基于有限理性的连锁董事战略分析

连锁董事是组织广泛采用的一种环境管理战略。那么，“连锁董事”存在的理论基础是什么？这在中国学才是一个比较新的研究领域，少有的几篇文献均以组织为重点展开探讨。国外相关方面研究较早，各学者从不同角度各砟重地加以诠释。为了更深刻、更全面地理解“连锁董事”的存在性，本文在评述西方理论的基础上，对各理论中合理因暑以整合，特别是考虑到现有理论仅从组织层或个人层出发，提出应从组织、个人和社会出发进行多层面分析。同时由于有理论过分强调理性决策，而现实中的组织、个人、社会决策都是有限理性的，应该把有限理性这一假设也纳入到分析框架中。因此，提出由连锁董事个人、连锁组织、社会三个层面的成本、收益分析及有限理性决策组成的新的分析框架。     

借鉴国际经验加快中国个人信用制度建设

从经济学理论看,个人信用制度的建设对一国经济的健康发展至关重要.应借鉴国外个人信用制度建设的成功经验,并结合中国具体国情,加快中国个人信用制度建设.     

论刑法中客观主义的合理性

刑事古典学派的刑法思想在历史上起过巨大的进步作用,客观主义作为其基本立场在今天仍然有着重大的现实意义。在刑法理论的各个具体领域中都能找到客观主义合理稳固的落脚点,我国新刑法也明显反映出向客观主义倾斜的态度。     

Collaboration,motivation, and the size of organizations

We present an analytical model of an organization that offers operational drivers of limits on team size. The model trades off benefits from collaborative problem solving against the disadvantages of diminishing motivation when groups get large. Collaboration is represented as parallel employee activity combined with frequent sharing of partial information, with a resulting superlinear performance increase over team size. Motivation is modeled by team members periodically setting an effort level either to contribute to the best of their ability or to “cruise”; at the minimum level not recognizable as shirking. Each individual decision is limited by bounded rationality based on team rewards, the time horizon of team interaction, and individual expectations about colleagues’ behavior. The decision collapses to a simple “barrier rule”;. Work hard when a certain “barrier percentage”; of team members work hard, and otherwise shirk. The influence of team size on this barrier percentage depends on the extent of benefits from collaboration: As long as performance increases quadratically with team size, the increased benefits resulting from collaboration exactly balance the temptation to shirk, with the barrier percentage approaching a fixed limit for large team sizes. As soon as the performance increase slows to anything less than quadratic, shirking eventually sets in and limits the possible size of the team. This implies that cooperation is sustainable in large organizational units, provided the problem‐solving processes used are powerful enough to ensure sufficient performance increases. Thus, effective problem‐solving methods are of double value, improving direct productivity and mitigating the social dilemma from team production. A manager should enlarge his or her organization up to the minimum of the limit set by the cooperation barrier and the exogenous performance limit.     

Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice

We develop a model which reflects the tendency of people to simplify the decision problems they face. The decision maker chooses among alternate strategies only on the basis of the payoff she assesses she would obtain from them, and these assessments do not explicitly take into account her subjective judgements regarding the likelihood of alternate states of the world. At each stage, the decision maker chooses the strategy that she assesses to give the highest payoff. She updates her assessments adaptively. We show that such behavior leads to maxmin choices. We also consider the decision maker who experiences shocks. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8.     

Adaptive Performance: A New Scale to Measure Individual Performance in Organizations

As a component of overall employee performance, adaptive performance refers to the ability of an individual to change his or her behaviour to meet the demands of a new environment. The concept is relevant to firms that face especially complex and volatile business conditions. Research and practice have been hampered by a general lack of a widely available, psychometrically sound, multidimensional scale of adaptive performance that is applicable across a wide range of job contexts. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, we develop and evaluate a 19‐item scale measuring five dimensions of adaptive performance. Copyright © 2012 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic Interaction between Governments and Investors under Privatization Programs

This article analyses the strategic moves of governments and investors under privatization programs in a game‐theoretic context. In sequential‐move games of both perfect information and incomplete information, the best response of the strategic investors to observing a slow pace of privatization is to have a low participation in economic activity because of concerns over public policy credibility. This is true even if the government chooses to randomize its action to send mixed signals to the investors while adopting a slow pace of privatization for budgetary reasons. However, the outcome is Pareto inferior to a situation of phased but fast implementation of privatization programs and high private‐sector participation under plausible assumptions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

论企业技术创新内部达尔文主义的合理性

企业技术创新中的内部达尔文主义的本质就是外部技术创新竞争与选择的企业内部化。基于高技术企业内部的技术创新竞争实例,从生物学、哲学、管理学和经济学等多个角度分析了技术创新竞争内部化的合理性。     

论矿业权无形资产评估的可行性

论证矿业权制度的设立、矿业权流转及矿业权价值评估的必要性，这仅仅是问题的一方面。另一方面还应揭示出矿业权价值来源于何处，需找到价值补偿的源泉。本文论述矿山地租的形成、表现形式，它与超客利润的联系以及矿产资源开采收益、矿业权使用费和矿业权价值上的具体体现。