A theory of sequential reciprocity

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.     

碎片复写：高强度再利用背景下的首钢 北京冬奥组委总部景观设计营建

当今中国乃至其他国家和地区，对工业旧址采取高强 度再开发的模式已成为趋势，工业建筑及户外场所面临存亡的 巨大挑战，如何认识和尊重工业遗存成为此类后工业改造项目 面临的新课题。随着首钢的搬迁与转型，作为首钢发展的起点 与北部对外门户的西十筒仓区域，成为北京冬奥组委总部落户 之选。面对建筑的先行与价值的不认同所带来的工业体系破碎 化，景观设计重拾了工业系统的价值，在阅读并尊重原有工业 空间逻辑的基础上，对原有地形结构进行创造性复写，并将重 译的工业碎片谨慎地嵌入景观体系中。“碎片复写”设计方式 的提出为高强度开发背景下的工业旧址再利用乃至城市空间更 新如何兼顾科学与艺术、法则与自由提供了策略。     

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.     

Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff.     

企业技术创新战略选择机制问题的研究

技术创新战略的选择对企业有着深远影响,甚至关系到企业的生存。如何建立有效的技术创新战略选择机制一直是困扰企业的难题。把企业技术创新战略选择机制的重点放在企业比较容易测度、使用的方法上来,对企业技术创新进行较为细致的风险估计、战略选择的博弈分析,并介绍了Logistic生长模型,为企业选择技术创新战略提供了便利的分析工具。     

景区门票价格偏高的一个博弈论解释

指出景区产品是差别垄断产品，通过引入博弈论的思想，论证差别垄断这一特性可能使得景区自动趋向完全垄断价格，造成社会福利损失。这一模型可以解释我国门票价格偏高以及部分景点还在酝酿提价的现象。     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 2: Formal model of the resolution process

In a drama, characters' preferences and options change under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus they undergo change and development. A formal model of dramatic transformation is presented that shows how the core of a drama is transformed by the interaction among the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process is seen to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality.     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 1: Dramatic resolution vs. Rational solution

Drama theory differs from game theory in that it does not regard actors' preferences and perceived opportunities as fixed, but as capable of being changed by the actors themselves under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus characters in a drama undergo change and development. A manyperson, multiphase theory of dramatic transformation is presented, showing how thecore of a drama (in the sense of game theory) is transformed by the interaction between the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process of dramatic transformation is shown to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality; it is proved that when all these paradoxes have been overcome, a full dramatic resolution has been reached, satisfying actors' emotional and moral demands, as well as the demands of rationality.     

Congestion effects in a public-good economy

This paper considers a public-good economy with congestion, where participants jointly produce a public good from input of a private good. This economic model gives rise to a transferable-utility game, the profit game, that depends on consumer preferences and a congestion parameter. The simplicity of the game allows the maximum level of congestion that guarantees the nonemptiness of the core of the economy to be determined. It is known that the sustainability of the Lindahl equilibrium in the core of the economy depends on the distribution of profits. In this paper two distributions of profits are compared: the Lindahl solution and the marginal-contribution solution. The latter is more often in the core than the Lindahl solution which in turn Lorenz-dominates the marginal-contribution solution.