Detecting Accounting Fraud in Publicly Traded U.S. Firms Using a Machine Learning Approach

We develop a state-of-the-art fraud prediction model using a machine learning approach. We demonstrate the value of combining domain knowledge and machine learning methods in model building. We select our model input based on existing accounting theories, but we differ from prior accounting research by using raw accounting numbers rather than financial ratios. We employ one of the most powerful machine learning methods, ensemble learning, rather than the commonly used method of logistic regression. To assess the performance of fraud prediction models, we introduce a new performance evaluation metric commonly used in ranking problems that is more appropriate for the fraud prediction task. Starting with an identical set of theory-motivated raw accounting numbers, we show that our new fraud prediction model outperforms two benchmark models by a large margin: the Dechow et al. logistic regression model based on financial ratios, and the Cecchini et al. support-vector-machine model with a financial kernel that maps raw accounting numbers into a broader set of ratios.     

Value creation around merger waves: The role of managerial compensation

This paper examines the relation between executive compensation and value creation in merger waves. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm risk increases the likelihood of out-of-wave merger transactions but has no influence on in-wave merger frequency. CEOs with compensation linked to firm risk have better out-of-wave merger performance in comparison to in-wave mergers. We also present evidence that cross-sectional acquirer return dispersion is greater for in-wave acquisitions. Our results suggest that the underperformance of acquiring firms during merger waves can be attributed in part to ineffective compensation incentives, and appropriate managerial incentives can create value, particularly in non-wave periods.     

Supply chain finance and impacts of consumers’ sustainability awareness

Several new methods have been proposed for supply chain finance (SCF) with bank credits, but none of them mentions how to solve the borrowers’ moral hazard problems in SCF. This paper examines the moral hazard problem in supply chain financing with procurement contract (or purchase order). We show that since supply chain is an up-down directed structure, when financing with the procurement contract, the supplier’s effort monitoring task can be rendered to the procurement contract, which can secure the supplier’s optimal effort and capital choices in production. Hence, compared to separate lending, the supplier’s credit rationing problem can be mitigated, and most importantly, banks’ under-estimation on the supplier’s default risk and the over-estimation on the retailer’s default risk will both decrease. We further show that the retailer’s corporate social responsibility expenditure can increase consumers’ brand recognition, thus when facing demand shocks arising from consumer’s unexpected concerns, the retailer can better stabilize the firm value.     

The Effects of Analyst‐Country Institutions on Biased Research: Evidence from Target Prices

Prior research demonstrates that a strong institutional infrastructure in a country moderates self‐serving behavior of market participants. Cross‐country economic activities have increased significantly, presenting a research opportunity to examine the relative influence of local versus foreign institutional infrastructure on individual market participants. We utilize variation in analyst‐country location relative to covered firm location to examine institutional determinants of optimism in analyst research. Focusing on target prices, where persistent optimism is well documented, we find that analysts domiciled in countries with stronger institutional infrastructures exhibit significantly attenuated target price optimism and more value‐relevant target prices. Our results demonstrate the importance of domestic country‐level institutional factors in moderating self‐serving behavior of market participants engaged in cross‐country activities.     

Sentiment and bias in performance evaluation by impartial arbitrators

This study investigates whether relative performance evaluations of labor output are biased in the presence of sentiment, even when the (supposedly independent) evaluators are external. Data from a field-experiment setting—involving a pro-sport League's best-player award—allows for empirical testing of this proposition. After controlling for within-match performance, the results show that the match officials provide significantly better evaluations to players celebrating a ‘milestone’ game—an occasion on which sentimental favorites exist. However, this sentiment bias holds only in certain cases, and appears to have weakened in more recent years.     

Non‐wage benefits,costs of turnover and labour attachment

Like firms in established market economies, many Russian firms provide non‐wage benefits to their workers, such as housing, medical care or day care. This article explains the provision of benefits as a strategic choice for firms in the presence of labour and service market imperfections. Analysing unique survey data for 404 industrial establishments from 40 Russian regions, the authors provide strong evidence that non‐wage benefits are used by firms to attach workers and thereby reduce the costs of labour turnover in the face of tight labour markets. It is also shown that this attachment strategy works due to imperfections in the regional markets for social services.     

A comparison of voluntary and mandated climate change-related disclosure

This study draws on legitimacy theory to investigate the relationship between mandatory disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions by companies that are subject to specific environmental legislation (the Australian National Greenhouse Energy Reporting Act 2007) and the level of voluntary environmental disclosures. Using a sample of 535 observations, we find that i) Overall, legislation-affected companies increase their disclosures compared with non-affected companies, ii) As many companies reduce their disclosures as increase them, iii) there is an increase in the level of emissions volume disclosures in legislation-affected companies compared with the same company pre-implementation, iv) legislation-affected higher emitters have higher levels of voluntary disclosures. These findings are consistent with legitimacy theory, which predicts differential disclosures in circumstances to avoid scrutiny.     

Information Intermediary or De Facto Standard Setter? Field Evidence on the Indirect and Direct Influence of Proxy Advisors

We examine whether proxy advisory firms (PAs) serve primarily an information intermediary role by providing research and voting recommendations to shareholders, or directly influence executive compensation by exerting pressure on firms to adopt preferred pay practices. Through a field study, we find that PAs are perceived as both information intermediaries and agenda setters and that these roles provide leverage to enable PAs to exercise significant influence over executive pay practices. Boards feel, and sometimes yield to, pressure to conform to PA “best” practices despite their own preferred compensation philosophies, even in the absence of overt PA scrutiny or negative shareholder votes. We also find that PAs are susceptible to conflicts of interest and generally use a “one‐size‐fits‐all” approach to voting recommendations. Overall, however, PAs are viewed as improving compensation practices by increasing transparency and accountability and fostering dialogue between firms and their shareholders.     

Job Security and Risk‐Taking: Theory and Evidence From Professional Football

This article investigates how job security impacts risky decision making. In a theoretical model, we show how risk‐taking can be affected by job security. Agents with moderate job security become more risk averse as their job security increases. Conversely, agents with very high (or low) job security act in a more risk neutral manner. We test these predictions using data on head coaching decisions from the National Football League, finding that job security has a negative and statistically significant effect on risk‐taking.     

Mortgage Choice as a Natural Field Experiment on Choice under Risk

Data on approximately 280,000 borrowers from the UK Survey of Mortgage Lenders are used to model choices between variable and fixed rate mortgages. The choice is assumed to depend on three factors: risk attitude, interest‐rate expectations, and individual discount rate. The ordered probit model is used for estimation, while taking account of a number of econometric issues including missing counterfactuals, selectivity, and endogeneity. A large number of strong effects are found, including: higher income borrowers are less risk averse and have a lower discount rate, and risk aversion rises with the amount borrowed, providing evidence of increasing relative risk aversion.