浅谈企业财务管理信息化建设

本通过论述企业财务会计信息失真的原因和危害，指出财务管理的重要性，加强财务管理，是企业发展的永恒主题，信息化建设是有效途径。     

西方国家社会责任会计信息披露及其对我国的启示

社会责任会计(SocialResponsibilityAccounting)是西方国家于上世纪七十年代创立的一个会计分支。一些国际组织、国家政府及会计职业团体在近三十年间对社会责任会计信息的披露问题从理论和实践上进行了研究和尝试。这些研究和实践对建立我国社会责任信息披露机制及提高披露水平有着重要的借鉴意义。     

浅议上市公司的会计信息失真与防范

章从六个方面分析了上市公司会计信息失真的原因，列举了常见的六种失真方式，重点提出了完善公司治理结构、加强内控，加强对中介机构的监管和处罚力度，完善股东索赔方面的法律以及加大对造假的处罚力度等四个方面的防范措施。     

关于完善中国商业银行信息披露制度的思考

新巴塞尔资本协议作为指导和规范各国银行业经营活动的一个国际性标准,对银行业信息的披露提出了具体要求。目前,中国商业银行信息披露制度与新巴塞尔资本协议的相关方面存在不少差距。按照新协议的监管要求,缩小国际差距,加快完善信息披露制度,对当前中国银行业稳健经营,提高国际竞争力具有重要意义。     

The evolution of consumer knowledge and sources of information: Hungary in transition

The authors’ research in Hungary during the period of transition to a market economy provides an opportunity to examine the evolving relationships between consumer product knowledge and its antecedents, including advertising, personal search, interpersonal sources, and brand experience. Their findings, based on survey data collected in Budapest in 1992 and 1998, indicate that the market information variables explain more variance in consumer knowledge later rather than earlier in the transition. Advertising is an important predictor of consumer knowledge later but not earlier in the transition, personal search is important at both times, and interpersonal sources are not important in either time period; brand experience is negatively related to knowledge earlier in the transition and positively related later in the transition. This study allows one to begin to understand the boundary conditions associated with studies conducted in developed economies. Managerial implications for firms investing in transitional economies are presented. Robin A. Coulter (robin.coulter@business.uconn.edu) is Ackerman Scholar and an associate professor of marketing in the School of Business at the University of Connecticut. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research interests include branding, cross-cultural consumer behavior, advertising, and research methods. Her work has appeared in theJournal of Consumer Research, the Journal of Consumer Psychology, theJournal of Applied Psychology, and theInternational Journal of Research in Marketing. Linda L. Price (llprice@email.arizona.edu) is Soldwedel Professor of Marketing in the Eller School of Management at the University of Arizona. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. Her research combines qualitative and quantitative methodologies to examine the active, emotional, imaginative aspects of consumers’ decisions and activities, and the social and cultural context of marketplace behaviors. Her work has appeared in theJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, and other leading marketing, management, and social science journals. Lawrence Feick (feick@katz.pitt.edu) is a professor of business administration in the Katz Graduate School of Business at the University of Pittsburgh. He received his Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State University. His current research focuses on cross-cultural consumer behavior, consumer word-of-mouth, and referrals. His work has appeared in the Journal of Marketing, theJournal of Marketing Research, the Journal of Consumer Research, Psychological Bulletin, andPublic Opinion Quarterly. Camelia Micu (camelia.micu@business.uconn.edu) is a marketing doctoral candidate at the University of Connecticut. Her research interests include advertising and product trial and cross-cultural consumer behavior.     

网络环境下图书馆信息咨询服务的新模式

图书馆的信息咨询服务在网络信息的湍流中感到了前所未有的压力，这对图书馆工作既是挑战，又是机遇。本文讨论了网络环境下图书馆的发展变化，指出图书馆无论在传统条件下还是在网络环境下，信息咨询服务都是图书馆工作的主题，图书馆只有在信息咨询服务方面不     

风险投资股份转让的博弈分析

本文讨论风险投资股份转让的两种方式的比选问题,基于信息的不对称程度,可实现的交易范围相应变小,而随着风险企业控制方的不同,不同的转让方武是最优的.     

Information processing and innovative choice

In this paper we examine how the information processing of subjects who make an innovative choice (innovators) differs from that of subjects who make a noninnovative choice (noninnovators). The task involves selection of an alternative within a range of prerated product category innovativeness. We propose that subjects who seek 1) impersonal/uncontrollable sources, 2) higher levels of information, 3) more detailed (versus summary) data, and 4) noncomparative (versus comparative) data are more likely to make innovative choices. The research method is a computerized process tracing experiment utilizing Search Monitor (Brucks 1988).The authors wish to express their gratitude to Merrie Brucks for the use of and help with Search Monitor and to Eric Johnson, Dave Schmittlein, and Mita Sujan for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.