FDI税收激励的两难选择

本文从博弈论视角分析实施税收激励政策吸引FDI的内在机理,并以亚洲其他国家的税收激励实践为鉴,探析当周边国家实行税收激励时,我国面临两难时的谨慎选择。     

Decision Making Costs and Problem Solving Performance

We report the results from an experimental study of how problem solving behavior is affected by financial rewards. We formulate three alternative hypotheses: costly rationality, extrinsic/intrinsic trade-off, and distraction effects. Subjects play a computerized version of the Tower-of-Hanoi game and report their beliefs about the optimal solution through a quadratic scoring rule. Subjects participate in one of two treatments: a high penalty and a low penalty. We find that eliciting beliefs, in addition to observing playing behavior, reveals useful information about subjects' cognitive behavior. We reject our hypothesis that the increase in the extrinsic penalty affects the intrinsic valuation in such a way as to decrease the amount of effort applied.     

我国知识型员工特点及激励对策

随着经济的发展、科技的进步,我国的知识型员工对于企业来说越来越重要。与普通员工相比,知识型员工具有素质高、专业能力和自主性强、富有创造性、重视自我价值的实现、流动性大、能为企业创造价值等特点。由于我国正处于社会经济发展的转型期,部分企业并不了解如何激励知识型员工,导致我国企业创新能力不高,管理效率低下,最终和外资企业竞争失败,人才流失严重。要充分激励知识型员工的积极性,企业应充分授权,建设人性化的企业文化和学习型组织,建立公平、合理的薪酬制度,以提高企业管理效率,在激烈的市场竞争中取得胜利。     

An Analysis of Tax Incentives to Attract FDI in Bangladesh： An Empirical Study

The purpose of the study is to understand whether it is still viable to use tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment （FDI） considering their effectiveness and costs to the country, and if not, what should be the alternative, effective, and viable means of promoting the vital FDI inflow. The study investigated various incentives provided by BOI, and other relevant sources available as secondary sources. However, the multinational enterprises （MNEs） are not attracting for investment in Bangladesh always with tax incentives and there are alternative means of attracting FDI such as direct financial grants, subsidies loan guarantees, etc. This paper focuses on tax incentives and the debate against the effectiveness and efficiency in attracting FDI.     

Financial crises: reducing pro-cyclicality

The swing in favour of markets weakened regulation, created incentives for excessive risk-taking, and reduced transparency and diversity. As a result, financial markets became more pro-cyclical. The right combination of regulation and markets is required to reverse this. Principle-based reform should aim to change behaviour rather than forbid activity. Central Bank accommodation has been blamed for the crisis, but excessive leverage due to lax regulation was of a much greater magnitude than any monetary imbalance. Capital's mobility and arbitrage in response to regulation, implies changes must be adopted globally. A diversity of voice and power is essential to enable implementation of the core set of proposals that can make financial markets more robust.     

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DECENTRALIZED PLANNING PROCEDURES

Abstract. The paper surveys the theory of decentralized planning procedures, dealing with price-guided, quantity-guided and mixed procedures. Informational and incentive properties of the various procedures are dealt with, as is the problem of public goods. The practice of planning in the USSR, Hungary and India is also discussed.     

The supply of and demand for accounting information

The article analyzes the use of accounting information in Russia. We assess reporting behaviour in the lending process for a sample of Russian companies in the years 1999–2004 and postulate that Russian companies manage their earnings in order to avoid showing losses when applying for bank financing. Once a credit has been granted, companies are predicted to manage earnings because of the bank's monitoring activities. By means of univariate and multivariate analysis we are able to attribute the discontinuity around a zero target in the earnings distribution with firms’ response to the banks’ assessment of accounting performance. This implies that financing considerations affect the reporting incentives of Russian companies.     

The Research about Earnings Management Incentives of Listed Companies in China

This paper overviews earnings management incentive of listed companies and finds the incentives of cost in transactions with stockholders, a comparative performance advantage and a rational response to that market behavior which is anticipated. This paper tells us that even if there were no agency problems, earnings management should exist all the time.     

The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk

Recent corporate events have brought a heightened public awareness to corporate governance issues. Much work has been accomplished to date, but it is clear that much more remains to be done. This paper provides a review of empirical research in four relevant areas of corporate governance. Specifically, the paper provides an overview of (a) the role that outside directors play in monitoring managers, (b) the emerging literature on the impact of board diversity, (c) the existence of and incentives for corporate executives to manage firm earnings, and (d) managerial incentives to bear risk.     

The effect of stock-based incentives and governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure of intangibles

The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of stock-based incentives in encouraging more voluntary disclosures about firm-specific intangibles. I also examine whether corporate governance, previously found to be related to voluntary disclosures, is a complement to or substitute for stock-based incentives. Using content analysis of annual reports of a sample of high-tech firms, I find that stock-based incentives are positively associated with firms' voluntary disclosures about intangibles. With regard to the effect of governance mechanisms, I find that corporate governance does not have a relationship with disclosures when stock-based incentives are low. On the other hand, better governance will strengthen the positive effect of stock-based incentives on disclosures, suggesting that governance and incentives mechanisms are complements instead of substitutes. The results also show that this complementary effect primarily results from the internal monitoring provided by the board of directors.