Game-theoretic properties of Final-Offer Arbitration

Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA) is a dispute settlement procedure in which an arbitrator chooses one side's final position as the resolution. Game-theoretic models of FOA in two-sided interest disputes are reviewed, especially models of the disputants' final offer choices under uncertainty about the arbitrator's preferences. The extent to which the Brams-Merrill Theorem (1986) reveals optimal strategic behavior under FOA, and the implications for efficiency and equity, are assessed. Analysis of a model not satisfying the hypotheses of the Theorem suggests that, for some arbitrators, FOA can have an undesirable tendency. Another game model is used to address the question of how disputants' differential risk-aversion is reflected in their strategic behavior, and in the fairness of FOA outcomes. This calculation clarifies some apparently contradictory empirical evidence about FOA.     

ALIGNMENT EXPOSED: HOW CEOS ARE PAID, AND WHAT THEIR SHAREHOLDERS GET FOR IT

This article begins by arguing that, for many companies, there is a significant "disconnect" between how managers are paid and what is actually achieved for shareholders. This paper answers two questions of prime importance to investors: Is there a way to know beforehand whether managers' incentives are well aligned with those of its shareholders? And does such alignment actually make a difference in the returns one is likely to see?
In answering the first question, the author argues that cash bonuses and performance-based equity grants (i.e., grants based on managers' meeting accounting-based operating targets) are likely to provide stronger, more cost-effective incentives than grants of stock or options because the former are generally based on measures over which managers have significantly more control than the stock price. Using this insight, the author develops a method for evaluating compensation structures based on the variability of compensation, the number and type of compensation metrics purportedly driving that variability (including the award of performance shares or options), the stability of those metrics over time, and the apparent level of discretion in the use of those metrics to either fund or distribute bonuses (including equity). All these elements are disclosed to varying degrees in the proxy statements or annual reports of companies.
Using his compensation scores for 140 companies and their return history over the last eight years, the author concludes that "high alignment" companies outperform their "low alignment" peers by more than 5% per year in total shareholder returns. Furthermore, increases in alignment scores by individual companies over time tend to lead to higher total shareholder returns, and degradation of scores lead to lower returns. In short, observable improvements in compensation structure appear to pay off in the form of significant abnormal returns.     

CREATING VALUE WITH MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

This report addresses two key questions for today's top executives: Do acquisitions create value for acquirers? And under what circumstances have acquisitions created the most value for acquiring shareholders?
The authors' analysis of over 1,500 completed deals by non-financial companies in the United States over the past 12 years shows that, at announcement, acquirers' shareholders suffer small losses, on average, in the short term around the initial deal announcement. Over longer intervals, such as one or two years following the announcement of the transaction, acquirers tend to slightly outperform industry peers.
The average or median market response hides tremendous variability in how the market has reacted to individual deals, however. This article provides evidence that the "right" M&A transaction can create substantial value for acquirers. One-quarter of the transactions lead to market-adjusted gains in excess of 5% for the acquirer and oneeighth of the transactions lead to gains in excess of 10% in the short term. However, some deals have also destroyed substantial shareholder value.
Financing structure is a key driver of the stock market reaction. Stock-financed transactions, on average, have a negative stock market reaction, while cash-financed transactions have benefited acquirers in both the short term as well as the long term.
Acquisitions of private companies or assets and units of public companies have consistently generated higher returns for acquirers than purchases of public companies.
Moreover, EPS dilution is not a major driver of how the stock market reacts to a deal. Although "accretive" deals perform slightly better than "dilutive" ones in the short and long run, the difference is small and not statistically significant. Over the long run, acquiring shareholders have benefited the most from deals within the same industry and that avoid targets with relatively optimistic earnings growth projections.     

When and how should infant industries be protected?

This paper develops and analyzes a welfare maximizing model of infant industry protection. The domestic infant industry is competitive and experiences dynamic learning effects that are external to firms. The competitive foreign industry is mature and produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for the domestic good. A government planner can protect the infant industry using domestic production subsidies, tariffs, or quotas in order to maximize domestic welfare over time. As protection is not always optimal (although the domestic industry experiences a learning externality), the paper shows how the decision to protect the industry should depend on the industry's learning potential, the shape of the learning curve, and the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.Assuming some reasonable restrictions on the flexibility over time of the policy instruments, the paper subsequently compares the effectiveness of the different instruments. Given such restrictions, the paper shows that quotas induce higher welfare levels than tariffs. In some cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any amount of government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota (including the case of a voluntary export restraint, where no revenue is collected). In similar cases, the quota may even be preferred to a domestic production subsidy.     

SELECTION BIAS CORRECTIONS BASED ON THE MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL: MONTE CARLO COMPARISONS

Abstract.  This survey presents the set of methods available in the literature on selection bias correction, when selection is specified as a multinomial logit model. It contrasts the underlying assumptions made by the different methods and shows results from a set of Monte Carlo experiments. We find that, in many cases, the approach initiated by Dubin and MacFadden (1984) as well as the semi-parametric alternative recently proposed by Dahl (2002) are to be preferred to the most commonly used Lee (1983) method. We also find that a restriction imposed in the original Dubin and MacFadden paper can be waived to achieve more robust estimators. Monte Carlo experiments also show that selection bias correction based on the multinomial logit model can provide fairly good correction for the outcome equation, even when the IIA hypothesis is violated.     

Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?

Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In the standard model of division of commodities, we investigate how much information about indifference surfaces is needed to construct social ordering functions satisfying the weak Pareto principle and anonymity. We show that local information such as marginal rates of substitution or the shapes “within the Edgeworth box” is not enough, and knowledge of substantially non-local information is necessary.     

Combining biodiversity modeling with political and economic development scenarios for 25 EU countries

In the EURURALIS project, a chain of models was used to predict the changes in sustainable development indicators for European human well-being, ecology and economy issues, for four alternative scenarios of the future socio-economic development. This paper describes the biodiversity analysis of the project. Models based on general relationships between environmental factors and biodiversity loss were combined with socio-economic, land-use and environmental models to derive data that were integrated into an interactive tool for policy makers. The biodiversity analysis takes into account the effects of land-use change, climate change, fragmentation by major roads, area of unfragmented patches, nitrogen deposition, forestry and disturbance. Results show that biodiversity is projected to decrease between now and 2030 in most countries for all scenarios, indicating that it is unlikely that the EU will be able to fulfill its commitment to stop biodiversity loss by 2010. This is mainly due to urbanization and increase in stress factors, and outweighs the area increase of nature arising from land abandonment. Merits, limitations and uncertainties of this approach to biodiversity assessment are discussed.     

Service Quality,Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector

This paper presents a simple model which illustrates the possible policy- and welfare-implications of endogenous product selection in the postal sector. The cost of a unit of mail depends on its "quality" (e.g., speed of delivery) and on the type and location of the addressee (firms, urban households, and rural households). Senders have inelastic demands and differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Addressees are passive but their utility may affect social welfare. Two operators play a two-stage game, first choosing qualities and then prices. We first show that the equilibrium with two private (profit maximizing) operators results in an inefficient provision of quality. Then, we consider the mixed (Nash) equilibrium with one private and one (welfare maximizing) public operator. If the budget constraint of the public firm is not binding, this equilibrium is shown to be first-best efficient even if social welfare accounts for the utility of addressees. If the budget constraint is binding, the mixed equilibrium is not efficient but yields a higher level of welfare than the private equilibrium. Finally, we study the impact of minimum quality standards within our setting.     

Adam Smith and the ethics of contemporary capitalism

This paper presents a theoretical elaboration of the ethical framework of classical capitalism as formulated by Adam Smith in reaction to the dominant mercantilism of his day. It is seen that Smith's project was profoundly ethical and designed to emancipate the consumer from a producer and state dominated economy. Over time, however, the various dysfunctions of a capitalist economy — e.g., concentration of wealth, market power — became manifest and the utilitarian ethical basis of the system eroded. Contemporary capitalism, dominated as it is by large corporations, entrenched political interests and persistent social pathologies, bears little resemblance to the system which Smith envisioned would serve the common man. Most critiques of capitalism are launched from a Marxian-based perspective. We find, however, that by illustrating the wide gap between the reality of contemporary capitalism and the model of amoral political economy developed by Smith, the father of capitalism proves to be the most trenchant critic of the current order.G. R. Bassiry is currently professor of Management and international business at California State University, San Bernardino, California. Formerly he served as Vice President and Acting President of Farabi University. His most recent articles on business ethics include Ethics, Education, and Corporate Leadership,Journal of Business Ethics and Business Ethics and the United Nations: A Code of Conduct,Sam Advanced Management Journal. He has also published numerous journal articles on international business, corporate strategy and corporate leadership, and is the author ofPower vs. Profit by Arno Press of New York Times.Marc Jones is a management lecturer at the University of Otago, New Zealand. His research interests include multinational corporations and economic development. He has worked as a financial analyst for Electronic Data Systems Corporation and as a management consultant for Peat Marwick Main & Company.