Institutional investors' corporate site visits and corporate investment efficiency

This study examines the association between institutional investors' corporate site visits (CSVs) and the visited firms' investment efficiency. Using unique CSVs' data from China, this study provides empirical evidence that institutional investors' CSVs lessen the visited firms' corporate investment inefficiency, including both over- and underinvestment. The negative relationship between CSVs and investment inefficiency is less pronounced for firms with higher quality financial reporting and better corporate governance. In addition, CSVs show a decrease in corporate overinvestment by monitoring the risk-taking activities of younger CEOs and expansionary firms, and supervising the use of excess free cash flows. Meanwhile, CSVs could mitigate underinvestment by reducing managerial shirking from entrenched CEOs, such as dual or longer-tenured CEOs. The possible economic mechanism behind this association is that CSVs increase institutional shareholding percentages. All the main findings are robust to a battery of endogeneity and robustness tests.     

低放固体废物处置场项目基本预备费估算研究 ——基于蒙特卡罗模拟法

目前我国对于核设施退役与放射性废物治理相关项目的需求日益增长,为确定现有规定中的各设计阶段的基本预备费费率是否能满足工程实际需求,本文针对低放固体废物处置场项目使用CRYSTAL BALL软件进行蒙特卡罗模拟,对工程的基本预备费进行计算。本文通过对两种方案分别进行Beta-PERT分布和正态分布模拟,得到不同置信区间下的基本预备费费用和费率并进行验证,得出基本预备费费率基本目前项目的实际情况,验证了蒙特卡罗模拟方法在低放固体废物处置场可行性研究阶段基本预备费的估算具有可行性,有良好的应用和推广价值。     

Institutional investors' corporate site visits and aggressive financial reporting

This paper investigates the impact of institutional investors' corporate site visits on financial reporting aggressiveness. While prior research has shed light on the monitoring impact of institutional shareholding on firms' financial reporting practices, institutional investors' preference regarding financial reporting remains unclear. Using a sample of Chinese firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2019, we find that institutional investors' on-site visits significantly increase financial reporting aggressiveness of hosting firms. The on-site visit effect is more salient in firms that are more sensitive to the influence of institutional investors, for example, firms with a less powerful chief executive officer, financially constrained firms, and firms operating in competitive industries. Our study highlights that under a setting of weak minority shareholder protection such as in China, managers are likely to recognize revenue aggressively to please powerful shareholders who paid intensive attention to them.     

Security Analysts’ Site Visits and Stock Price Synchronicity

This paper investigates how security analysts’ corporate site visits impact listed firms’ stock-price informativeness. Examining a sample of security analysts’ visits to Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2019, we find that security analysts incorporate firm-specific information into share prices through site visits, significantly reducing the visited firms’ stock price synchronicity. This finding is robust to an alternative measure of stock price informativeness and a two-stage least-squares approach using the introduction of high-speed rail as the instrumental variable. We also find that the impact of analysts’ site visits on firms’ stock price synchronicity is more pronounced for firms with lower information disclosure quality and poor corporate governance than for other firms. Further analysis on firm characteristics documents that this effect is stronger for large-size firms, firms in the manufacturing industry, and state-owned enterprises.