Market concentration and competition in OECD mobile telecommunications markets

This study analyses the progress of market concentration in OECD member states’ mobile telecommunications markets and evaluates the relationship between market concentration and performance. Using annual panel data from 24 OECD member states for the 1998–2011 period, the study estimates regression equations for market concentration, mobile prices and profits. The empirical results indicate that the more concentrated the mobile market, the higher the prices and profits, providing support for the market power hypothesis. If this hypothesis holds, then market concentration can be a useful indicator of market performance. On the other hand, the applicability of the hypothesis is unclear for the second half of the sample period. The results provide evidence that regulatory policies influence the structure and performance of mobile markets.     

Mobile termination and collusion,revisited

The standard model by Laffont et al. (RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1): 1–37, 1998a; 38–56, 1998b) treats termination fees as an instrument to increase market power in a one-shot game of horizontal product differentiation. A prediction (Gans and King, Economics Letters, 71: 413–420, 2001) within this framework is that, with non-linear tariffs, firms should be interested in low termination fees. This seems to be at odds with regulatory experience in many countries. We offer an alternative approach, using an infinitely repeated Bertrand competition. We focus on symmetrical calling patterns and investigate simple two-part tariffs for two customer types, as well as general non-linear tariffs for two types and for a continuum of types. In this framework, when looking also at collusion in retail prices, termination fees make deviations from the collusive outcome less attractive. The optimum deviation strategy is usually to try to attract the high valuation customers since they exhibit the highest profits. Thus, a deviator will have a pool of heavy users which will have more outgoing than incoming calls, implying net termination payments. A cooperatively chosen termination rate can increase the deviator’s cost and thereby always stabilizes collusion.      

从服务营销系统模型看电信服务竞争优势

通信业务需求的飞速增长,直接导致异常激烈的电信业竞争。本质上,电信业竞争就是服务的竞争,正确把握这一理念是电信企业成功的关键因素之一。本文首先构造和分析了服务系统。其次,在此基础上分析其营销系统模型,并以中国移动通信公司(CMCC)所提供的服务,对相关问题做了进一步的分析与说明。最后,给出了电信运营企业如何获得服务竞争优势的几点建议。     

The structure of production of the Spanish telecommunications sector

The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical measures of the returns to scale coefficients, substitution elasticities between capital and labor, their marginal productivities, and the profitability of inputs in the Spanish telecommunications industry. The results of this study indicate that constant returns to scale can strongly be rejected and that the profitability indices of both factors have risen consistently since 1974. Furthermore, it concludes that the company is relatively overcapitalized, a result generally consistent with the Averch-Johnson effect for rate of return regulated monopolies.The author wishes to thank Dr. Boris Bravo-Ureta and Dr. Emilio Pagoulatos for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. She is also indebted to an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions and to Telefónica de España for providing the data necessary for this study.     

试析电子合同的效力

电子合同的效力问题影响电子商务的法律安全,对电子商务的发展至为重要.应从合同的效力要件方面,分析电子合同当事人的缔约能力问题,当事人意思表示真实的判断问题,电子合同内容及形式的有效性问题.现行合同法对电子合同的规定太少,不能适应电子商务的发展,应尽快制定电子商务法.     

Entry under Asymmetric Regulation

In recent years, the local telephone industry has evolved from a traditionally regulated structure of natural monopoly to one characterized as having a dominant firm and competitive fringe. Yet, legacy regulation from the monopoly era still remains in this new environment, and is often applied solely to the dominant firm. Economic theory suggests that asymmetric regulation of this sort will induce competitive entry. We find support for this theory by demonstrating that the amount of entry into local telephone markets is significantly higher when asymmetric quality-of-service standards are present.     

Who you are or whom you know? Consumption interdependences in social networks

This paper presents an analysis of whether a consumer's decision to switch from one mobile phone provider to another is driven by individual consumer characteristics or by actions of other consumers in her social network. Such consumption interdependences are estimated using a unique dataset, which contains transaction data based on anonymized call records from a large European mobile phone carrier to approximate a consumer's social network. Results show that network effects have an important impact on consumers’ switching decisions: switching decisions are interdependent between consumers who interact with each other and this interdependence increases in the closeness between two consumers as measured by the calling data. In other words, if a subscriber switches carriers, she is also affecting the switching probabilities of other individuals in her social circle. The paper argues that such an approach is of high relevance to both switching of providers and to the adoption of new products.     

REGULATIONS AND STRATEGY: EVIDENCE ON ADVERTISING

This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firms’ advertising spending among the population of local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the hybrid rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have a negative relationship with advertising spending. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes has had a positive and significant impact on firms’ advertising spending. These results highlight the importance of incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to be market oriented and strive for superior performance.     

Global Consistency Versus Local Responsiveness: Deutsche Telekom's Human Resource Management Strategies in Central and Eastern Europe

This article analyses the competing demands faced by Deutsche Telekom for global consistency and local responsiveness as it attempted to coordinate its human resource management strategies across its Eastern European subsidiaries. It considers the degree to which the former economic and political histories of Eastern Europe continue to influence and/or constrain multinational corporation strategies and practices in the post-2000 era. Institutional path dependency, strategic international human resource management, and international industrial relations theories are used to assist in analyzing the data. The study concludes that managerial constraints associated with the historical and economic legacies of these former socialist countries are rapidly declining, thereby allowing multinational firms to implement “Western-style” human resource management strategies. It further suggests that industrial relations institutions at the European Union level, rather than individual country level, have the greatest potential to impact on international human resource management strategies in the region. Multinational corporations should therefore engage in more-integrated strategic international human resource management and international industrial relations approaches.     

基于收入目标的X电信公司资源配置模式设计

介绍了X电信公司基于“收入目标认购制”的经营资源配置模式,包括薪酬资源配置、营销资源配置和滚动性投资资源配置.公司根据整体业务发展情况确定基本收入增长率,各分公司在此基础上结合实际情况“认购”自己的目标增长幅度.