Should there exist secondary markets for executive stock options?

This paper investigates the potential disadvantages of the secondary markets for executive stock options (ESOs). The benefits of such markets are evident, but they might also have negative effects for shareholders. Executives might, for example, use inside information to time their ESO selling. We investigate two personal motives of managers that can be assumed to affect their optimal selling decision, that is, managers' personal portfolio management issues and the use of inside information. We explore these motives by analyzing unique data from Finland, where there are secondary markets for ESOs. The results of the study support the traditional portfolio diversification hypothesis according to which managers tend to sell their ESOs when holding an ESO is equivalent to holding the underlying stock; that is, in such a case a manager's wealth is closely tied to the stock price of the firm. With respect to the use of inside information the results indicate that ESO selling activity is not related to future stock price behaviour, suggesting that managers do not use inside information to determine the selling time of their ESOs. These results imply that the existence of secondary markets for ESOs does not weaken the usefulness of ESOs as the management compensation, although the benefits of such markets are evident.     

Accounting for Option–based Compensation: The Economic Cost Approach

The intrinsic value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the difference between the stock price on the date of the grant and the exercise price of the option. The fair market value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the market value of stock options on the date of the grant. These approaches do not reflect the changes in the option–based compensation cost after the grant date. This paper proposes an economic cost approach that not only adjusts for the changes in the value of the options during its life but also records the issuance of the stock at fair market value on the exercise date.     

双重二元经济条件下失地农民补偿问题研究

本文以福建省为例，探讨失地农民问题形成的原因和双重二元经济条件下现行征地补偿标准的缺陷，指出随着工业化和城市化的发展单位农业用地产值和单位建设用地产值两者之间差距不断扩大，征地补偿标准应综合考虑土地的新用途对产值的边际贡献以及土地利用对当地GDP的贡献。     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.     

Investment Opportunities and the Relation Between Equity Value and Employees' Bonus

A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long‐term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance.     

试论不当得利的构成要件

不当得利制度发源于罗马法诉权,是民法中一项重要内容。构成不当得利有四个条件:必须一方获得利益;必须他方受到损失;必须受利益与受损失之间有因果关系;受益必须没有合法依据。     

试论我国湿地生态效益补偿制度框架构建

湿地是物种多样、资源丰富的生态系统,同时兼具经济、生态和社会三大价值。湿地生态效益补偿制度的建立,是稳定湿地周边经济,保障湿地有效保护和可持续发展的重要制度。在分析阐述我国湿地生态效益补偿制度建立的目的、原则的基础上,进一步确立了我国湿地生态效益补偿制度涉及的相关利益者和主客体,探讨了建立湿地生态效益补偿制度的补偿标准、补偿手段,初步构建了我国湿地生态效益补偿制度的补偿框架。     

Learning across the life cycle: Experimentation and performance among the hollywood studio heads

Guided by notions from the literature on organizational learning, this paper investigates how product line experimentation and organizational performance change across the careers of top managers. Its subjects are the studio heads who ran all the major Hollywood film studios from 1936 to 1965. The study found first, that product line experimentation declines over the course of executive tenures; second, that there is an inverse U‐shaped relationship between top executive tenure and an organization's financial performance; and third, that product line experimentation is more likely to benefit financial performance late in top executives' tenures. These findings are consistent with a three‐stage ‘executive life cycle’. During the early years of their tenures, top managers experiment intensively with their product lines to learn about their business; later on their accumulated knowledge allows them to reduce experimentation and increase performance; finally, in their last years, executives reduce experimentation still further, and performance declines. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adverse selection in group insurance: The virtues of failing to represent voters

Compared with non-union workers, union workers take more of their compensation in the form of insurance. This may be because unions choose democratically, and democratic choice mitigates adverse selection in group insurance. Relative to individually-purchased insurance, we show that group insurance chosen by an ideal profit-maximizing employer can be worse for every employee, while group insurance chosen democratically can be much better. The reason is that democracy can fail to represent the preferences of almost half the group.Received: January 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification: J51, D82, G22     

A strategic human resource perspective of firm competitive behavior

Embedded within firms are unique stores of intangible human assets that likely influence the way firms compete. We argue that the human and social capital of a firm, particularly at the upper echelon and board of director (BOD) levels, contribute to the firm's awareness of the competitive environment and its motivation and ability to undertake numerous, complex, and forceful competitive actions. We also suggest that the firm's executive compensation systems moderate the effects of these intangible human assets on firm competitive behavior. By examining how human capital, intra-firm social capital, and executive compensation influence firm competitive behavior, we advance a strategic HRM perspective of firm competitive behavior and outline several implications for future research.