战略联盟不稳定性理论研究综述

20世纪90年代以来组织间关系发生了深刻变化，诸如价值链、供应链、知识链、集群等在内的涉及企业问长期协作关系的联盟组织模式已成为很多公司变革的战略选择。然而，理论研究和实证调查都已经注意到并开始揭示联盟中的合作风险和不稳定性情况，资料显示有一半以上是失败的。那么，是什么因素决定着联盟的不稳定性呢？如何才能维持联盟的成功和可持续发展呢？本文围绕资源基础理论、交易费用理论、博弈理论和社会困境理论四个方面对有关涉及联盟不稳定性的研究现状进行总结性说明，以期建立起一般性的分析框架，推进对企业联盟风险、联盟不稳定性的系统性研究。     

地方政府竞争策略选择的博弈分析

市场化条件下地方政府具有独立的特殊利益,地方政府竞争是实现其特殊利益的主要方式。现实中地方政府之间的竞争往往陷入了地方保护的“囚犯困境”。通过建立“地方政府竞争策略选择的博弈模型”剖析了各地方政府的竞争策略选择过程,揭示了地方保护产生的内在机理。分析表明,地方政府利益与地方公共利益的差别是影响策略选择的关键,而中央政府的行为对于打破地方政府之间的“囚犯困境”至关重要。     

失地农民城市适应困境与对策研究

通过问卷调查与个案访谈发现，失地农民在城市适应中所面临的困境是：职业上低层次、低技术含量、低工资待遇、低稳定性，并且因城市生活风险和生存成本的提高，并未随着收入的增加生活水平相应地提高；社会交往的同质性、内倾性和被动性，交往范围比较狭窄；身份认同的边缘性；生活方式的滞后性；社会保障的缺失。文章分析了其产生的原因，并且提出了相应的对策。     

Anger in social conflict: Cross-situational comparisons and suggestions for the future

This paper reviews research on the role of anger in conflict. We distinguish between intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of anger, the former referring to the impact of parties’ feelings of anger on their own behavior and the latter referring to the impact of one parties’ anger on the other’s behavior. We further compare the effects of anger across a variety of conflict settings, including negotiation, ultimatum bargaining, prisoner’s dilemma, resource dilemma, and coalition formation. At the intrapersonal level, anger is associated with competition in all conflict settings. In contrast, the interpersonal effects of anger differ across situations, with anger sometimes eliciting cooperation, sometimes eliciting competition, and sometimes having no effect. Based on the research reviewed, we conclude that the interpersonal effects of anger in conflict are determined by the level of interdependence of the parties, their information processing tendencies, and the justifiability of the anger expressions. Preparation of this paper was facilitated by a Veni grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO 451–05–010) awarded to Gerben A. Van Kleef.     

Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game

We consider how group size affects the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary contributions. A fixed amount of the good is provided if and only if the number of contributors reaches an exogenous threshold. The threshold, the group size, and the identical, non-refundable cost of contributing to the public good are common knowledge. Our focus is on the case in which the threshold is larger than one, so that teamwork is required to produce the public good. We show that both expected payoffs and the probability that the public good is obtained in the best symmetric equilibrium are decreasing in group size. We also characterize the limit outcome when group size converges to infinity and provide precise conditions under which the expected number of contributors is decreasing or increasing in group size for sufficiently large groups.     

邮政储蓄改革的变迁与邮政储蓄银行设立的再思考

从邮政储蓄银行的设立角度入手分析邮政储蓄改革的进程，以邮政储蓄改革的变迁为主线，对我国20年来的邮政储蓄问题进行重新梳理，认为，虽然邮政储蓄银行的设立符合渐进式市场化改革的思路，但由于缺乏全面考虑邮政储蓄改革的基础条件和没有认识到政府因素的介入，邮政储蓄银行的设立并非是邮政储蓄改革一劳永逸的方案，邮政储蓄改革未来的发展道路仍然很漫长。     

Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy

We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms' incentive to disclose information to the governments in the Brander–Spencer setting. With quantity competition, we find firms disclosing both demand and cost information, thereby justifying the literature's omniscient-government assumption. With price competition, however, firms have no incentives to disclose demand or cost information, so governments remain uninformed. Further, with quantity competition and unknown demand, governments are caught in an informational prisoner's dilemma.     

Investigation on Dumpling Issue——Remarks from China's State Council Information Office

From the very beginning of the dumpling incident,China has pav great concernontheoroblem and moved rapidly to find the reason and take further actions.Series of investigations carried in both countries by co-organized experts'team received a primary fruit as the true picture of the incident.Each time,China IS sparing no effort responsibly to solve the products quality dilemma,which other countries face in the same.     

文化创意产业版权保护的博弈分析

文化创意产业作为国民经济的重要组成部分和第三产业的支柱，对经济发展起到极大的推进作用，而互联网对以版权为核心的文化创意产业带来了巨大冲击。面对版权保护，国内文化创意企业陷入“囚徒困境”，使整个产业受到损失。基于静态博弈模型，以版权保护的视角，对文化创意企业间的关系进行了博弈分析，得出通过加大对盗版的惩罚力度和提高正版企业社会声誉等方式保护版权的结论，最后对文化创意产业的版权保护提供对应的建议。