煤矿井下继电保护系统的研究

本文介绍了煤矿井下继电保护的基本任务与要求,通过对钱家营矿井下三采区变电所变压器短路电流的计算、继电保护的整定,针对性的提出了煤矿井下采区变电所开关继电保护的方法。     

TS模糊模型在个股股价预测中的应用研究

个股价格短期内的变化量一般可通过股票技术指标间接反映出来,且这些指标间有着一定的相关性;另外,股票价格模型具有Takagi-Sugeno(TS)模糊模型所研究问题的非线性、时变性特点,基于此,本研究将TS模糊模型与分析出的股票常用技术指标相结合进行股价预测。结果显示预测出的价格与股票实际价格近似一致,精度高,因此研究具有一定的实用价值。     

融资融券对股价波动的影响——基于标的证券确定和调整的视角

基于标的证券确定和调整视角,利用沪市首批参与融资融券业务的50只股票的相关数据,采用事件分析法,文章实证研究了融资融券对股价的波动影响。研究结论发现:融资融券具有平抑股价,稳定市场作用。最后文章给出了建议。     

我国跨境短期资本流动的成因结构分析：2005～2008——一个基于VAR模型的实证研究

本文利用2005年7月以来的月度统计数据,通过基于VAR模型的脉冲响应分析和方差分解分析,从实证意义上验证了国内汇率、利率、房地产市场和股票市场对跨境短期资本流动的现实影响作用,且诸变量中,以汇率和地产价格的影响力为相对最强。据此本文认为,为了有效应对短期资本跨境流动的问题,今后一个阶段,应合理引导汇率预期并努力维持房地产价格的相对稳定。     

农民工市场失灵及其矫正

农民工短缺现象的出现至少在一定程度上说明了农民工市场失灵,难以依靠市场自身的力量调节供求关系。市场失灵不仅造成用工短缺,也使社会福利受损。农民工市场失灵,除了不完全竞争、信息不完全等一般因素外,还与该市场发育不成熟、制度安排不合理密不可分。近年来一系列有关农民工政策的出台,在一定程度上可使失灵的市场得到矫正。     

关于建立融券卖空机制对股市影响的分析

通过对股价涨跌、波动幅度和成交量的对比分析,可以发现融券卖空机制的引入有利于完善证券市场的价格发现机制,增强证券公司的盈利能力,丰富投资者的投资选择。在进一步增强证券的可融性,降低中国股市的系统性风险和控制监管漏洞与异常交易的基础上,中国股市建立融券卖空机制的现实条件已基本具备。     

粤港澳大湾区城市群区域治理机制的架构思考:从政府治理权出发

推进建设粤港澳大湾区城市群,尤其应当重视各级政府在该区域治理机制架构中的地位。协调不同法域、不同层级和不同类型地方政府之间的治理权,是推进该城市群协调发展,并率先推进实现新型城镇化转型的基础和保障。就该区域而言,政府治理权的架构可以分为三个层次:根据中央顶层设计的区域布局,推动地方政府转换行使治理权的视阈,合理安排不同地方政府治理权,并建立权力协作机制;由此机制出发,协调区域内各地方的发展方向,深化彼此之间利益共生关系;最后,与利益共享对应,还应当配合财政供给改革,实现区域治理责任的成本共担。     

The HRM–capital market link: Effects of securities analysts on strategic human capital

This article develops theory about an agency problem affecting the strategic human capital (SHC) of the firm. It proposes three categories of SHC‐related choices managers must make that imply a trade‐off between near‐ and long‐term performance. Dispersed shareholding, firm coverage by securities analysts, and their practice of publishing quarterly earnings forecasts are argued to entail a bias in management incentives, shifting the balance in this trade‐off toward near‐term performance. To restore the balance, securities analysts would need to distinguish transitory from recurring effects of SHC‐related choices in their valuation models (e.g., treating certain labor cost savings during cyclical downturns as transitory). Restoring the balance would also require them to anticipate long‐term effects in their long‐term earnings forecasts (e.g., long‐term positive effects of retaining employees with valuable skills during cyclical downturns). The article discusses specific transitory cost effects and long‐term effects they could potentially take into account. The skills and incentives needed by analysts to account for such effects are argued to vary across firm segments.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

融券制度与内部人寻租——来自准自然实验的经验证据

内部人寻租一直以来是理论与实务界关心的重点,如何有效抑制内部人寻租行为是资本市场的重大课题。本文以内部人交易度量内部人寻租,分析了融券制度对内部人寻租的影响。研究发现:(1)融券制度对内部人寻租有显著抑制作用,并且融券规模越大,内部人寻租越少。(2)相比于国有企业,非国有企业当中融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用更加明显。本文还将内部人交易分方向进行回归,结果显示融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用主要体现在卖出方向上。本文进一步分析了融券制度影响内部人寻租的路径,发现“竞争效应”和“信息效应”是融券制度影响内部人寻租的两条重要路径。本文考虑了竞争性解释——分析师关注的作用,发现分析师关注并不能影响本文结论的正确性;本文还利用反面事实推断、倾向得分匹配、反向因果检验等方法,确保实证结论的稳健性。本文的研究结果,丰富了内部人寻租的特征及影响因素研究,有利于市场监管部门加强对内部人寻租行为的控制;扩充了有关融券制度的文献,为卖空制度的推行及完善提供理论依据。