In 1996, the UK government privatised the railway industry based on a separation of rail infrastructure from train operations. Track, stations and signalling were transferred to a private sector infrastructure company, Railtrack plc. Separate passenger and freight train operators were required to pay track access charges to Railtrack for use of its rail infrastructure.
In 2001, in an attempt to meet the government’s plan to expand freight traffic, the government-appointed rail regulator substantially reduced the amount of track charges payable to Railtrack by the freight operators. The resulting shortfall in Railtrack’s revenue is met by public subsidy from another regulatory agency, the Strategic Rail Authority.
A failure by the regulators to insist on rail freight growth targets or to impose any claw-back of the subsidies for non-performance is a tribute to weak political and legislative control over regulatory mechanisms and, to a certain extent, reflects the ‘capture’ of the state regulatory process by the freight industry.
The net result has been a decline in rail freight traffic, an increase in public subsidy and a substantial increase in the earnings of the largest freight operator. 相似文献
