保险产业市场结构和市场绩效的关系研究

对于市场结构和市场绩效的关系问题,理论界存在两个较为权威的假说,即市场力量假说和效率结构假说。笔者通过实证分析检验这两个假说在我国保险市场中的适用性,认为在我国保险市场存在传统的市场结构—市场行为—市场绩效假说,保险市场可以通过增加有效率企业的数量,引入竞争机制,最终通过市场自然选择的过程,形成少数新的规模大并能够具有市场力量的保险公司,从而提高保险业的绩效水平。     

清洁发展机制及其对我国可再生能源发电的启示

清洁发展机制（CDM）是近几年来国际社会的热门话题，本文从走循环经济道路和建立环境友好型社会出发，结合清洁发展机制，从各方面分析了我国可再生能源发电的现状和CDM项目的市场潜力及优势。进而根据目前我国CDM项目的开发情况分别从微观和宏观两个层面提出了一些建议，如选择合适的融资方式、强化政策体系的建设与创新、提高国际谈判能力和建立CDM联系机制等。     

中国能源消费与经济关系分析

足够的能源供应是经济可持续发展的基础。1952～2004年中国能源强度值在经历了长期而波动的高值状态后,从1977年开始逐年下降,能源强度值在1991年降至0.30tce/103yuan水平以下,到2004年仅为0.16tce/103yuan。作者分析了影响中国能源消费总量、GDP、能源强度值变化的因素,通过对各产业能源强度、中外能源强度、中外能源消费结构、中外产业结构对比,揭示了第二产业能源强度值过高及其过半的产业比重、以煤炭为主的能源消费结构都是中国能源强度值过高的根本原因。但是通过对各产业对经济增长的贡献分析,发现第二产业对经济增长的贡献强度要强于第三产业。因此,作者指出,在以经济目标为首要任务的现阶段,解决能源与经济的可持续发展的重点应放在第二产业能源强度值的降低,以及第二产业向第三产业的适当转移。     

地方财政体制权责不对称问题研究

地方财政体制权责不对称已经成为分税制后我国地方财政管理体制运行中的一个较为突出的问题。主要表现为：事权划分原则性不强且缺乏法制化基础导致了政府间事权下移，地方政府级次过多与“倒轧账”式的分税模式引起了地方政府间财权上移，转移支付制度不规范造成了地方政府间财力差距日益扩大。为此，我们应选择相应的治理对策来完善我国地方财政体制。     

集群式供应链的竞争力及培育分析

集群式供应链是产业集群和供应链之间的藕合组织形式。本文对集群式供应链这种新型的组织形式和集群式供应链的概念进行了阐述,并对其竞争力及其培育进行分析,为集群式供应链这种新型组织方式的构建研究奠定了基础。     

需求势能理论在多级物流网络预选点中的应用

针对分销物流网络的特点,提出了基于服务时限的多级物流网络选址问题和选点思路,应用需求势能理论建立了多网点选址数学模型,并提出了详尽的求解方法和步骤。最后通过医药分销物流网络系统的实例分析,说明了该方法在网络选点过程中的模型化方法和求解步骤。     

节约型城市与北京城市发展

分析了北京的自然资源状况,认为目前的经济发展模式依然是粗放的,是不可持续的;北京必须选择走"节约型城市"的道路,别无其他选择;提出了建设"节约型城市"的思路和方法.     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large     

Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation

From 1994 to 2003, New Zealands corporatized electricity lines networks operated with no industry regulator, but under the spotlight of mandatory information disclosure. As a result there exists a large body of detailed, audited and publicly available accounting data on the financial performance of these businesses. Using that data, this paper finds that price-cost margins have widened substantially since deregulation. We estimate the extent to which light-handed regulation has allowed profits to exceed the levels which would have been acceptable under the old rate-of-return regulatory framework, and find that the answer is about $200 million per year, on an ongoing basis.We thank colleagues at Victoria University, and two anonymous referees for this journal, for constructive comments on this paper. Any remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.JEL classification: D21; K23; L11; L43; L51     

Two-settlement Systems for Electricity Markets under Network Uncertainty and Market Power

We analyze welfare and distributional properties of a two-settlement system consisting of a spot market over a two-node network and a single energy forward contract. We formulate and analyze several models which simulate joint dispatch of energy and transmission resources coordinated by a system operator. The spot market is subject to network uncertainty, which we model as a random capacity derating of an important transmission line. Using a duopoly model, we show that even for small probabilities of congestion (derating), forward trading may be substantially reduced, and the market power mitigating effect of forward markets (as shown in Allaz and Vila 1993) may be nullified to a great extent. There is a spot transmission charge reflecting transportation costs from location of generation to a designated hub whose price is the underlying for the forward contract. This alleviates some of the incentive problems associated with the forward market in which spot-market trading is residual. We find that the reduction in forward trading is due to the segregation of the markets in the constrained state, and the absence of natural incentives for generators to commit to more aggressive behavior in the spot market (the strategic substitutes effect). In our analysis, we find that the standard assumption of no-arbitrage across forward and spot markets leads to very little contract coverage, even for the case with no congestion. We present an alternative view of the market where limited intertemporal arbitrage enables temporal price discrimination by competing duopolists. In this framework, we assume that all of the demand shows up in the forward market (or that the market is cleared against an accurate forecast of the demand), and the forward price is determined using a market clearing condition.