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11.
Pascal Frantz 《Accounting & Business Research》2013,43(2):109-121
This paper introduces a model seeking to explain the discretionary write-downs, write-offs, and other restructuring provisions reported by managers. The model comprises a firm, a manager, and a financial market. The firm is about to be restructured. The manager has some private information about the likelihood of success of his restructuring action. The manager may recognise all or part of the expenditure associated with his future restructuring action by reporting a discretionary restructuring provision. The manager chooses whether or not to report a provision, recognising the impact of the provision on his compensation. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his provision policy. Testable implications are consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Strong and Meyer (1987), Elliott and Shaw (1988), and Zucca and Campbell (1992). 相似文献
12.
M. Ray Perryman 《Journal of economic issues》2013,47(2):563-568
For the last twenty years, the world economy has evolved at a great speed. Every good, capital asset, and knowledge is mobile and induces more competition. Innovation in commodities is a complex process that requires more cooperation. To innovate in the knowledge economy, firms nowadays must establish “win-win situations” for individuals in creating networks. These networks are useful for firms in order to come up with innovative strategies. The building of networks enables the interactions between agents, the environment, and institutions. The interdependence of agents and institutions is not new to evolutionary theory (Commons 1931; Veblen 1898). However, I argue that institutions must be more flexible than ever before in order to help agents adapt to the modern knowledge economy. On the basis of the role of meso-networks, I propose new long-run specialization and short-run competitiveness that will promote greater efficiency and equality around the world in relation to firms and countries exporting industrial goods into world markets. Within the innovative networks, I analyze the role of two different actors: (i) the “economic leader” who has a long-run strategy and (ii) the “go-between leader” who knows how to diffuse “useful information” to actors to help them innovate in new products, services, or processes. 相似文献
13.
Kishore Gawande William Maloney Gabriel Montes-Rojas 《Journal of development economics》2009,90(2):267-275
There exist legal channels for informational lobbying of US policymakers by foreign principals. Foreign governments and private sector principals frequently and intensively use this institutional channel to lobby on trade and tourism issues. This paper empirically studies whether such lobbying effectively achieves its goal of trade promotion in the context of Caribbean tourism, and suggests the potential for using foreign lobbying as a vehicle for development. Panel data are used to explore and quantify the association between foreign lobbying by Caribbean principals and US tourist arrivals to Caribbean destinations. A variety of sensitivity analyses support the finding of a strong association. The policy implications are obvious and potentially important for developing countries. 相似文献
14.
Yu-Bong Lai 《Scottish journal of political economy》2020,67(4):404-419
To investigate whether rent-seeking discourages productivity, we consider a third-market model, in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm engage in both Research and Development (R&D) and output competition. We show that the relationship between rent-seeking and productivity depends on two forces. On the one hand, rent-seeking increases the marginal benefit of R&D and encourages productivity. On the other hand, a lower production cost due to R&D enables the government to extract the rent from the firm to a greater extent and discourages the productivity. Which force is dominant depends on the level of corruption or, as an alternative interpretation, the weight the government attaches to political contributions. Unlike the monotonic relationship proposed by the literature, we find a non-monotonic relationship between rent-seeking and productivity. 相似文献
15.
This paper analyses how regulatory competition affects principles‐based and rules‐based systems of regulation. Competition between regulators creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage that generates a race to the bottom by regulators that is socially harmful. We derive the welfare effects of such competition and the regulatory response to these effects, in particular, regulatory harmonisation. We find, however, that regulators can adopt harmful regulatory harmonisation. These effects can make coordination efforts in developing global regulation socially desirable. We demonstrate, moreover, that corporate lobbying is not always harmful: it can both encourage and discourage socially desirable regulation. 相似文献
16.
Mireille Chiroleu‐Assouline Thomas P. Lyon 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2020,29(2):439-461
The literature on special interest groups emphasizes two main influence channels: campaign contributions and informational lobbying. We introduce a third channel: providing information about the credibility of political rivals. In particular, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often aim to communicate scientific knowledge to policymakers, but industry‐backed groups often attempt to undermine their credibility. We extend a standard signaling model of interest‐group lobbying to include fixed costs of policymaker action and show that these costs make possible two mechanisms for creating doubt about the value of policy action. The first uses Bayesian persuasion to suggest the NGO may be a noncredible radical. The second involves creating an opposition think tank (TT) that acts as a possible radical, not a credible moderate. We show that the TT cannot always implement the Bayesian persuasion benchmark, and we characterize how optimal TT design varies with exogenous parameters. 相似文献
17.
《Business History》2012,54(2):215-235
Today both Denmark and Sweden are successful fashion exporters due to the re-export of clothing designed in Scandinavia and produced in low-wage countries, while domestic clothing manufacturing has become almost non-existent over the past 20 years. This article compares the strategies of Danish and Swedish trade associations in clothing manufacturing and discusses whether or not the associations encouraged the abandonment of local manufacturing and adoption of global value chains. The analysis is carried out on the basis of interest group theory as developed by Mancur Olson and others, and the findings confirm that interest group influence can entail long-term negative effects, but also that variations in institutional settings are decisive. 相似文献
18.
This research examines the museum characteristics associated with lobbying on the 1990 FASB Exposure Draft (FASB, 1990) that would have required US museums to capitalize their collections. A sample of 103 museums that lobbied on the Exposure Draft is compared to a matched sample of museums that did not choose to lobby. The results reveal that museums which lobbied are larger, older, and members of or accredited by the American Association of Museums. Also, proportionately more private museums and art museums than exist in the overall US museum population chose to lobby on the proposed requirement. 相似文献
19.
Mike Felgenhauer 《Journal of Economics》2007,90(3):295-312
This paper studies interest group influence on policy making. Lobbying occurs in a first price auction where an interest group
wins with certainty, if her bid exceeds the loser’s bid by the policy maker’s valuation for the socially best policy. Otherwise
the latter implements the privately known best policy. In equilibrium the size of the policy maker’s valuation does not matter for the size of the policy bias. The idea is to construct a “reference game”
and to shift the support of the equilibrium mixed strategies into the original game, without altering the structure of the
densities. 相似文献
20.
Rigoberto A. Lopez 《Journal of Agricultural Economics》2008,59(1):25-40
This paper tests the Protection for Sale model in terms of the structure of protection and how realistic the estimated domestic welfare weight is relative to campaign contributions. Using data from US food manufacturing, empirical results support the key predictions for the structure of protection when either all food manufacturing industries or most of the general population is assumed to be politically organised. The domestic welfare weight is estimated as low as 0.837, the lowest econometric estimate to date, underlining that protection is for sale and that, with a qualified ‘yes’, the model fits the data for these industries. 相似文献