ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES OF A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN OLIGOPOLY REVISITED: AN EXTENSION TO STACKELBERG COMPETITION

This paper revisits De Fraja and Delbono (1989), which is the seminal paper on mixed oligopoly, in order to pay more attention to Stackelberg competition. First, we show that, even in Cournot competition, if the number of private firms is sufficiently small, privatization necessarily reduces social welfare. Second, we demonstrate that when a public firm is a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, privatization necessarily reduces welfare irrespective of the number of private firms. Moreover, we show that even when a public firm remains a follower, privatization reduces welfare if the number of private firms is relatively small.     

Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs

I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of identical leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Besides showing existence I characterize the equilibrium set and provide a number of results that contribute to the applied literature. As the number of leaders increases, leaders produce more and eventually they deter entry. Leaders produce more than the Cournot best reply, but they may underinvest in entry deterrence. As the number of followers increases, leaders become more aggressive. When this number is large, if leaders can produce the limit quantity and at the same time have market power, then they deter entry.     

供应链绩效控制的多目标主从对策研究

基于对供应链订货模式的分析,考虑顾客参与协调的合理性与公平性要求,文中建立了基于订货协调创新的供应链绩效控制的多目标主从对策模型,研究了不同决策机制下特定协调策略对供应链绩效水平的影响。应用改进的遗传算法,对一个化工品分销系统Stackelberg主从对策问题进行离线仿真计算,结果表明,订货协调创新策略可以有效地控制供应链的绩效水平,分销商、顾客以及整个供应链系统的绩效得到不同程度的改善,多目标Stackelberg主从决策机制更加合理,接近实际。     

基于Stackelberg模型的出口补贴政策对经济的影响分析

出口补贴政策一直是各国政府重点研究的战略性贸易政策之一。本文在Stackelberg寡头垄断模型的基础上，分析了当两国企业共同竞争海外市场时，追随者企业所在国的补贴政策对各国经济活动的影响效果。结果显示，补贴政策会增加本国企业的产量，提高本国企业的利润和净福利，甚至会在产品价格下降的情况下提高本国总体福利水平。     

面向化工企业的供应链模型研究

针对上海某化工企业与其原料供应商之间的Stackelberg博弈特征,利用二层规划理论构建了上层为原料供应商,下层为该化工企业的两层模型;然后利用仿真算例验证了模型的合理性,并简要分析了该化工企业存在的问题。     

Intertemporal monopolistic pricing of non-durables

This paper provides a tractable analytical framework to study intertemporal equilibria between non-competitive supply and dynamic demand for non-durable goods. The basic hypothesis is that consumers enjoy utility from particular services rather than from commodities. Consumption of the non-durable good follows a dynamic pattern, because it depends on the stock of durables and energy demand provides the prototypical example, e.g., mobility, thermal comfort, etc. are the output of a combination of durable and non-durable goods. Indeed, turmoils in energy markets are to a great deal due to short run inflexibility and this gives this theoretical paper a topical flavour. The outcomes differ substantially across the strategic setups while differences in expectations (myopic versus rational) matter only transiently but not in the long run.      

不对称信息下逆向供应链定价策略分析

逆向供应链与传统供应链不同,传统供应链中的定价策略在逆向供应链中不再适用。为了解决该问题,基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的逆向供应链系统,在对称信息和不对称信息情况下,应用博弈理论对逆向供应链中废旧产品回收的定价策略进行研究,并将两种情况下的结果进行比较分析,得出一些有价值的结论。     

A dynamic Stackelberg model with production-adjustment costs

We investigate the (dynamic) stability of a stackelberg oligopoly model of a market of a homogeneous good, with output competition, one Stackelberg leader and a number of identical followers. We assume that each firm incurs quadratic production-adjustment costs if it changes its output. We present a simple necessary and sufficient condition for stability of the model. Using the condition, we compare the stability of this model with the stability of two related Cournot models in which all firms present are followers. It turns out that the Stackelberg model is more stable than these two Cournot models.     

A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets

Summary. This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium. Received: June 20, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001     

非对称冲击下的货币政策协调：一个斯塔克尔伯格模型

本文在非对称性冲击的假定下，研究了货币政策协调的斯塔克尔伯格博弈。对模型的斯塔克尔伯格均衡解的分析表明，非对称冲击对货币政策协调的政策效果有着不确定影响。在货币政策协调领域，由于冲击性质的改变，斯塔克尔伯格博弈中领导者的“先发优势”和“先动策略”并不能保证其从货币政策协调中获取确定的政策收益。