What do information frictions do?

Summary. We present an overlapping generations model in which a labor market friction (moral hazard) coexists and interacts with a credit market friction (costly state verification). Our main results are: (i) while credit market frictions have long- and short-run real effects, labor market frictions typically have only short-run effects unless they also affect the volume of investment per worker, (ii) the frictions amplify each other to produce higher long-run unemployment than would result from only labor market frictions, (iii) these distortions may prolong the effect of temporary shocks, and (iv) the dynamics of economies with both frictions are qualitatively similar to their frictionless counterparts.Received: 25 February 2003, Revised: 1 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E13, E24, O41, O17. Correspondence to: Joydeep BhattacharyaWork on this paper began while Bhattacharya was visiting the University of Texas at Austin and was completed when Chakraborty was visiting the IMF Institute in Washington, DC. We are grateful to both institutions for their hospitality. For helpful comments and suggestions we thank Valerie Bencivenga, Dean Corbae, Scott Freeman, Rajesh Singh, participants at the Macro Tea in Austin, and especially, an anonymous referee of this journal. The usual caveat applies.     

Optimal audit policies with correlated types

Summary. We propose a version of Townsends [17] model of costly audits where the agents types are correlated. Audits are used because agents have a limited ability to bear risk so that the Full Surplus Extraction (FSE) scheme á la Crémer and McLean [5,6] and McAfee and Reny [13] are suboptimal. It is shown that Townsends result is a special case of our model when agent types are uncorrelated. The performed numerical simulation of the model using two agents and two types offers interesting insights into what we call the Townsend Ridge. Indeed, the optimal contract which specifies wages to be paid and the audit strategy are remarkably different from one side of the ridge to the next. The observed discontinuity at the ridge reflects a discreet change from a single to a dual audit policy.Received: 11 November 2002, Revised: 10 September 2003JEL Classification Numbers: C63, D82.Correspondence to: M. Martin BoyerWe wish to thank seminar participants at the CEA-Toronto, SCSE-Montréal and WCES-Seattle meetings for discussions and comments on an earlier version of the paper, as well as an anonymous referee for this journal. This paper was financially supported by an Emerging Scholar grant from the American Compensation Association, and by the Fonds FCAR-Québec. The continuing financial support of CIRANO is also appreciated. We remain responsible for any error.     

Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model

Summary. This paper describes optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model with stochastic monitoring. An agent operates a risky project on behalf of a principal who can observe the projects revenues at a cost. We show that an optimal contract exists such that, at any history, either the principal claims the projects entire revenues or promises to claim nothing in the future. In particular, the agents expected income rises with time. Moreover, except in at most one period, the principal claims all revenues when audit occurs. We provide conditions under which all optimal contracts satisfy these properties.Received: 4 February 2004, Revised: 4 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D8, C7. Correspondence to: Cyril MonnetWe wish to thank Patrick Bolton, Vitor Gaspar, Mark Guzman, Martin Hellwig, Narayana Kocherlakota, Thorsten Koeppl, Albert Marcet, Benny Moldovanu, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim, the University of Minnesota, the Society for Economics Dynamics Meetings in New York and the Society for the Advancement in Economic Theory in Rhodos for helpful comments and discussions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the European Central Bank, the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.     

注册会计师虚假验资民事责任探讨

“验证企业资本 ,出具验资报告” ,是注册会计师法定的审计业务之一。近年来因虚假验资报告而引发民事纠纷不断出现。本文以注册会计师验资业务为切入点 ,阐述了验资报告的法律性质和作用 ,从法意上探讨了虚假验资报告的判断标准。从现行法律出发 ,结合法理和司法审判实践认为 :虚假验资对第三人的民事责任是侵权性质的民事责任 ;其民事责任的归责原则为过错责任原则 ,而过错的判断标准应为《中国注册会计师独立审计准则》 ;虚假验资报告与损害事实之间存在事实上的因果关系是注册会计师民事责任的重要构成要件。文章还对虚假验资报告除委托人以外的其他利害关系人的范围作了界定、对虚假验资证明民事赔偿责任的范围和顺序等其它民事责任问题作了探讨。     

论税务稽查期限延长的法律控制——以吉林丰达有限公司案为例

我国现有税收法律规范对税务稽查期限延长次数与长度的规定存有法律漏洞。为避免因税务机关多次延长稽查期限导致纳税义务人承担多缴纳税款滞纳金等不利性后果而由此产生的诸多争议,在立法面上,税务稽查期限延长的次数和长度应予法律保留;在执法面上,税务机关延长稽查期限应接受由程序参与性、程序中立性、程序理性和程序及时性构成的正当行政程序之约束;在救济面上,应建立税务稽查期限不当延长的抵抗权制度、抗告诉讼制度以及税款滞纳金停止计算制度。     

中国商业银行操作风险控制战略结构模型研究

根据新巴塞尔资本协议的精神,操作风险管理正成为商业银行风险管理的核心内容。操作风险控制战略结构模型的设计是有效地实施风险控制战略行为的前提,而模型设计过程必须借鉴国内外商业银行操作风险管理的实践经验,认为因子分析可以对模型的有效性和可靠性提供检验。     

试论财务会计应对衍生金融工具挑战的途径

衍生金融工具是战后新出现的一种新的投资手段,种类繁多,发展迅速,风险和报酬都极大,因而对会计处理提出了更高的要求。研究了衍生金融工具在会计定义、会计确认、会计计量和会计信息披露方面对传统会计理论的冲击,并综合目前的研究成果,提出了相应的对策。     

方向基函数神经网络在说话人识别中的应用

首先对方向基函数神经网络模型(Direction basisFunctionNeuralNetworks)进行了描述。这种模型可以通过计算矢量间的夹角来对矢量进行相似性判别。与径向基函数神经网络模型(Radial basisFunctionNeuralNetworks)不同的是,它特别适合于具有方向不变性的模式识别领域,如语音识别。重点探讨了方向基函数神经网络在说话人识别中的应用,在此基础上研制成功了1个说话人确认系统并用硬件进行了实现。实验数据表明这个系统具有很好的性能。     

Formal Analysis of Segregation of Duties (SoD) in Accounting: A Computational Approach

This study examines a computational framework for segregation of duties (SoD) in the design as well as implementation of accounting systems. The framework consists of a model of workflows in accounting systems based on workflow graphs, a partial order model of roles performed by the actors in the accounting system, and a specification of SoD rules. We develop a set of algorithms for four SoD rules that can be used in the enforcement of SoD. For the SoD rule that precludes task type conflicts, our results show that while compliance verification can be carried out efficiently, finding an SoD compliant assignment of tasks is computationally intractable. For those situations, we present an integer linear programming (ILP) formulation for finding compliant assignments using public domain ILP solvers. For the remaining three SoD rules, we demonstrate efficient ways of testing compliance for a given assignment as well as finding compliant assignments.     

Heterogeneous consumers and differentiated food markets: Implications for quality signaling in food supply chains

The Fellow's address begins by noting several recent consumer food trends and the changing way in which we perceive value-added. I then focus on the topic of heterogeneity in consumer behavior, reviewing contributions from the literature that enhance our ability as economists to model and measure heterogeneity. Supply chain responses to consumer heterogeneity are examined, including a discussion of information flows within supply chains and the role of certification and verification. I close with a consideration of policy implications flowing from consumer heterogeneity.