The CALM Method

Abstract

This paper addresses the need for an assessment/summative evaluation regarding the CALM (The Consignment Auction Li—quidation Marketing) Method of Mass Product Distribution. Originally developed and initiated in 1993, in response to the common need business organizations have for product liquidation outlets, this nontraditional form of distribution targets audiences contemplating the distribution of products, including manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and other entrepreneurs.

The topic of distribution is considered to be one of four primary “marketing tools” referred to as the “marketing mix.” In addition to distribution, the other three components of the marketing mix are product, price, and promotion. The mass distribution of products via consignment auction liquidation outlets may be viewed as an additional channel of distribution. However, mass consignment auction liquidation on a national basis has not been adequately assessed or evaluated. There is little published about this type of product distribution.

The effectiveness of the CALM Method utilized on a national basis and covering a 10-year time span is presented. Effectiveness was largely assessed through statistical observations of the effect of various independent variables on the dependent variable, “auction outlet profitability.” Independent variables include geographic location/region of each consignment auction outlet; population size of each consignment auction outlet's community; merchandise type; consignment term, etc. The CALM Method yields the opportunity for profitable liquidation of mass quantities of merchandise on a national basis. This assessment/summative evaluation yields the opportunity for insight regarding the method's actual effectiveness and adds to the limited amount of research found in this area of mass distribution.     

论我国破产重整程序存在的问题——以英国法为视角

我国2006年颁布的《企业破产法》首次引入了重整制度,试图给陷入财务困境又有重生希望的企业提供一个法律保障机制。但实践中重整程序应用的不多且条文本身也存在着各种问题。在制度设计上,如程序的启动、自动冻结的效果、破产管理人权利的分配、法院的介入以及强制裁定权的运用等方面存在着缺陷。英国公司重整制度自上世纪八十年代以来进行了多次重大修改,其制度的改革和完善给我国立法者提供了很多启示。     

A Note on the Determinants of the Outcomes of Bankruptcy Petitions: Evidence From Korea

This study provides evidence on the determinants of the outcomes of bankruptcy petitions using Korean firms for the period from 1977 to 1994. We hypothesize that a firm with more free assets, less liquid assets, longer existing period, larger size, lower operating risk, and more goodwill would have higher survival prospects from the bankruptcy petition. The results from logit estimation confirm this hypothesis. The free assets, existing period, firm size, and goodwill have positive influence on the probability of reorganization, while the liquid assets, and operating risk are negatively related to the probability of reorganization. Among these variables, the free assets percentage is the most significant at the one percent level in determining the outcomes of bankruptcy petitions. This reveals that a bankrupt firm with more free assets tends to be reorganized because it would be easy to obtain additional financing needed for the successful reorganization. The liquid assets and existing period are also significant at the five percent level. We conclude that a firm with more free assets, less liquid assets, and longer existing period would have higher survival prospects in Korea.     

Knightian uncertainty and insurance regulation decision

In contrast to insurance companies, regulatory authorities or regulators can obtain only limited information about the companies’ value. It hence leads to some effects on the regulation design, which is however often overlooked in the literature. This article characterizes the limited/imperfect information as Knightian (Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1921) uncertainty (ambiguity). In order to stress the analytical effects of ambiguity on the regulation decisions, we firstly carry out an analysis in a standard immediate bankruptcy regulation where default and liquidation are considered as indistinguishable events. It is noticed that ambiguity-averse regulators require more “ambiguity equity”. We show then that under ambiguity an immediate liquidation policy delivers wrong liquidation with a positive probability. As an illustrative example to fix the wrong liquidation problem under ambiguity, a new regulation rule is developed with a regulatory auditing process. Based on this new model setup, we focus on examining how the riskiness of the firm’s value and the debt ratio affect liquidation probability.      

亏损属性、会计盈余与股票价格

文章将亏损上市公司按照亏损属性不同分为了四种类型,对每类亏损公司的会计盈余与股票价格的关系进行了深入分析,认为:(1)对于单赤字、虚双赤两类亏损公司,其会计盈余的价值相关性较为微弱,而且其股价变动更多地是与公司发生的各种"表外事件"相关;(2)对于实双赤公司和三赤字公司,由于其已经出现资不抵债的情形,投资者很可能执行清算期权,因而亏损信息引起其股价急剧下跌,而且三赤字公司股价下跌的幅度比实双赤公司下跌的幅度更大.     

Trading with the crowd

We formulate and solve a multi-player stochastic differential game between financial agents who seek to cost-efficiently liquidate their position in a risky asset in the presence of jointly aggregated transient price impact, along with taking into account a common general price predicting signal. The unique Nash-equilibrium strategies reveal how each agent's liquidation policy adjusts the predictive trading signal to the aggregated transient price impact induced by all other agents. This unfolds a quantitative relation between trading signals and the order flow in crowded markets. We also formulate and solve the corresponding mean field game in the limit of infinitely many agents. We prove that the equilibrium trading speed and the value function of an agent in the finite N-player game converges to the corresponding trading speed and value function in the mean field game at rate $O(N^{-2})$. In addition, we prove that the mean field optimal strategy provides an approximate Nash-equilibrium for the finite-player game.     

Secured and unsecured debt in creditor-friendly bankruptcy

This article develops a continuous-time asset pricing model for valuing corporate securities in the presence of both secured and unsecured debt. We consider a framework where creditors dominate the negotiation process. This is consistent with the increasing influence of creditors in bankruptcy. We show that the unsecured creditors are incentivized to liquidate the firm prematurely relative to the first-best threshold. However, if the firm’s liquidation value is very low, it should complement its secured debt with unsecured debt as a form of insurance to avoid early liquidations. Our results have important implications for the debt structure and the resolution of financial distress of modern firms with substantial intangible assets.