河南省知识经济测度与发展战略

文章论述了知识经济对河南发展的重要作用，在总结知识经济测度方法研究现状的基础上，建立了评价河南经济的知识投入，知识产出和储存，知识流通和扩散以及知识学习发展水平的指标体系，测度结果表明：目前河南知识经济发展水平居全国中下游，与美国差距很大，在此基础上，提出了河南知识经济发展战略。     

A strategic market game with seigniorage costs of Fiat money

Summary. A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context. Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001     

Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

科研开发与经济增长——兼论科研开发的溢出效应

经济划分为科研部门和非科研部门，科研开发对经济增长的作用及科研对非科研部门具有外溢效应。1999-2003年30个省市自治区的面板数据表明，科研开发对经济增长具有较大的拉动作用，同时科研开发部门对其他部门的外溢作用明显为正。     

农业高新技术投资项目风险评价

The agricultural high-teeh investment project （AHIP） is eharaeterized by technology-intensive, high risk and great profit. This article analyzes essential factors of the risks of the agricultural high-tech investment projects and the traditional risk evaluation method of agrtcultral projects. We think that the applications of the sensitivity, analysis and probability ore defer. Therefore; this article introduces a structural model to evaluate the risks of the agricultural high-tech investment projects and the system of the concrete evaluation indexes.     

Trade and Renewable Resources in a Second Best World: An Overview

We provide an overview and introduction to the emerging field of trade and renewable resources, and discuss the potential impact of trade liberalization on welfare and resource conservation. A key factor determining the effect of trade reform is the institutional context or property rights regime, and our survey is organized such that it loosely follows the development of new insights with respect to institutions in this literature. This implies a transition from the benevolent planners model to the polar opposite benchmark of open access in the 1990s. Currently the pendulum is swinging back towards management and regulation, but institutions are treated as endogenous. We discuss and compare various key models in some detail and search for common ground between protagonists and antagonists of free trade. Paper based on Keynote address by Erwin Bulte, 12th Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Bilbao (Spain), June 28–30, 2003.     

企业技术创新网络治理机制研究

企业技术创新网络是在现代技术创新环境中产生的新型创新模式。其目的是在提高企业技术创新能力的同时,使网络中所有成员共同获益。在对企业技术创新网络的组织结构及特征进行论述的基础上,分析了其在运行过程中存在的主要问题,并针对性地给出了企业技术创新网络的一系列组合治理机制。     

民营经济发展战略研究

当前,国内民营经济发展主要有三种模式,即温州模式、苏南模式和青浦模式.三种模式对发展我国民营经济都具有借鉴意义,但不能照搬照抄.民营经济发展战略是一项复杂的系统工程,民营经济发展可采取集团化战略、多元化战略、融资战略、人力资源开发战略等四种战略,这四种战略都具有现实意义.     

巨灾风险证券化及在中国保险市场的应用

在分析了巨灾风险的损失频率与损失幅度的特点、传统保险与再保险对抗巨灾风险的局限性等方面的基础上，重点介绍了巨灾风险证券的几种产品类型，分析了各种风险转移方式的优缺点。最后，根据中国保险市场的特点，从应用环境和应用条件两个方面提出了开展巨灾风险证券化应用的若干设想。     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin