农村工业化与西部地区农业可持续发展

我国西部地区相对落后，农业生态环境脆弱。要实现西部地区农业可持续发展，必须走农村工业化的道路。促进农村工业化进程，可以采取发展乡镇企业、产业化经营、转移剩余劳动力以及加强农业生态环境保护等措施，实现农村工业化和农业可持续发展的同步进行。     

Policy Issues Raised by For-Profit Spinoffs from Professional Associations: An Evaluation of a Recent AICPA Initiative

This paper provides an evaluation of the spinoff of a for-profit company from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), a nonprofit professional association. The evaluation is based on a review of the literature on public policy issues surrounding organizational conversions from nonprofit to for-profit legal status. Many criticisms of this for-profit spinoff were voiced by professional leaders and accounting regulators, and we demonstrate that these criticisms are grounded in widely recognized policy principles relating to nonprofit conversions. The public policy issues raised by this study have implications for the governance of professional associations in all disciplines.     

农村经济的“第二个飞跃”与农用土地制度改革

土地制度的安排与改革决定着农村经济发展的前程。我国农业的改革和发展,要有两个飞跃:第一个是实行以家庭联产承包经营为主的责任制;第二个是发展适度的规模经营,发展合作经济。现行土地制度制约着第二个飞跃的实现,需要调整和完善。土地私有化不是我国土地制度改革的方向。土地制度改革在于适应现代农业建设的需要,构建农地财产权新的框架,以利于农业产业化经营,发展多种形式的适度规模经营。     

浅论我国农村环境的法律体系建设

本文分析了我国农村环境法律体系在立法、执法等方面存在的问题,据此提出了健全和完善农村环保法制的一些设想。     

农村劳动力转移模型:基于中国制度背景的构造

本文在对经典的农村劳动力流动模型进行理论梳理的基础上,引入中国的制度变量,试图构建适合中国制度背景的农村劳动力转移模型,同时,运用经验事实对其作进一步的实证检验,并分析了模型的政策含义。     

论国有企业治理文化及其治理结构效应

企业治理文化是企业文化的有机组成部分,不同的治理文化会对企业治理结构产生不同的影响。本文在分析企业治理文化及其影响因素的基础上,着重探讨了国有企业治理文化及其治理结构效应,说明了加强国有企业治理结构建设,必须高度重视国有企业治理文化建设。     

试论农村会计准则的制定

为了使农村会计也像企业会计一样尽快走上正轨,我国理论界和实务界,以及各地区的各级相关部门,都做出了各种各样的改革和尝试,对于规范农村会计核算作用明显。本文针对我国制定农村会计准则的相关问题进行了研究。分别从制定农村会计准则的必要性,农村会计准则应具备的特点、农村会计目标和准则制定的关系等问题进行了分析,并指出了制定农村会计准则应注意的几个问题。     

"非典"与流动人口管理模式改革路径的选择

从人口迁移规律入手,分析了"非典"流行期间,北京流动人口管理中存在的种种问题,认为这是执行流动人口和户籍人口"分立并行"管理体制的结果;提出了以"居住地人口管理"模式取代"户籍属地管理"模式的改革设想.     

企业契约形式、财权安排与财务治理演进

本文认为,企业契约形式与财权安排及财务治理具有非常密切的内在联系。对我国不同时期企业契约形式的考察,发现财权安排具有内在逻辑,企业财务治理在不同历史时期具有不同的演进特征。     

Trade intensity,country size and corruption

Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed. We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples less subject to selection bias. Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002 We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance, and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.