The NDC Model： A Way to Resolve Moral Hazard in China＇s Social Security System

Since the mid-1990s, China has adopted a partially funded pension scheme in building its social security system. However, after nearly 10 years of operations, people found that the serious moral hazard problem of contribution defaults and loss of control concerning pension payment stemmed from this partially funded pension scheme. This institutional arrangement has also resulted in the so-called “adverse selection in non-market institutions”,which in turn is capable of destroying the current system. This article argues for the introduction of the Notional Defined Contribution (NDC)scheme, because it can solve the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection. Moreover,it can solve the problem of a lack of institutional conditions for the entry of the social security fund into the stock market. It is important to note that the NDC scheme fully conforms to the initial intention of the policy-makers who designed the partially funded pension scheme in mid-1990s.