THE EMERGENCE OF AN OFFSHORE ECONOMY

There has been growing interest over the past few years in the changing political structure of the world. Predictions range from the withering away of the state to the advent of a global state. This article proposes an alternative scenario: that the state system is not disappearing, but is in the process of creating secondary, relatively unregulated juridical spaces in which economic activities can develop more or less without hindrance. This secondary space, known as `offshore', already dominates international finance and shipping, and plays a significant role in international trade and telecommunications. Offshore is a barrier to the extension of those social provisions that were traditionally provided by states. This paper offers an insight into the ways by which increasing integration of the global market is supported and facilitated by the state system.     

A Double Moral Hazard Model of Organization Design

We develop a theory of organization design in which the firm's structure is chosen by trading off ex post efficiency in the implementation of projects against ex ante efficiency in the selection of projects. Using our framework, we derive a novel set of empirical predictions regarding differences between firms with a functional structure and firms with a divisional structure. We examine how the overall profitability of the two structures is affected by various factors like size, complexity, and asymmetry in the importance of tasks and also explore the desirability of adopting a narrow business strategy.     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in the United States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision. We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter 7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is that a financially distressed firm chooses its action in order to minimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- and under-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates a workout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter 11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i) in default, total firm value and equity value increase upon the announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcement of Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt are more likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firms that renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firms entering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industries than for firms in growth industries.     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in theUnited States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision.We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganizationunder Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is thata financially distressed firm chooses its action in order tominimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- andunder-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates aworkout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i)in default, total firm value and equity value increase uponthe announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcementof Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt aremore likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firmsthat renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firmsentering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industriesthan for firms in growth industries.     

The Informational Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market: An Intraday Analysis

Using a unique dataset based on daily and hourly high-yieldbond transaction prices, we find the informational efficiencyof corporate bond prices is similar to that of the underlyingstocks. We find that stocks do not lead bonds in reflectingfirm-specific information. We further examine price behavioraround earnings news and find that information is quickly incorporatedinto both bond and stock prices, even at short return horizons.Finally, we find that measures of market quality are no poorerfor the bonds in our sample than for the underlying stocks.     

Can platform competition support market segmentation? Network externalities versus matching efficiency in equity crowdfunding markets

We investigate whether, in spite of the existence of cross‐market network externalities, platform competition can lead to segmentation of the two sides of the market served by the platforms. We address this question in the context of competition between two equity crowdfunding platforms that connect startups looking for capital with prospective investors. Given the heterogeneity in the populations of startups and investors in terms of the riskiness of the former population and the degree of risk aversion of the latter population, we investigate whether there exists an equilibrium where the two populations are segmented to ensure an improved match between them. We find that the segmenting equilibrium can arise only when compatibility in terms of their risk profiles is of high importance to both populations, and compatibility is significantly more important than the size of the network externality considered by startups. Segmentation is likely to improve the welfare of both populations when the basic benefit from any kind of match is relatively high.     

What Do FAS 157 “Fair Values” Really Measure: Value Or Risk?

FAS 157, the U.S. accounting standard that prescribes how fair values of assets and liabilities are to be measured when other U.S. GAAP standards require fair valuation, stipulates that fair values be measured as the exit values of assets and liabilities—the proceeds for assets hypothetically sold on the date of the financial report, and, correspondingly, the amount required to settle liabilities on the date of the financial report. This conceptual article argues that exit values do not reflect the value of the net assets of the firm to shareholders, which is best reflected by discounted cash flows to maturity. Moreover, exit values—biasing fair values downward when markets are illiquid—have a pernicious, systemic risk effect; specifically, they give rise to write‐downs that in turn cause contagion: prices of equities and other financial instruments of peers react negatively, leading to further write‐downs by those peers. This may have aggravated the recent financial crisis. However, while exit values are not proper measures of value to shareholders, they are useful measures of downside risk when prospects turn sour for a firm. Thus, both exit values and discounted cash flows should be presented in financial statements.     

Sabotage in the financial system: Lessons from Veblen

The global financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 has generated a wide-ranging discussion about the causes of the meltdown and the role of banking and bankers in today's economy. However, the ongoing debate rarely addresses questions of business tactics in the financial industry. Indeed, while ‘incentives,’ ‘vested interests,’ power, and—increasingly—social utility are often factored into analyses of financial regulation, the strategies and tactics of financial institutions are rarely discussed in a systematic way in academic and policy debate. Nonetheless, we believe that these two elements are key to understanding the financial system, not as a mere sector of the wider economy but as a business enterprise driven by its own logic and shaped by a variety of business tactics of its key agents. In our vision of finance as business, we draw on the concept of industrial sabotage as a business tactic (originally developed by Thorstein Veblen) to explore the roots of the financial sector's contemporary architecture. Our key premise is that the central motive driving the process often described as ‘financialization’ or financial innovation is the sabotage instinct of finance operating as business. Whereas Veblen originally understood sabotage as “conscientious withdrawal of efficiency,” today, we argue, the workings of the banking and financial sector augment the very notion of efficiency by relying on concepts, techniques, and institutions of financial innovation that are shrouded in complexity. In this article, we explore conceptual, institutional, and selected policy dimensions of this phenomenon.     

Trade and information in the corporate bond market

This paper examines the impact of shifting liquidity and institutional trading in the corporate bond market on inferences regarding informational efficiency. We find that when institutional trade dominance and other bond trading features are accounted for, stock leads evidenced in earlier studies surprisingly disappear. Short windows after firm-specific news releases are examined, and bond trading advantages are shown to be pronounced particularly when equity market liquidity is low (during after-market hours). Cross-sectionally, the effect of credit risk and other firm/bond level characteristics are determined. Finally, ‘top bonds’ are identified, and their common ex ante identifiable characteristics are determined.     

Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure

We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows.