The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.     

Disagreement over the emergence of private property rights: alternative meanings, alternative explanations

This paper is an exercise in the history of thought, which compares Austrian and neoclassical theories of the emergence of private property rights, and examines, in part, the extent to which Austrians can be said to offer a commonly-agreed upon explanation that parallels Carl Menger's exemplary story of the emergence of money. We address the sources of disagreement (and apparent conflict) among emergence theorists in both schools. We try to show that some of the disagreement hinges on an unclear meaning of the term “emergence,” which is resolvable, while other sources of disagreement are fundamental at the methodological level. JEL Code B25, E40, E53     

Introduction to the special issue on positive conflict—Conflict and employees: The right and processes to be heard

Conflict, defined as clash, competition, or mutual interference of opposing or incompatible forces or qualities, may be positive. The appropriate amount of conflict may be a delicate balance not easily achieved. Thus, a key issue is conflict management. The major charter of this special issue is the presentation of work which suggests or demonstrates that conflict can be a positive force in the modern organization. It also is pointed out that conflict, positive or otherwise, and its resolution involves a broad spectrum of inquiry into the rights and obligations of those involved in the conflict     

Does support from government help firms survive? Evidence on financial and political assistance in China, 1998–2007

ABSTRACT

Using the National Bureau of Statistics data set over the period 1998–2007, this article examines the dual roles of financial assistance and strong political links on firm survival in China by applying a semi-parametric duration model. We find that generally either financial assistance or strong political links had a positive effect on the likelihood of firm survival. Furthermore, if firms received both types of support from government, their survival rate was around two times as high compared to only receiving a single support. The likelihood of survival depended on the amount of assistance a firm received. We also find firm ownership impacts on its survival pattern. Lastly, China joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) coincided with (cet. par.) higher firm failure, especially with regard to state-owned firms; however, this period also saw the authorities targeting political and financial help on the ‘better’ firms (especially SOEs) with characteristics likely to increase their chance of survival.     

Do Institutions Cause Growth?

We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.     

风险投资中控制权分配及其影响因素的研究

在风险投资中,创业者和风险投资家由于目标不同而存在着利益冲突,这时对风险企业的控制权进行适当分配成为关键.由于风险投资中有关控制权问题的复杂性,国内外对这方面的研究目前还较少,尚处于起步阶段.文章以不完全合同作为理论基础通过建立两期模型分析了影响风险企业中控制权配置的重要因素,从而在统一的不完全合同理论的框架下对风险企业的控制权、现金流量权、声誉机制等各种影响因素展开系统的研究.     

企业家人力资本产权的内涵、结构与功能

企业家是经济生活中最为稀缺的人力资本资源。企业家人力资本既不同于非人力资本资源,也不同于一般的人力资本资源,在经济增长和社会进步的过程中扮演着不可替代的角色,发挥着举足轻重的作用。借助于西方人力资本理论和产权经济学理论,较为系统地分析了企业家人力资本产权的内涵、结构与功能,得出关于企业家人力资本产权的3个重要结论。     

风险企业的道德风险与控制权配置的模型分析

风险企业的控制权配制是在满足风险企业家激励相容和风险投资家参与约束条件下的一种相机性配置机制,它有别于 传统理论要求的"剩余索取权必须与控制权相匹配"的配置原则,能使双方在签约后根据企业绩效(或企业风险)的变动,进行相 应的权利调整,因而尽可能地解决了风险企业中的风险分担和激励问题。     

论人力资本与智力资本的"虚拟资本"性质

本文认为人力资本、智力资本理论的产生,本质上是提出了"虚拟资本"问题,是对这些过去被看作是费用或成本的东西进行"资本化定价".在当代企业的资本范畴中实际上已经形成了以实体资本为一方的"硬资本"和以虚拟资本为另一方的"软资本"两大部份,而这两大部份是建立在"资本三要素"--物质资本、人力资本、智力资本基础上的.由"资本三要素"的基础概念,我们可以推解出一系列新的资本概念和形态,从中我们可以较清晰地辨别虚拟资本与实体资本的构架与层次,并可直观地厘清它们的边界与关系,这有利于我们更好地理解人力资本与智力资本的特性和功能.     

上市公司控制权转移的财富效应分析

上市公司控制权的转移会改变投资者对目标公司的预期,从而引起目标公司股价的变化,进而使得目标公司股东的财富发生变化。本文采用事件研究法,分行业对2002年我国资本市场上第一大股东发生变更的目标方公司股东财富进行了实证研究。结果表明:对于整个资本市场而言,控制权转移能为目标公司带来显著的财富增加;而对于不同行业控制权转移的财富效应存在着较大的差别,只有原材料企业在公告日前可以获得显著的正财富效应,而工业企业和消费企业的财富效应并不明显。