village. It is concluded that embedding market mechanisms within customary institutions has had notable benefits for the herders of Xiareer Village, because it is a better fit to the coupled pastoral social-ecological system. Based on these findings, we argue that in pastoral communities where the rangeland transfer system for contracted grazing land has not yet been implemented, it is critical to reconsider China’s current policy approach to pay greater attention to the innovative management systems being developed in local regions. Instead of considering market-based approaches as oppositional to traditional institutions, options that derive from the interaction of market-based and customary institutions should be considered.     

Foreign direct investment: the role of institutional and cultural determinants

Using panel data for 29 source and 65 host countries in the period 1995–2009, we examine the determinants of bilateral FDI stocks, focusing on institutional and cultural factors. The results reveal that institutional and cultural distance is important and that FDI has a predominantly regional aspect. FDI to developing countries is positively affected by better institutions in the host country, while foreign investors prefer to invest in developed countries that are more corrupt and politically unstable compared to home. The results indicate that foreign investors prefer to invest in countries with less diverse societies than their own.     

Institutions and Work Incentives in Collective Farming in Maoist China

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that assumes widespread shirking and inefficiency in agricultural production under the collective system in Maoist China, and attributes these problems to egalitarianism in labour remuneration and difficulties in labour supervision. Drawing on interviews with 131 former production team members from 16 provinces, this paper re‐examines the issue of work incentives by placing it in a historical and social context in which formal institutions, such as the different forms of collective organization, income distribution and state extraction, as well as informal institutions, such as indigenous social networks, communal norms and collective sanction, interacted with non‐institutional factors, especially local geographical, demographic and ecological conditions, to constrain and motivate Chinese villagers participating in collective production. The complexity and fluidity of this context gave rise to a multiplicity of patterns of peasant behaviour in team farming, which accounts for the contrasting performances of rural collectives in different areas and periods.     

La gestión mecanicista de las Instituciones de Educación Superior: un estudio desde la modelación sistémica

The bureaucratic tendencies to organize work in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) of which facilitates personnel control and the mechanical ways to measure educational content are the ones that shatter education in pieces, under the hierarchy criterion, also shattering the professor's labor. This organizational method results in an incompetent education, leaving very negative consequences for teaching development. We address this problem by using systemic modeling and Structural Equations Systems (SEM) to confirm hypotheses from scientific observation. It was proven that there was a negative impact of mechanistic management which affected teacher's development. This was proven in context in two HEIs located in Villahermosa (Tabasco, Mexico).