对中国人民银行征信法规建设与执法效能的思考

征信法规建设的滞后使得中国人民银行分支机构征信工作缺乏法律依据,一定程度上制约了征信执法效能的发挥。为提高征信执法效能,应进一步完善《征信管理条例》并使之尽早出台,加快制定企业征信方面相关办法、《个人信用信息基础数据库管理办法》实施细则和信用评级方面相关办法等。     

柔性行政在税收执法中适用的可行性分析

随着中国改革开放的深入和社会主义市场经济体制的日益完善,传统刚性行政执法那种僵化、忽视行政相对人权益的弊端日渐显露,通过对近几年执法现状的回顾,人们对行政执法问题进行了重新反思,柔性行政执法被提上日程。柔性行政执法以其灵活性强、注重行政相对人意愿的优势弥补了刚性行政执法的缺陷,而税收行政执法一向被认为是具有强制性的,柔性行政执法在税收执法当中是否具有可行性,很多人抱着怀疑态度,因此需要从理论的高度对税务柔性行政执法存在的正当性、合理性及必要性进行认识。     

新农村建设环境法律问题研究

农村环境问题主要表现在农业生产带来的污染、农村生活垃圾污染以及工业区转移农村导致的污染。农村环境保护存在环境立法不健全,环境执法工作滞后,农民环境管理参与度不高等问题,要改善新农村建设中环境保护不力的现状,需从完善农村环境立法,加强环境执法工作和提高农民参与环境保护的积极性入手,完善环境法制,推动新农村建设。     

Reseller adoption of manufacturers' e-business tools: The impact of social enforcement, technology-relationship fit and the mediating role of reseller benefits

Manufacturer-reseller relationships are increasingly becoming technology-infused as distribution managers are employing e-business tools to streamline existing channels. This research examines the role of social enforcement, relationship-technology fit and the perceived reseller benefits in reseller adoption of manufacturers' e-business tools. The results of the empirical test involving a sample of 224 resellers suggest that social enforcement and technology-relationship factors impact reseller e-business adoption, while reseller benefits play a mediating role. Implications of these findings for researchers and managers are discussed.     

On the severity of ruin in a Markov-modulated risk model

We consider a Markov-modulated risk model in which the claim inter-arrivals, amounts and premiums are influenced by an external Markovian environment process. A system of Laplace transforms of the probabilities of the severity of ruin, given the initial environment state, is established from a system of integro-differential equations derived by Snoussi [The severity of ruin in Markov-modulated risk models Schweiz Aktuarver. Mitt., 2002, 1, 31–43]. In the two-state model, explicit formulas for probabilities of the severity of ruin are derived, when the initial reserve is zero or when both claim amount distributions are from the rational family. Numerical illustrations are also given.     

论我国行政强制程序谦抑

在国家行政管理中,行政强制也是一种有限的社会资源。行政强制以及实施程序的谦抑性也就成为现代行政强制程序所追求的价值目标,也是行政强制立法者所应当具备的理念。程序的存在是对权力的规制、抑制、平衡、指引,程序强调限制恣意和防止权力滥用,可以防止立法或者行政机关觊觎专擅,侵害民权的坚实堡垒。我国行政强制法中所体现的程序谦抑,结合我国社会实践中特殊典型的案例,对我国行政强制程序进行研究思考,提出完善我国行政强制程序的谦抑性的构想。     

Performance measurement and management in Portuguese law enforcement

Performance measurement of police services is complicated by ambiguous and complex goaland objectives-setting, and by the difficulties of measuring outputs. This article looks at the organizational and management changes being made in Portuguese police forces. The authors fill a gap in the literature on performance measurement in Portugal by taking a national approach to the study of how law enforcement agencies are introducing new management accounting changes. The article therefore widens the debate on performance measurement and performance improvements in law enforcement.     

Optimal taxation and growth with public goods and costly enforcement

This paper studies optimal direct and indirect taxation in an endogenous growth framework with a productive public good and costly tax collection. Optimal (growth-maximizing) tax rules are derived under exogenous collection costs. The optimal direct–indirect tax ratio is shown to be negatively related to the administrative costs of collecting these taxes, as documented in cross-country data. This result also holds under endogenous collection costs (with these costs inversely related to administrative spending on tax enforcement), but for these to generate significant effects on tax collection requires implausibly high degrees of efficiency in spending, or the allocation of a large fraction of resources to tax enforcement. Depending on how it is financed, the latter policy may entail adverse effects on growth. Improving ‘tax culture’ and the sense of civic duty through greater budgetary transparency may be a more effective policy to improve tax collection and promote economic growth.     

Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy

This paper describes a model where the size of the informal sector decreases as the degree to which financing contracts can be enforced in the formal sector rises. Agents who choose to operate in the informal sector can evade taxes, but they have no access to official means of contract enforcement. Numerical simulations of the model suggest that lax tax enforcement alone does not suffice to generate a large informal sector. Contractual imperfections, on the other hand, can generate a large informal sector and account for several distinguishing features of the organization of production in developing economies. I would like to thank Tim Kehoe, Ed Prescott and Manuel Santos for their guidance, and seminar participants at ITAM, the Universidad Torcuato di Tella and the University of Montréal for their valuable comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.     

On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

We study the effectiveness of costly rewards in mitigating excess extraction in a standard Common Pool Resource (CPR) game experiment. We implement two treatments. In the first, rewards are a pure transfer from one player to the other. In the second, the benefits of receiving a reward are higher than the cost of providing it. Referring to the latter as “net positive” rewards, we observe that these are used more frequently than transfer rewards, and that, unlike transfer rewards, they are effective in sustaining cooperation in the CPR game. JEL Classification C72, C92, D74