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21.
中央政府与地方政府的政策博弈及其治理 总被引:21,自引:0,他引:21
本文描述了中央政府和地方政府政策博弈的凸现与加剧,认为这种政策博弈的制度性根源是市场取向的分权制以及以GDP为核心的政绩指标考核体系,制度性根源对政策博弈具有传导机制.这种政府博弈的积极影响促进了中央政府政策的更加合理、完善,而消极影响则是中央政府调控能力大打折扣、中央政府遭遇信任危机和扰乱市场秩序.治理途径则在于建立新型中央政府和地方政府关系,采取消除政策博弈的措施,即真正做到财权与事权的统一、建立居民的退出与呼吁机制、构建更加合理的政绩观与指标考评体系. 相似文献
22.
基于博弈论的建设工程投标报价研究 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
为使建设工程投标者能够中标并获得较高收益,就要讲究投标报价的策略和技巧。在与传统投标报价模型的比较之下,文章把博弈论运用到投标报价的决策中,建立了非合作性博弈模型和静态贝叶斯博弈模型,提出了投标者应采取的最优报价水平,进而得出了博弈思想的运用使报价更具动态性,更符合招投标实际操作的结论。 相似文献
23.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献
24.
Somdeb Lahiri 《Economic Theory》2002,19(2):429-434
The lexicographic composition of reflexive and complete binary relations (which are often called abstract games) is studied.
The necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for a lexicographic composition of quasi transitive relations to be quasi
transitive.The case of acyclicity of lexicographic composition of two relations is also investigated.
Received: September 25, 2000; revised version: November 28, 2000 相似文献
25.
Engelbert J. Dockner Gustav Feichtinger Alexander Mehlmann 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1993,3(2):145-152
We consider a differential game of R&D competition and explore the impact of rivalry on the firms' investment behavior over time. Using closed-loop strategies and hence allowing for strategic interactions among rival firms we show that R&D spending by the individual competitor is increased due to competition in the race for priority. This leads us to argue that competitive encounters enhance R&D activities at the same time as increasing efficiency in the race for a technological breakthrough. 相似文献
26.
Summary. Most of the literature on collusive behavior in auctions ignores two important issues that make collusion difficult to sustain at least in one-shot interactions: the detection of cheating and the verification of bids. Colluding bidders may deceive each other by using shill bidders. Also, if the identities of the bidders and their bids are not published then it would be difficult to verify the bid of a colluding bidder. This paper addresses these problems in one shot second price auctions where one bidder offers another bidder a side payment in exchange for not participating in the auction, while the number of other bidders is stochastic. In spite of the barriers to collusion mentioned above, a simple side payment mechanism which depends only on the auction price is introduced. It induces a successful collusion, eliminates the verification problem, provides no incentive for the use of shill bidders and guarantees that the proponent obtains ex-post non-negative payoff. The colluding bidders are ex-ante strictly better off compared with the competitive case, irrespective of their types.Received: 27 November 2002, Revised: 28 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, D44, D82.Yair Tauman: Correspondence toWe would like to thank an anonymous referee for very valuable comments and suggestions that significantly improved the paper. We thank Shmuel Zamir for a helpful discussion. 相似文献
27.
Richard?BaronEmail author Jacques?Durieu Hans?Haller Philippe?Solal 《Economic Theory》2004,23(2):445-454 (2004)
Summary. We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 9 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72.Correspondence to: H. HallerWe thank a referee for helpful comments. The hospitality of the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author. 相似文献
28.
Summary. The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts define a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory perceives of acts as functions from states to consequences. Sequential decisions, accordingly, get conceptualized by mappings from sets of states to sets of consequences. Thus, the question arises whether a natural definition of a tree can be given, where nodes are sets of states. We show that, indeed, trees can be defined as specific collections of sets. Without loss of generality the elements of these sets can be interpreted as representing plays. Therefore, the elements can serve as states and consequences at the same time.Received: 23 January 2003, Revised: 2 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72, D70.
Correspondence to: Klaus RitzbergerWe are grateful to Larry Blume, Ariel Rubinstein, Jörgen Weibull, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the universities of Vienna, Salamanca, and Heidelberg for helpful comments. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under project P15281 is also gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
29.
Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired
level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective,
firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the
tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which
charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual
firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions. 相似文献
30.
Eilon Solan 《Games and Economic Behavior》2000,31(2):245
A team is a group of people having the same motives but possibly different available actions. A team game is a game where two teams face each other. An absorbing game is a repeated game where some of the entries are absorbing, in the sense that once they are chosen the play terminates, and all future payoffs are equal to the payoff at the stage of termination. We prove that every absorbing team game has an equilibrium payoff and that there are -equilibrium profiles with cyclic structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73. 相似文献