全文获取类型
收费全文 | 2391篇 |
免费 | 84篇 |
国内免费 | 32篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 202篇 |
工业经济 | 77篇 |
计划管理 | 406篇 |
经济学 | 975篇 |
综合类 | 173篇 |
运输经济 | 29篇 |
旅游经济 | 14篇 |
贸易经济 | 249篇 |
农业经济 | 147篇 |
经济概况 | 235篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 3篇 |
2023年 | 38篇 |
2022年 | 8篇 |
2021年 | 37篇 |
2020年 | 59篇 |
2019年 | 67篇 |
2018年 | 51篇 |
2017年 | 73篇 |
2016年 | 84篇 |
2015年 | 78篇 |
2014年 | 127篇 |
2013年 | 133篇 |
2012年 | 120篇 |
2011年 | 148篇 |
2010年 | 112篇 |
2009年 | 158篇 |
2008年 | 189篇 |
2007年 | 171篇 |
2006年 | 169篇 |
2005年 | 137篇 |
2004年 | 92篇 |
2003年 | 94篇 |
2002年 | 85篇 |
2001年 | 65篇 |
2000年 | 28篇 |
1999年 | 47篇 |
1998年 | 21篇 |
1997年 | 16篇 |
1996年 | 23篇 |
1995年 | 21篇 |
1994年 | 15篇 |
1993年 | 7篇 |
1992年 | 7篇 |
1991年 | 9篇 |
1990年 | 3篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 1篇 |
1984年 | 6篇 |
1983年 | 2篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有2507条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, C72.
Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper. 相似文献
62.
Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand correspondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand correspondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.Received: 29 July 2004, Revised: 17 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D51, D91, C73.
Correspondence to: Thomas MariottiWe thank Michele Piccione for useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. 相似文献
63.
Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers:
D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002. 相似文献
64.
Deepak K. Sinha 《Journal of Economics》1997,66(1):1-22
When all products in the economy are weak gross substitutes, preferences are homothetic, and firms face menu costs then all prices in an industry move together at the same rate. In the closed-loop Nash noncooperative equilibrium, all firms invest in productivity and reduce real prices. As a result, in the case of quadratic menu costs, the outputs of industries and the economy go up along S-shaped time paths characteristic of diffusion of innovations. 相似文献
65.
The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. 相似文献
66.
67.
Finn?Roar?Aune Rolf?GolombekEmail author Sverre?A.?C.?Kittelsen 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2004,29(4):379-400
Without an international climate agreement, extraction of more natural gas could reduce emissions of CO2 as more clean natural gas may drive out dirty coal and oil. Using a computable equilibrium model for the Western European electricity and natural gas markets, we examine whether increased extraction of natural gas in Norway reduces global emissions of CO2. We find that both in the short run and in the long run total emissions are reduced if the additional quantity of natural gas is used in gas power production in Norway. If instead the additional quantity is exported directly, total emissions increase both in the short run and in the long run. However, if modest CO2-taxes are imposed, increased extraction of natural gas will reduce CO2 emissions also when the additional natural gas is exported directed.earlier version of this paper was presented at the 25th Annual IAEE International Conference in Aberdeen June 2002. 相似文献
68.
Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous
and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem
stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social
value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because
of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems
often studied in macroeconomics.
Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due
to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful
comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235
“Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization
for public policy and industry regulation”).
Correspondence to: C. Le Van 相似文献
69.
Summary. An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at
-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most
percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a
-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if
where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that
-majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller
s.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D21, D52, D71, G39.
Correspondence to: Hervé CrésThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Danish Research Councils and hospitality of HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Mich Tvede and support from Fondation HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Hervé Crés. 相似文献
70.
In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical
model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model,
Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find experimental evidence that players select the center-sponsored star. Based on a slight
modification of Bala and Goyal’s model, we design a network formation experiment in which, depending on link costs, periphery-sponsored
stars and the empty network are the only strict Nash networks. We observe that almost all groups not only reach a strict Nash
network once but also switch the center player in periphery-sponsored stars several times. The main innovation in our experiment
is to use a continuous time framework which we believe to be a more realistic setting to study behavior in network formation
situations and which makes coordination on stars much easier than simultaneous strategy adaptation in discrete time.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9125-1.
JEL Classification C72 · C92 · D81 相似文献