排序方式: 共有13条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
11.
Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
We investigate the effects of shareholder governance mechanismson bondholders and document two new findings. First, the impactof shareholder control (proxied by large institutional blockholders)on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholdercontrol is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firmis exposed to (protected from) takeovers. In the presence ofshareholder control, the difference in bond yields due to differencesin takeover vulnerability can be as high as 66 basis points.Second, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associatedwith strong shareholder governance. Therefore, without bondcovenants, shareholder governance, and bondholder interestsdiverge. 相似文献
12.
Summary For a linear modelY =ϑ + Z,ϑ ∈V,V ⊂ ℝ
n
a linear space, the following theorem is proved under simple conditions on the subspaceV: The projection onV (i.e. the least squares estimate forϑ) is a sufficient statistic iffZ is normally distributed. Further, this result is extended to the case of a multivariate linear model. 相似文献
13.
Abstract . In the context of a two-sector overlapping-generations model it is demonstrated that a steady-state transfer paradox may arise under commodity trade with stability and without distortions or bystanders. The existence of the paradox is due to the effect of the transfer on world capital accumulation, which is shown to always (i.e., for any ranking of factor intensities and savings rates) improve the donor's terms of trade. Transfers may also improve steady-state welfare for both donor and recipient and produce paradoxical welfare results along the transition path. 相似文献