Bidding for the future: signaling in auctions with an aftermarket

This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards as bidders attempt to signal via the winning bid. Signaling is most prominent in second-price auctions where equilibrium bids are “above value.” In English and first-price auctions, signaling is less extreme since the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice. The opportunity to signal lowers bidders’ payoffs and raises revenue. When bidders understate their private information, separating equilibria need not exist and the auction may not be efficient.     

Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior.     

Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games

We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects’ learning behavior. But the subjects follow only a few decision rules for basing their play on their information, and these rules have simple cognitive interpretations. There is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and many equilibria in mixed strategies. We find that the only equilibrium consistent with the data is one of the mixed strategy equilibria. This equilibrium is shown, surprisingly, to be consistent with Jordan's Bayesian model.     

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining

We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero.     

Endogenous structural change and crisis in a multiple time-scales growth model

The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies, and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn “productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path. Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as long term and endogenous outcomes.     

Natural conjugate priors for the instrumental variables regression model applied to the Angrist–Krueger data

We propose a natural conjugate prior for the instrumental variables regression model. The prior is a natural conjugate one since the marginal prior and posterior of the structural parameter have the same functional expressions which directly reveal the update from prior to posterior. The Jeffreys prior results from a specific setting of the prior parameters and results in a marginal posterior of the structural parameter that has an identical functional form as the sampling density of the limited information maximum likelihood estimator. We construct informative priors for the Angrist–Krueger [1991. Does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings? Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 979–1014] data and show that the marginal posterior of the return on education in the US coincides with the marginal posterior from the Southern region when we use the Jeffreys prior. This result occurs since the instruments are the strongest in the Southern region and the posterior using the Jeffreys prior, identical to maximum likelihood, focusses on the strongest available instruments. We construct informative priors for the other regions that make their posteriors of the return on education similar to that of the US and the Southern region. These priors show the amount of prior information needed to obtain comparable results for all regions.     

Randomization and simplification in dynamic decision-making

Randomization adds beneficial flexibility to the construction of optimal simple plans in dynamic environments. A decision-maker, restricted to the use of simple plans, may find a stochastic plan that strictly outperforms all deterministic ones. This is true even in noninteractive deterministic environments where the decision-maker's choices have no influence on his signals nor on the future evolution of the system. We describe a natural decomposition of simple plans into two components: an action selection rule and a behavior modification rule. In noninteractive environments optimal simple plans do not require randomization in the action selection rule. Only randomization in the behavior modification rule may be necessary.     

The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen

Strategic rationality is subjected here to natural selection. In a zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information, one long-run individual is informed of the state of the world, and plays against a sequence of short-run opponents who are not. Strategies are noisy and have bounded recall. An equilibrium in these is shown to exist. Relative to any such equilibrium, sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is not decreasing in the original level of recall, thus capturing the Red Queen effect. The selection pressure to reduce a small amount of noise is less than that to increase recall.     

Employment changes, the structure of adjustment costs, and plant size

In this paper, we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of Norwegian plants. The data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment changes is inversely related to plant size. We develop and estimate a simple “q” model of labor demand, allowing for the presence of fixed, linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs. The econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components, unrelated to plant size. As a result, the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants. The quadratic component of costs is also always important. In most specifications fixed costs are higher for employment contractions. The quadratic component is higher during employment contractions compared to expansions for small plants, while this is not true for larger plants.