Liquidity traps with global Taylor Rules

An important theme in the writings of Jess Benhabib is the global stability of equilibrium in monetary economies. A key result emerging from his research is that Taylor-type interest rate feedback rules that are bounded below by zero can lead to unintended liquidity traps. The present paper shows that even if the interest rate rule is not bounded below by zero, that is, even if the government could credibly commit to a globally active Taylor rule, self-fulfilling liquidity traps cannot be ruled out. This result is shown to obtain in models with flexible and sticky prices and under continuous and discrete time.     

《游梁式抽油机》标准的修订及与国际接轨探讨

针对SY/T 5044—2003《游梁式抽油机》在指导我国抽油机的发展及出口时存在的问题，基于国内外抽油机标准的发展状态，以及比较API Spec 11E《抽油机规范》与SY/T 5044—2003《游梁式抽油机》，论述了SY/T 5044—2003《游梁式抽油机》的修订及与国际接轨的必要性和迫切性，同时对标准的修订提出了几点建议。     

社会公平视阈下我国廉租房制度建设的路径选择

城镇廉租房制度具有维护社会公平和稳定社会秩序的功能。但是,随着市场化进程的加快,最低收入家庭住房支付能力不足问题愈显突出,廉租房在制度设计和执行上呈现出内生矛盾。因此,从社会公平角度去重新审视廉租房制度设计和推行办法,给这一制度注入新的思路和活力,具有重大的理论意义和现实意义。     

Interest rate rules and global determinacy: An alternative to the Taylor principle

A well‐known determinacy condition on interest rate rules is the “Taylor principle,” which states that nominal interest rates should respond more than 100 percent to inflation. Unfortunately, notably because interest rates must be positive, the Taylor principle cannot be satisfied for all interest rates, and as a consequence global determinacy may not prevail even though there exists a locally determinate equilibrium. We propose here a simple alternative to the Taylor principle, which takes the form of a new condition on interest rate rules that ensures global determinacy. An important feature of the policy package is that it does not rely at all on any of the fiscal policies associated with the “fiscal theory of the price level,” which has so far been the main alternative for determinacy.     

民间借贷的几点法律思考

民间借贷是融资的渠道之一,在我国的法律体系之中,还没有关于民间借贷的专门性的法律法规,已有的相关规定非常混乱,存在诸多弊端,我国应尽快制定专门的民间借贷法律法规,解决民间借贷引起的问题,促进民间借贷的健康有序发展。     

On eliciting beliefs in strategic games

Several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects. Using data from one such study we conduct an experiment where our experienced subjects observe early rounds of strategy choices from that study and are given monetary incentives to report forecasts of choices in later rounds. We elicit beliefs using three different scoring rules: linear, logarithmic, and quadratic. We compare forecasts across the scoring rules and compare the forecasts of our trained observers to forecasts of the actual players in the original experiment. We find significant differences across scoring rules. The improper linear scoring rule produces forecasts closer to 0 and 1 than the proper rules, and these forecasts are poorly calibrated. The two proper scoring rules induce significantly different distributions of forecasts. We find that forecasts by observers under both proper scoring rules are significantly different from the forecasts of the actual players, in terms of accuracy, calibration, and the distribution of forecasts. We also find evidence for belief convergence among the observers.     

物流系统中面向数据分析的路径规划算法研究

提出了一种新型数据挖掘路径规划算法,该算法通过扫描物流路径信息数据库,进行初始筛选,得到初步的路径序列,然后生成有针对性的候选过度路径序列,对候选路径序列进行优化处理,进而得到物流过程中的有用路径序列,试验表明该路径规划算法可有效减少所需扫描的物流路径信息数据库的次数,同时缩小了候选路径集合,其时间成本得到有效控制.     

Gains from manipulating social choice rules

Gibbard–Satterthwaite analysis is extended by examining the size of the potential gains that can be achieved from manipulation. The authors are grateful for an invitation from the University of Athens to visit their Ph D program where some of this work was done.     

Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

This paper studies a game of persuasion. A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to take an action by presenting evidence. Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) showed that when the listener's decision is binary, neither randomization nor commitment have any value for the listener, and commented that the binary nature of the decision was important for the commitment result. In this paper, I show that concavity is the critical assumption for both results: no value to commitment and no value to randomization. Specifically, the key assumption is that the listener's utility function is a concave transformation of the speaker's utility function. This assumption holds vacuously in the binary model. The result that concavity implies credibility allows us to dispense with the assumption that the listener's decision is binary and significantly broadens the scope of the model.     

An experimental test of a committee search model

The objective of this paper is to design a laboratory experiment for an infinite-horizon sequential committee search model in order to test some of the implications obtained by the model in Albrecht et al. (2010) (AAV). We find that, compared with single-agent search, the search duration is longer for committee search under the unanimity rule, but is shorter for committee search in which at least one vote is required to stop searching. In addition, according to estimates from round-based search decisions, subjects are more likely to vote to stop searching in committee search than in single-agent search. This confirms that agents are less picky in committee search. Overall, the experimental outcomes are consistent with the implications suggested by the AAV model. However, despite the prediction from the AAV model, we could not obtain a significant outcome in relation to the size order of the probabilities of voting to stop searching in committee search for the various plurality voting rules.