公平关切下闭环供应链差别定价决策

针对零售商和第三方回收商具有公平关切的情形,研究由制造商主导的三级供应链成员及整个系统的差别定价最优决策。分析了零售商以及第三方回收商公平中性和公平关切两种情形的决策模型。研究发现:零售商以及第三方回收商的公平关切行为最终会造成各自利润的损失,并且对整条供应链利润也是不利的,而这样的公平关切行为对制造商来说却是有利的。同时当公平关切程度较弱时,对整条闭环供应链系统是不利的;而当公平关切程度较强时,对整条闭环供应链系统是有利的。     

Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism

It is well known that the Nash equilibrium in network routing games can have strictly higher cost than the optimum cost. In Stackelberg routing games, where a fraction of flow is centrally-controlled, a natural problem is to route the centrally-controlled flow such that the overall cost of the resulting equilibrium is minimized.We consider the scenario where the network administrator wants to know the minimum amount of centrally-controlled flow such that the cost of the resulting equilibrium solution is strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. We call this threshold the Stackelberg threshold and prove that for networks of parallel links with linear latency functions, it is equal to the minimum of the Nash flows on links carrying more optimum flow than Nash flow.Our approach also provides a simpler proof of characterization of the minimum fraction that must be centrally controlled to induce the optimum solution.     

Second‐Mover Advantages with Asymmetric Costs and Information Updates: A Product Life Cycle Perspective

Two firms with asymmetric costs engage in a Stackelberg game under multiple levels of uncertainty with information updating. A product life cycle perspective is employed to reveal when and why a second‐mover may have an advantage. At early stages in the product life cycle, when uncertainty is the dominating factor, the impact of uncertainty may be either positive or negative. As a result, the Stackelberg leader faces the possibility of either overshooting or losing its market leadership position to the second‐mover. In later market stages, when cost is more important, a process‐innovating second‐mover may accrue higher profits. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stackelberg leadership in a dynamic duopoly with stochastic capital accumulation

I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second, the leader invests more than the follower; as a result, in the steady state, the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower’s. Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.JEL Classification: C61, C73, D43, D92, L13Financial support within the project The post-entry performance of firms: technology, growth and survival lead by Enrico Santarelli, co-financed by the University of Bologna and MIUR, is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Uwe Cantner, Roberto Cellini, Roberto Golinelli, Helen Louri, Enrico Santarelli, Antonello Scurcu, Peter Thompson, two anonymous referees and the audience at the final workshop of the project (Bologna, November 22-23, 2002) for useful comments and discussion. The usual disclaimer applies.     

具有自营平台的制造商与零售商的竞争与合作模型

本文研究了由1个制造商和1个零售商组成的供应链中的竞争与合作定价问题,其中制造商具有平台直销渠道。本文建立了竞争下的Stackelberg博弈模型,并分析了解的唯一性和合理性,然后给出合作定价模型和各渠道的定价策略,结果表明制造商和零售商最优策略是降低线下渠道销售价格而线上平台销售价格不变。通过对比表明供应链合作所增加的收益等于非合作下零售商的收益,并证明了顾客对线下渠道购买偏好越高,合作所增加的收益越大。进一步地,分析了在合作的情况下制造商是否放弃通过平台直销渠道销售商品的问题,并给出双渠道下供应链总利润比单渠道下总利润高的判定条件。最后给出一个算例,对所获得的结论进行验证和补充。     

政府补贴下考虑销售努力的绿色供应链决策研究

在政府给予绿色补贴的情况下,考虑企业销售努力对绿色供应链决策的影响.以一个制造商和零售商构成的二级绿色供应链为研究对象,建立制造商主导和零售商主导的不同权力结构下的绿色供应链决策模型.通过对比分析不同模型决策,进一步采取算例分析进行验证,为企业实施绿色供应链管理提出相关建议.研究结果表明:政府绿色度补贴系数改变了产品绿色度、批发价格、销售努力、零售商利润、制造商利润以及供应链总体的利润;销售努力的投入会影响产品的批发价格以及零售商利润;无论是否考虑销售努力,集中决策下,供应链的效率总是大于分散决策下的效率;零售商主导的分散决策下,供应链效率高于制造商主导时的供应链的效率.     

Strategic product showcasing mode of E-commerce live streaming

E-commerce live streaming can considerably help brands improve sales dynamics, but it is multiple dilemmas in choosing suitable e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes. To address the multiple dilemmas, we first employ the Stackelberg game to depict three e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes: brand self-live streaming, influencer-led live streaming mixture, and influencer-led special live streaming. Second, we analyze the relationship between choices and game parameters, including live streaming stimulus sensitivity, unit service quality improvement cost, and service sensitivity. Meanwhile, through the comparative analysis of the three modes, we get the optimal threshold of each mode. Last, we conduct a case study comparing Chinese apparel and accessories brands Hodo and RUANS to verify the above relations. The results suggest that: (i) the more sensitive consumers are to live streaming stimulus, the more beneficial it is for the brand manufacturer to employ special live streaming, while the increase in unit service quality improvement cost will harm the brand manufacturer; (ii) the fixed participation fee determines the choice of e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes; (iii) e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes can help brands to optimize their decision-making.     

Endogenous location leadership

We analyze a game of timing where Sellers, which have marginal production cost asymmetries, can delay entry and a commitment to a location in a Hotelling type setting. When cost differences are large enough the game becomes a war of attrition that yields Stackelberg behavior where the high cost firm will delay choosing a location until the low cost firm commits to its position. We find interaction effects between timing and the degree of product differentiation and compute timing/location and mixed strategy equilibria through a range of marginal cost differences. The firms maximally differentiate with moderate cost differences; with somewhat greater cost differences there is intermediate differentiation, and; with large cost differences there is a blockading monopoly. The low cost firm always commits to entry immediately whereas the high cost firm either enters immediately, shortly after the low cost leader, or never, depending on the cost differences. Finally, we find that in equilibrium the duopoly is sustained for a larger range of cost differentials and that differentiation is greater than the social optimum.     

Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs

I study a version of the Stackelberg game with many identical firms in which leaders and followers use a continuous cost function with no fixed cost. Using lattice theoretical methods I provide a set of conditions that guarantee that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. With convex costs the model shows the same properties as a quasi-competitive Cournot model. The same happens with concave costs, but only when the number of followers is small. When this number is large the leaders preempt entry. I study the comparative statics and the limit behavior of the equilibrium and I show how the main determinants of market structure interact. More competition between the leaders always displaces the followers. Instead, how a stronger threat of entry affects the equilibrium depends on the technology. With strictly convex costs it is the followers that eventually displace the leaders.