Media attention and regulatory efficiency of corporate violations: Evidence from China

We examine the influence of media attention on the regulatory efficiency of corporate violations in a restrictive media environment. Using a hand-collected sample of corporate violations in China during 1998–2018, we find that fraudulent firms accompanied by more negative media attention are associated with a higher hazard rate of the violation being investigated and enforced. The effect is not diminished by the political connections of the fraudulent firms and is robust after controlling for potential confounding factors. Our findings suggest that by influencing regulatory efficiency, the media serve as an effective governance mechanism even in markets with strict media control.     

Governance or reputation? Flexible tax enforcement and excess goodwill: Evidence from the taxpaying credit rating system in China

This study investigates the effect of flexible tax enforcement on firms’ excess goodwill using unique manually collected data on taxpaying credit rating in China from 2014 to 2021. We document that A-rated taxpayer firms have less excess goodwill; A-rated firms reduce excess goodwill by 0.005 vis-a-vis non-A-rated firms, which accounts for 100% of the mean value of excess goodwill. This finding holds after multiple robustness tests and an endogeneity analysis. Moreover, this negative effect is more pronounced in firms with low information transparency, that are non-state-owned and that are located in regions with low tax enforcement intensity. The channel test results suggest that taxpaying credit rating system as flexible tax enforcement reduces firms’ excess goodwill through a reputation-based effect and not a governance-based effect. This study reveals that the taxpaying credit rating system in China as flexible tax enforcement can bring halo effect to A rating firms, thereby limiting irrational M&As and breaking goodwill bubble.     

Investment-specific shocks and external balances in a small open economy model

Abstract.  We set up a standard small open economy business cycle model driven by government spending shocks, neutral productivity (TFP) shocks, and investment-specific shocks. The model is calibrated to quarterly Canadian data and its predicted moments and sample paths are compared with their Canadian counterparts. We find that the model captures the dynamics in investment and in the trade balance better than special cases of the model where either one of the productivity shocks is omitted. More specifically, the model matches the variance of the trade balance-output ratio, its correlation with output and its autocorrelation. It also matches the output-investment correlation.     

Are Co-integrated Stock Prices Consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis?

This paper responds to the unsatisfactory argument that there is no correspondence between co-integration and the efficient market hypothesis. A law of one co-integrating vector of prices is proposed for the exchange rate and domestic and overseas stock prices. Markets must therefore be efficient in long-run equilibrium because no arbitrage opportunities exist. However, arbitrage activity via the disequilibrium error correction allows above-average (risk-adjusted) returns to be earned in the short run. The elimination of these arbitrage opportunities means that stock market inefficiency in the short run ensures stock market efficiency in the long run.     

Collateral constraints and the amplification mechanism

Kiyotaki and Moore (J. Polit. Economy 105 (1997) 211) have offered a theory for how common shocks to credit-constrained firms are amplified through changes in collateral values and transmitted as fluctuations in output. I clarify and extend their model by showing that their collateral amplification mechanism is not robust to the introduction of markets that allow these firms to hedge against common shocks. A theory of incomplete hedging is proposed in which the supply of hedging available in the economy is constrained by the aggregate value of collateral. I illustrate how the constraint reinstates amplification effects and discuss empirical implications of this new mechanism.     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

An instrumental variable approach for panel unit root tests under cross-sectional dependence

For dynamic panel models with cross-sectional dependence, several unit root tests are constructed using a Huber-type instrument, whose null asymptotics are standard Gaussian and do not depend on nuisance parameters. A Monte-Carlo simulation shows that the proposed tests have better sizes and comparable powers relative to other two existing tests developed for cross-sectionally dependent dynamic panel models.     

Econometric analysis of linearized singular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models

In this paper I propose an alternative to calibration of linearized singular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Given an a-theoretical econometric model as a representative of the data generating process, I will construct an information measure which compares the conditional distribution of the econometric model variables with the corresponding singular conditional distribution of the theoretical model variables. The singularity problem will be solved by using convolutions of both distributions with a non-singular distribution. This information measure will then be maximized to the deep parameters of the theoretical model, which links these parameters to the parameters of the econometric model and provides an alternative to calibration. This approach will be illustrated by an application to a linearized version of the stochastic growth model of King, Plosser and Rebelo.     

Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers

In this paper we analyze empirically the effect of terms of trade shocks on economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes. We are particularly interested in investigating whether terms of trade disturbances have a smaller effect on growth in countries with a flexible exchange rate arrangement. We also analyze whether negative and positive terms of trade shocks have asymmetric effects on growth, and whether the magnitude of these asymmetries depends on the exchange rate regime. We find evidence suggesting that terms of trade shocks get amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. We also find evidence of an asymmetric response to terms of trade shocks: the output response is larger for negative than for positive shocks. Finally, we find evidence supporting the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates.