Lies,damned lies and statistics: the accuracy of survey responses

That survey research is error prone is not a new idea and different varieties of non-sampling error have been investigated in the literature as well as consideration being given in many statistics textbooks to the issue of sampling error. The paper here considers research upon corporate environmental reporting. It compares information provided by corporate environmental reports with information that survey respondents claim their organization’s environmental report contains. This enables the accuracy of the claims to be assessed. Consideration is given to two different industries the Water industry and the Energy industry. Errors due to inaccurate reporting by survey respondents are shown to be relatively infrequent and respondents appear just about as likely to claim they report information that they do not, in fact, report as to fail to indicate that they report information that is, in fact, actually reported.     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Integrating local ecological services into intergovernmental fiscal transfers: The case of the ecological ICMS in Brazil

Local conservation efforts are often related to benefits at higher governmental levels. On the one hand, these efforts are strongly connected to local land-use decisions. On the other hand, activities such as sustainable water management or biodiversity conservation are associated with regional, national or even global public goods. Therefore, spatial externalities or spillovers exist, which—if not adequately compensated for—lead to an underprovision of the public goods and services concerned. This article investigates intergovernmental fiscal transfers as an innovative instrument for compensating local jurisdictions for the ecological goods and services they provide across local boundaries. From a public finance perspective, fiscal transfers are a suitable instrument for internalising spatial externalities. However, most federal states use this instrument predominantly for social and economic public sector functions rather than for ecological ones. This article investigates the case of the ecological “ICMS” that was first introduced by a few states in Brazil during the 1990s. Part of the revenue from this value-added tax is redistributed to the local level on the basis of ecological indicators. In this way, the state level uses fiscal transfers to compensate municipalities for the existence of protected areas and other ecological services provided within their territories. The Brazilian experience illustrates that such fiscal transfers can represent both a compensation for land-use restrictions and an incentive to value and engage in more conservation activities at the local level.     

Ecological integrity as an economic variable: An application to forested landscapes in the southern United States

Ecological integrity is important to fully describe the development of an economy. We calculated an aggregate index that quantifies the closeness of a forested region to a natural state. This naturalness index was based on the diversity of native tree species and sizes for ecological subregions in a seral condition. The index used the spatial–temporal array of sample plots from the Forest Inventory and Analysis (FIA) database of the USDA Forest Service. In the 70 survey units of the southern US between 1961 and 2005 the naturalness of forests generally improved with per capita personal income and population. The increase with income was consistent with the hypothesis of an environmental Kuznets curve for forested landscapes.     

Ill-behaviour of transformation-frontiers with environmental quality versus pollution

If one looks at environmental quality N as a renewable natural resource (with its own natural dynamics) which is changed by emissions Z, then one gets a better understanding of the shape of the damage function. In the case of a logistic growth dynamics one obtains a well-shaped transformation frontier N(Z), even in a two-species natural dynamics. For a more general natural interaction in the framework of a prey-predator model one obtains the possibilities of a cusp catastrophe which makes the transformation frontier N(Z) ill-shaped for the standard arguments of economists and their most favoured environmental policy instruments.     

LOGISTICS SALIENCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

The primary purpose of this paper was to empirically explore some of the reasons that logistics has become more important, or salient, in comparison to other functions within the firm. A survey of 296 managers across multiple industries in the U.S. found logistics becomes more important within the firm when the industry increases in uncertainty, when there is an emphasis on time‐based competition, when there is greater adoption of information technology, and when there is an emphasis on cross‐functional integration.     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

The role of planning in achieving indigenous land justice and community goals

This paper suggests that the capacity of indigenous groups to engage effectively in a range of planning activities is crucial to achieving land justice and community goals. This argument is relevant in the face of long-standing tensions between indigenous peoples residing in post-settler societies and nation-states such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand over questions of land and natural resource use. The paper argues that effective planning is crucial for (i) protecting indigenous interests by engaging the planning activities of the state, (ii) the successful acquisition of lands through legal land claim processes, and (iii) helping indigenous communities achieve their goals by implementing effective community-based planning processes.     

Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion

We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques.     

Cap and trade policies in the presence of monopoly and distortionary taxation

We extend an analytical general equilibrium model of environmental policy with pre-existing labor tax distortions to include pre-existing monopoly power as well. We show that the existence of monopoly power has two offsetting effects on welfare. First, the environmental policy reduces monopoly profits, and the negative effect on income increases labor supply in a way that partially offsets the pre-existing labor supply distortion. Second, environmental policy raises prices, so interaction with the pre-existing monopoly distortion further exacerbates the labor supply distortion. This second effect is larger, for reasonable parameter values, so the existence of monopoly reduces the welfare gain (or increases the loss) from environmental restrictions.