Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly

We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo, F., [1997. The evolution of Walrasian behavior. Econometrica 65, 375–384]. Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents’ previous output. Firms make mistakes and deviate from their decision rules with a small probability. Applying stochastic stability analysis, we find that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set of states in which imitators are better off than are optimizers.     

Barter Trading as a Microeconomics Teaching Device

Karpoff reports on a “barter trading game” in which students exchanged real goods over a period of seven weeks with different market constraints imposed each week. Student comments about the exercise were favorable.     

不对称R＆D活动下的市场绩效分析——基于有差异产品的寡头市场

为了研究在Stackelberg寡头竞争模型下企业在产品市场是否合作对市场绩效的影响,建立了寡头市场中面向R＆D工艺的两阶段博弈模型。采用逆向归纳法求出了产品市场合作与不合作两种情况下的古诺-均衡解。研究表明,从促进技术进步的角度来看,对于R＆D效率不太高的R＆D项目,产品市场合作策略优于产品市场竞争策略。从提高企业利润的角度来看,对于R＆D效率较高的R＆D项目,当产品差异不大时,产品市场合作策略优于产品市场竞争策略;当产品差异较大时,产品市场竞争策略优于产品市场合作策略。对于R＆D效率较低的R＆D项目,产品市场竞争策略优于产品市场合作策略。从提高消费者剩余以及改善社会福利的角度来看,对于R＆D效率较低的R＆D项目,产品市场竞争策略优于产品市场合作策略。     

Mergers in asymmetric Stackelberg markets

It is well known that the profitability of horizontal mergers with quantity competition is scarce. However, in an asymmetric Stackelberg market we obtain that some mergers are profitable. Our main result is that mergers among followers become profitable when the followers are inefficient enough. In this case, leaders reduce their output when followers merge and this reduction renders the merger profitable. This merger increases price and welfare is reduced.      

Optimal cash holdings under heterogeneous beliefs

This paper explores a one‐period model for a firm that finances its operations through debt provided by heterogeneous creditors. Creditors differ in their beliefs about the firm's investment outcomes. We show the existence of Stackelberg equilibria in which the firm holds cash reserves in order to provide incentives for pessimistic creditors to invest in the firm. We find interest rates and cash holdings to be complementary tools for increasing debt capacity. In markets with a high concentration of capital across a small interval of pessimistic creditors or by a few large creditors, cash holdings is the preferred tool to increase the debt capacity of the firm.     

Dynamic cooperative promotion in the presence of consumer reference effect with competing retailers

This paper studies the cooperative promotion problem in the presence of the promotion reference effect. We consider retailer price-reduction promotion activities that enhance their sales but may impair brand image for the manufacturer. Moreover, because frequently used promotion induces a promotion reference effect on customers, we investigate how the promotion reference effect influences cooperative control strategies. We do so by examining the context in a supply chain with one leading manufacturer and two competing retailers, where the manufacturer implements a cooperative promotion program for the retailers. We use differential game models vis-a-vis dynamic promotion control strategies and cooperative promotion strategies under the scenario of existence and non-existence of the reference effect. Findings show that the presence of a promotion reference effect increases profit for the manufacturer but generates reduced profit for the retailers. We also find that the manufacturer augments the level of national brand advertising when incorporating the reference effect, and retailers raise (lower) their degree of promotion when the negative effect is low (high).     

Money-back guarantee and pricing decision with retailer's store brand

This paper investigates the money-back guarantee (MBG) choice problem in the presence of store brand introduction in a two-echelon supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and one retailer. Game-theoretic models with different MBG policies regarding the national brand and the store brand are examined. We found that the MBG policy could be a strategic tool to help the retailer developing its store brand even when a fairer policy is chosen by the retailer and the store brand is considered by consumers as a low-end substitute for the national brand. The presence of MBG is beneficial to the retailer while unfavorable to the manufacturer, even though the retailer provides a fairer MBG policy, i.e., MBG for both two brands. Although the national brand has advantages over the store brand, MBG will increase the competition and cause customer shifting from the national brand to store brand and thus bring a profit loss for the manufacturer. Moreover, we have found that the manufacturer could provide coordinate contracts for the retailer to improve its performance with which a win-win outcome could be reached for both the manufacturer and the retailer.     

制造商公平关切行为对绿色供应链生态标签策略的影响研究

考虑制造商存在公平关切行为,构建基于制造商为主导的Stackelberg绿色供应链博弈模型,研究自贴与行业认证生态标签策略下,制造商不同公平关切程度对绿色供应链各成员最优均衡决策的影响。结果表明：当制造商公平中性时,自贴和行业认证生态标签策略下,制造商利润均大于零售商。当制造商存在公平关切时,相较于自贴策略,行业认证策略下伴随制造商公平关切程度的增加,单位产品绿色度、零售商单位批零差价及绿色推广努力水平均较高,且呈现递增趋势;制造商成本与批发价的中间盈利也略高,但呈现下降趋势。同时,行业认证策略下零售商最优效用更高,制造商最优效用相对略低;但绿色供应链系统总效用均伴随制造商公平关切程度的增加而持续上升。     

制造商与网络零售商之供应链回购契约协调研究——基于Stackelberg博弈分析

运用基于经典报童问题的回购契约协调由单一制造商和单一网络零售商构成二阶供应链。构建stackelberg博弈模型和供应链整合模型,并求解算例,据此讨论双方如何运用回购契约,通过调整变量和参数来协调供应链的利润分配并实现供应链的最佳绩效。研究表明,作为主导方的制造商若同时提升批发价和更高倍率的补贴价,自身利润和供应链的总利润将会增加,供应链绩效也会得以改善,但跟随者网络零售商的利润会有所下降。     

考虑买方议价能力的双寡头供应商技术创新决策

在大型零售商的买方议价能力不断增强的背景下,研究了竞争供应商的技术创新决策问题。构建了由异质双寡头供应商、大型零售商组成的纵向市场结构模型,并将大型零售商的议价能力引入模型,考察了大型零售商议价能力条件下供应商的最优技术创新决策,分析了零售商议价能力的变化对不同供应商的技术创新决策的影响。研究发现:大型零售商议价能力的增强促进了小型供应商的技术创新、抑制了大型供应商的技术创新;当零售商的议价能力大于某一临界值时,小型供应商的技术创新水平会高于大型供应商。最后通过具体算例验证了研究结论,分析了参数变化对研究结论的影响。